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Abstract 
This thesis is an investigation into several proposed ways of increasing the supply 
of organs for transplantation purposes. It starts from a consideration of two sorts of 
donors which are already in use: humans declared dead according to brain-based 
criteria and nonhuman animals. 
In the first chapter I attempt to provide a theoretical underpinning for the brainstem 
criterion of brain death. I also criticise certain rival theories. 
In the second chapter I consider what constraints govern what we may do to the 
newly dead body - the fact that someone is dead does not mean we may treat their 
corpse as we please. I consider Professor John Harris' strong `opting out' policy, 
and argue against it. I briefly discuss other alternatives to the UK's present `opting 
in' system - `presumed consent' and `required request'. And I consider the 
problems generated by the proposed use as donors of another category of human 
cadaver - people declared dead according to cardiorespiratory criteria. 
The third chapter is an investigation into xenotransplantation - the use of organs 
from nonhuman animals. I argue that using animals `just because' they are animals 
is ethically indefensible. Instead I attempt to justify the killing of (some) animals as 
organ donors on the grounds that their interest in continued life is weaker than that 
of a human. But this has some counterintuitive implications concerning arational 
members of our species. 
In the final chapter I discuss the possible use of the `worst off' category of arational 
humans - the permanently and irreversibly unconscious. I argue that we have 
moral obligations to these people which do not stem only from a consideration of 
their interest in life. However, I think that we may use such people as donors under 
specialised conditions: if we are as certain as we can be that they are irreversibly 
unconscious, if their family (and ideally the donor too) have requested it, and so 
long as it can be done without distress to the public. Under no other circumstances 
do I think humans ought to be killed for organs. 
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Introduction 
Does the plight of those with organ failure 
justify the implementation of stronger 
policies of organ procurement? 
In writing this piece I implicitly assume that it is morally permissible, under some 
circumstances, for redistribution of organs to take place between some kinds of 
donors and those in need of organs, for the benefit of the latter. The fact that 
transplantation of organs takes place so frequently in medical centres around the 
world suggests that the medical community also, in general, thinks of organ 
transplantation as being permissible under certain circumstances. Therefore I offer 
no arguments to support the practice considered as a whole. 
Increasing the number of organs available would be enormously beneficial to the 
6107 patients on the waiting list for kidneys, 160 for livers, 113 for hearts, 74 for 
heart and lung, 243 for lungs, 116 for combined kidney and pancreas and 29 for 
pancreas-only (UK figures at December 31st 20011,2). Indeed as there are no 
current long term treatments for severe liver and heart failure, an organ transplant 
offers the only chance of survival in the medium to long term for patients awaiting 
these organs. 
If we are to save or improve the lives of people with end stage organ disease it is 
necessary to increase the number of organs available for transplant. In February 
2001 the British Health Secretary, Alan Milburn, promised to spend three million 
pounds increasing the number of organ donors. He also pledged to increase the 
kidney transplant rate by 100%. This was to be done by raising the public 
awareness of the cadaveric donor scheme by the inclusion of donor card application 
with credit cards etc. Yet it seems unlikely that this strategy will suffice: the number 
of people entering waiting lists for organs increases year on year whereas the 
incidence of people suffering the sort of injuries and illnesses that render them 
suitable (physically) to be considered as donors is showing a slight downturn, 
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although numbers have remained static for the last two years. There were 876 
cadaveric donors in the UK in 1992 and over 800 annually for the next five years. 
However donor number fell to 757 per annum in 1998 and have remained below 
800 for every year since then. In 2001, the last year for which data is currently 
available, there were 777 donors. By contrast there were 5124 patients on the 
general waiting list (for all organ types) in 1992 while in 2001 there were 6842.3 
Disclaimers 
It is without doubt the case that organ transplants save lives and, unfortunately, it is 
also the case that many people currently die who could be saved by a transplant. In 
this piece of writing I employ the simplifying assumption of referring to all 
transplants as being `lifesaving'. In fact this is not the case. Renal transplants, for 
example, are better described as improving patients' quality of life. Although a renal 
transplant will increase the probable life expectancy of a recipient compared to 
remaining on renal replacement therapy (dialysis), neither form of treatment for 
renal failure is likely to provide a normal lifespan. Nor can a renal transplant be said 
to be the only way to save a patient from immediate death: dialysis, combined with 
a regimen of blood pressure control, fluid management, and medications to 
maintain haemoglobin levels and control calcium loss can extend, often by many 
years, the life of a patient whose kidneys have failed. As a rough guide, it is 
estimated at the transplant centre in which I work that a patient with a functioning 
kidney graft has an 80% chance of surviving for 10 years. A patient on dialysis has 
a 20% chance of surviving for that period of time. 
Hearts, lungs and livers are more clear cut cases of lifesaving transplants: in most 
cases patients reaching `end stage' disease of these organs will die within a period 
of few days to a few months without a transplant (the times vary according to the 
organ failing and to the adequacy of replacement therapies). However, for 
simplicity, I will refer to the practice of transplantation as being `lifesaving' 
throughout this piece of writing. This will not affect the arguments which follow. 
Throughout this work I also follow customary medical usage in referring to the 
creatures used as organ sources as donors, without employing scare quotes. The 
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reader ought not to take this to mean that I believe nonhuman animals or dead or 
irreversibly unconscious humans who have not previously expressed an opinion to 
be capable of giving informed consent to be so used (even if they were willing). 
There seem few alternatives to the term `donor': `giver' or `benefactor' both carry the 
same air of voluntariness as `donor' and `source' sounds, to my ear, too coldly 
clinical -I worry that if we start to think of donors as being `sources of organs' we 
are in danger of ceasing to see them as creatures with interests and moral status. I 
apologise in advance if my use of the term `donor' grates with the reader - it seems 
to me to irritate less than the alternatives. 
In this thesis I rely on several assumptions that are not argued for. In chapter two I 
as good as assume that `the right' has primacy over `the good' -I do not present a 
full case for the claim. In chapter three I present a less than full case for my belief 
that it is morally permissible to use nonhuman animals for medical purposes. This 
is despite my also not fully justified belief that relevantly similar animal and human 
interests should be treated equally -I present a `presumption in favour of equal 
consideration'. And finally, I assume in both chapters three and four that at least 
one of the things that is objectionable about death is that it deprives people of future 
satisfactions and cuts short plans and projects. Readers should not infer that I think 
that this is the only thing that is objectionable about death. 
What sort of donors do I consider? 
The fact that organs are sometimes given to those whose own organs are failing 
raises the question of what doctors should be entitled to do in order to procure 
organs for their patients. There are many creatures in the world, both human and 
otherwise, from whom it would be physically possible to remove organs for the 
benefit of others (usually, but not exclusively humans). In the case of kidneys, `split 
livers', single lungs and corneas this need not involve the death of the donor. 
However a typical cadaveric donor may provide two kidneys, a liver, a heart or heart 
valves (which may be given to more than one person), a pancreas, two corneas, 
skin (for burns patients) and bone marrow (for leukaemia sufferers). It is clear that 
many more people may be helped by a dead donor than by one whose life we wish 
to preserve. 
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The discussion of possible donors which I offer in this piece of writing may be 
criticised for considering only certain categories of potential donors from among all 
those who have physically suitable organs. I do not, for instance, consider the 
possibility of forcibly removing one of a paired organ from convicted murderers; a 
position which a more cunning philosopher than I could perhaps argue for (along 
the lines of `he who maliciously takes a life must give back something to save a 
life'). I also do not consider John Harris' `Survival Lottery' idea: under which a 
healthy person could be killed if two or more people could thus be saved by his 
organs. 4 I limit the possible donor categories as I do because I wish this piece to be 
of interest not just as a work of academic philosophy but in practical terms to those 
who make the policies which govern organ procurement. For this reason I take as 
my starting points in chapters one and three two groups of donors which are already 
used: brain dead cadavers and nonhuman animals. (The latter are not presently 
used as whole-organ donors to humans, however pigs are used as donors of heart 
valves and pancreatic islet cells to humans, many species of mammal are used in 
preclinical trials and some (again pigs alone, to the best of my knowledge) are being 
genetically modified in preparation for use in humans. ) I proceed from a 
consideration of these groups whom, I think, it is safe to assume are currently 
considered (rightly or wrongly) to be relatively ethically uncontroversial to other 
groups of possible donors whom I believe to be relevantly similar. 
Theoretical underpinnings 
For the same practical reasons I strongly desire that my theory achieves reflective 
equilibrium - that it accords as nearly as possible with common sense. For all 
organ donors but especially for the most emotive category, dead human beings, it 
has always been important for those who excise organs to do so in a manner which 
is open to public scrutiny and defendable against criticism. In the light of the recent 
`organ retention' scandals at British hospitals (which, although the organs were not 
taken for transplant nonetheless had a significant negative impact on public 
perceptions of the work of transplant teams) it is even more important. Thus my 
proposals are limited to those that could, I hope, one day become practice. That is 
to say, I generally limit myself to considering ideas which could be made acceptable 
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to the public. 
I must note finally, before beginning, that I fail to set out (or indeed to have) a 
formed moral theory which governs my thinking in this piece. This is partially due to 
word-limit constraints: this essay is supposed to be an exercise in applied ethics 
and not in normative ethics. Suffice it to say I am not a Contractualist, a 
Deontologist or a Utilitarian, although I recognise that there are circumstances 
under which the appeal to a social contract, to `the right' and to consequences all 
carry weight. 
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Notes and references 
1. http: //www. uktransplant. org. uk/statistics/general_statistics/ 
wa i ti n g_I i st_2000_2001. htm 
2. The pancreas-only figures shown here are far from being a true 
reflection of the number of diabetics who could, in fact, be made insulin- 
independent with a transplant. Rather, the people on the waiting list 
tend to be those diabetics who are already known to transplant teams 
having received a previous renal transplant. (Renal failure is one of the 
complications of uncontrolled diabetes. ) The figures are also skewed by 
the fact that pancreas transplantation is in its infancy compared to that of 
other organs. 
3. http: //www. uktranspiant. org. uk/statistics/general_statistics/ 
cadaveric_donors_and_transplants_1992_2001. htm 
4. It should be noted that Harris himself describes the lottery idea as a 
`hypothesis' and not as a serious proposal for organ donation. See 
Harris (1995), p222. 
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Chapter One 
The determination of death: concepts and 
criteria 
Under what circumstances is it ethically defensible to remove organs from human 
beings and other animals for transplantation purposes? Since the first renal 
transplants of the 1950s this question has been hotly debated by ethicists, lawyers, 
public policy makers and the medical profession. However, at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, the range of possible answers has expanded, which has made 
it imperative that we formulate our answers to these questions carefully. 
In the first section of this work I intend to concentrate on the seemingly most 
plausible and least ethically problematic answer: that we can remove transplantable 
organs from human beings if they are dead. This does not mean that I believe 
organ removal to be ethically permissible `if and only if' something is dead; 
throughout this work I intend to discuss whether death is necessary, sufficient, both 
or neither for the ethical excision of organs. In fact I do not believe that death is 
either necessary or sufficient for the ethical removal of organs for transplantation. 
In chapter two I attempt a philosophical underpinning for the claim that, even after a 
being has been declared dead, there are other ethical issues to consider before 
removing organs; in chapter three I discuss the killing of non human animals for 
their organs and in the fourth chapter I shall argue that donation from a living, 
irreversibly unconscious, human donor, under certain specialised circumstances, 
may be acceptable. However, if it is ethically permissible to remove organs at all, 
removing them from the dead, on first appearance at least, seems to involve fewer 
ethical problems than removing them from the living. Exploring this category of 
donor first is appropriate as human `brain dead' cadavers have historically been the 
major source of organs for transplant. 
Yet this seemingly relatively unproblematic suggestion in fact ushers in a host of 
questions, the most hotly debated of which runs as follows; "under what 
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circumstances can we declare someone (or something) to be dead? " This question 
and my attempt to answer it will occupy the first chapter of this work. In addition to 
being an interesting metaphysical question it has immense practical importance in 
the field of organ transplantation; if we think it permissible to remove organs for 
transplant from the dead we wish to know when it is along the process of dying that 
a person becomes dead. For the purposes of organ donation we require only a 
criterion of death. In other words we need to know only which clinical features are 
indicative of death and how these can be reliably detected. However in order to 
justify my criteria I must examine the further question of which features (clinical, 
spiritual or otherwise) can be said to be constitutive of death. This question must be 
addressed if my criteria are to have defensible conceptual underpinnings. 
Questions about death 
Death is an extremely slippery concept, about which several different types of 
questions are regularly asked. These may take the form of metaphysical questions 
("what makes it true that a formerly living person has become dead? "), 
epistemological questions ("by what criteria can we know that someone has 
become dead? ") and clinical questions about testing ("what tests are appropriate for 
determining that someone has died? "). ' Unfortunately, questions of the first sort, 
concerning the analysis of the concept of death, are frequently muddled with 
questions of the second sort (which are, confusingly, often proposed as searches 
for the `definition' of death). It is vitally important to distinguish between these two 
very different questions if I am to clearly delimit the scope of my project. 
The need for a criterion 
At a recent symposium on organ transplantation which I attended, one of the 
speakers, a distinguished liver transplanter, talked of his dismay when, having 
achieved a technically perfect transplant of a liver into a woman dying of acute 
hepatic failure, he discovered that she was, in fact, brainstem dead, and had been 
so at the time of the transplant. Because we wish to avoid mistakes like these, and 
for other moral, legal and social reasons, we wish to know when someone is dead. 
For example, we assume that living people have certain interests (and perhaps 
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rights) that the dead do not, such as interest in not being caused pain. And respect 
for the living takes a radically different form to respect for the dead. In law, certain 
things may be done to a corpse which it is illegal to do to a living person (usually 
because they will cause death or serious injury). Burial and cremation are the most 
common examples but I am more interested in the removal of organs and in 
nontherapeutic medical interventions for the purpose of organ procurement. Both of 
these acts constitute battery if performed on a living person but both may be 
permissible after death, under appropriate circumstances (I will have more to say on 
this in chapter two). Murder charges may be proven or thrown out depending upon 
whether we believe that the accused's act was what caused death. (David Lamb 
cites an interesting case of a trial in the early days of organ transplantation of a man 
accused of killing another man by shooting him in the head. His defence counsel 
claimed that the cause of the victim's death was not in fact the bullet in his brain but 
the later excision of several of his vital organs by transplant surgeons. ) 
From a purely practical perspective there are certain behaviours which are 
appropriate when faced with a living human being which are not when we face a 
dead person. (There is a (probably apocryphal) story about a student nurse 
working in a terminal care ward. One of the patients died and a few minutes later 
the relatives arrived. The ward sister told the trainee to go into the patient's room 
and make her look `natural' before the relatives went in. The student propped the 
patient up in bed, placed her spectacles on her nose and put a newspaper in her 
hand. ) Other practical considerations show the need for a clear elucidation of 
criteria for declaring death: it is widely (although not universally perhaps) agreed 
that we would not wish to give a treatment the administration of which not only 
cannot improve the patient's condition but prolongs an existence meaningless to the 
patient. A desire not to prolong the suffering of relatives and the need for resources 
to be conserved to be spent on the living also affect our choice. It is important also 
that the general public have faith in the medical judgement that death has occurred 
if they are to trust physicians to treat their everyday maladies. And the feelings of 
medical staff must be taken into account. I recently overhead an intensive care 
specialist talking about her revulsion at being forced by a brain-dead patient's family 
to ventilate him until his heart stopped: "he was rotting away" she said. 
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Criterion and definition 
For all these reasons and more, we need some indicator (or indicators) of death 
such that someone is dead if and only if he or she displays this criterion. However, 
as Fred Feldman2 notes, no matter how good a criterion might be for determining 
that death has occurred, it is not to be confused with an analysis of the concept of 
death, of what it means to be dead. A point which I shall discuss in more detail 
below is that a criterion of human death need have no relevance to nonhuman 
biological beings such as racoons, gerbils and large root vegetables. Yet I, at least, 
would still like to think of the concept of death as one that applies universally to all 
biological beings -I do not think that there is one form of death for humans, another 
or several others for the rest of the animal kingdom and still others for plants. 
A criterion of human death does not offer any insights into the nature of death; it 
merely helps us to determine when death has arrived. It is proposed as a practical 
tool - as such it is successful if enough people adopt it. It may be superseded or 
require revision if advances in medical technology bring to light a new or better 
criterion: an obvious example of this is the `heart-lung' definition of human death 
which, for many years was accepted as the only criterion of death until advances in 
resuscitative and intensive care technology meant that people whose hearts had 
stopped could be revived, and that other people appeared to be dead even though 
their hearts and lungs continued to function. A criterion may be useful even if 
counterexamples exist. The analysis of human death (of what it means for humans 
to die) on the other hand "does not purport to be useful. It is not intended as a 
solution to any practical problem. Success for an analysis is measured by the 
extent to which it serves to enlighten us about the nature of death itself'. 3 An 
analysis of death must apply equally to anything that can die, and, if true, is 
necessarily true and true for all time, even if no-one adopts it. 
It is obvious that a further distinction needs to be introduced here. In order to 
formulate a useful criterion of human death, I must examine what an analysis of the 
meaning of death would consist of. In attempting to provide an adequate set of 
epistemological features to determine when death has occurred one is forced to ask 
the further question "what makes it the case that these particular clinical features 
11 
are indicative of death? " And in a world where different sets of clinical features (with 
different underlying concepts) are proposed to mark death's occurrence the need to 
critically examine these concepts becomes urgent. My biological account of death 
is at odds with other broadly `biological' definitions, such as Martyn Evans' `heart- 
lung' definition (1996). However, it is also in opposition to other proposed 
definitions of death. In particular I wish to criticise that collection of `ontological' 
theories which turn on the notion of the "conditions of existence of persons", 4 such 
as that of Michael Green and Daniel Wikler and of Karen Grandstand Gervais. It is 
vitally important for a clear understanding of the problem to be aware that, although 
I disagree quite vigorously with some of the other biological arguments available, 
the differences between my position and theirs are trivial compared to the gulf 
between the set of broadly biological analyses of death, and the ontological or moral 
analyses which I shall be discussing. In other words the difference between myself 
and the other biological-based theorists exists at the criteriological and not the 
conceptual level. 
Thus, although I wish to examine the concepts of death underlying the various 
different proposed criteria for death, I must also examine the nature of the concept 
of human death. I will sketch my analysis of the concept later in this chapter, 
however, I suspect that I will be unable to provide a full analysis without devoting 
the entirety of this work to the problem (and quite possibly, not even then). If my 
argument is the weaker for resting on assumptions that remain partially unexamined 
then so be it. My limited aim in this chapter is to describe and criticise competing 
criteria of death, together with their conceptual underpinnings, before setting out my 
own brief analysis and criteria. Before I begin this task however, I must briefly 
explain why it is that advances in technology have occasioned the need to choose 
between competing analyses of death. 
Death as a process 
Until the twentieth century the conceptual vagueness surrounding the notion of 
death mattered little; diagnosing death was a relatively uncontroversial matter. 
Death, whether in the form of the permanent cessation of cardio-respiratory 
capacity, the death of the brain or some subset thereof, or more esoteric concepts 
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such as the loss of the `breath of life', or `the departure of the soul from the body', 
was an event of fairly brief duration which could be tested for by listening for an 
absence of heart sounds or checking that breathing had ceased. It should be noted 
that, even before the introduction of resuscitative techniques and mechanical 
ventilation, the declaration of death involved what Gervais calls `a decision of 
significance' - "a decision that there is a certain feature (or cluster of features) 
whose permanent absence constitutes the death of that person". 5 Let us consider 
an example. A man suffers a huge myocardial infarction. His heart irreversibly 
ceases to beat. Soon afterwards, he loses consciousness. Because his heart is no 
longer working, oxygenated blood is no longer transported to his brain or other 
organ systems and waste gases are not brought to the lungs for removal. After 
around five minutes the cerebral hemispheres of his brain have been irreparably 
damaged by anoxia - he can never regain consciousness. Some minutes later his 
brainstem also succumbs. Trained medical staff arrive on the scene but decide that 
he has been `down' too long to make resuscitation worthwhile. However, many of 
this man's organs remain viable, his kidneys for example can survive without 
oxygen for up to forty eight hours if quickly excised and correctly preserved. His 
corneas remain perfectly usable for a number of days. Some cells with a low 
oxygen requirement remain viable for weeks after the original cardiac event. His 
hair and nails will continue to grow for weeks if not months. Biological activity is still 
discernible in his body until total putrefaction has taken place. The big question is: 
at what point did death occur? 
We may know all the medical facts pertaining to the process of deterioration in this 
unfortunate man's body. However, we are able to ask the further question "at what 
point in this process of deterioration did the man become dead? " Was it when his 
heart stopped? Was it when he lost consciousness for the last time? When the 
capacity for consciousness was irreversibly lost? Perhaps it was when he lost the 
capacity to regulate his bodily processes? Or was it when his life was deemed to 
be `not salvageable' by the medical staff in charge of his resuscitation? 6 Once the 
fatal process of events had been set in motion, whether by the cessation of the 
heart, or by damage to the brain, the other vital processes soon followed. Under 
these circumstances, when the different proposed features which mark that death 
has come occur close together, it is not necessary to argue about which of the 
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proposed underlying analyses of death are correct. 
However, the development of advanced resuscitative techniques and the availability 
of intensive care necessitated a redefinition as the technological leaps involved 
caused a `splitting' of the notion of death. A heart, once stopped, could be restarted, 
breathing and blood pressure could be maintained artificially, and intensive care 
units started to produce patients who, although permanently unconscious, had 
regained the capacity for spontaneous respiration. To quote Gervais "We have a 
conceptual problem to resolve, then, when it is no longer possible to live with a 
plurality of meanings or an unclarity of meaning attached to a particular concept".? 
Conceptual lack of clarity is tolerable in some situations (for example, it may not 
matter if I live my life believing whales to be fish rather than mammals (so long as I 
do not make my living as a marine biologist)), but in the case of something of such 
immense practical importance as the nature of human death unclarity can no longer 
be tolerated once the splitting up of the process of dying over hours and days forces 
us to question what it is that constitutes death. (Although it is important to note that 
while advances in technology necessitate our re-examining our concept of death 
they do not create the vagueness, they simply reveal the confusion that has always 
been present. ) 
So it is important to examine our analysis of death in order to provide criteria for 
declaring death to have occurred which are both useful and plausible. However, 
this raises the further problem of why the question of the nature of death is a 
philosophical question? Is it not a task more suited to physicians or lawyers to lay 
down the necessary and sufficient characteristics of human death? The question is 
philosophical rather than medical or legal as although physicians may show, for 
example, that a person exhibits an inability to spontaneously control their own 
internal milieu when tested, and although testing positive is a reliable indicator that 
death has occurred, the judgement that such an inability is constitutive of death 
goes beyond medical authority. Whether a patient is to be classed as alive or dead 
rests on our concepts of life and death. As David Lamb states "the concept of death 
cannot be exclusively determined by medical criteria. This is because it is related to 
more general philosophical beliefs concerning the meaning of life and death". 8 
(Even if one disputes this, to claim that the determination of the nature of death is 
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primarily a medical task is to adopt a philosophical position on the matter (albeit a 
possibly incoherent one), namely that it is empirically decidable. ) 
Death as a biological concept 
I must make it clear that the concept of death which I propose to examine is a 
biological concept - that is to say I believe that there is some concept of death as 
the cessation of biological processes which applies to all living beings. According to 
a variety of closely related theories which I shall later loosely group under the 
heading of `higher brain' based positions, the irreversible loss of consciousness or 
of `personal identity' is necessary and sufficient to count as the death of a human 
being. It follows from such definitions, the latter especially, that the death of a 
human being must be a radically different thing to the death of other animals: faced 
with an irreversibly unconscious human being and an irreversibly unconscious dog 
an adherent of one of the above sort of theories must be prepared to hold that, 
whilst the dog lives, the human is dead. I shall argue below that this conclusion is 
absurd and that a biological definition of death is correct - ultimately, however, I 
may be unable to prove that there is not a `personal' concept of death which applies 
to human beings alone. 
Which functions, according to our biological concept of death, are so important that 
their loss leads us to say that the organism as a whole is dead? Becker defines it 
thus: "a human organism is dead when, for whatever reason, the system of those 
reciprocally dependent processes which assimilate oxygen, metabolise food, 
eliminate wastes, and keep the organism in relative homeostasis are arrested in a 
way which the organism itself cannot reverse. It is the confluence of these and only 
these conditions which could possibly define organic death, given the nature of 
human organic function". 9 I think that this definition is not wholly satisfactory - it 
does not meet the `no counterexamples' stipulation mentioned above. For example, 
a being undergoing cryogenic freezing may fulfil all the conditions of Becker's 
definition, and yet still be returned to life after a period of suspended animation. 
Similarly, a sufferer of Guillaime-Barre syndrome may temporarily lose the capacity 
to breathe and be unable to remedy this problem themselves. However such a 
person is likely to remain fully conscious, and, so long as their breathing is taken 
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over by a machine for a short while, should soon return to full spontaneous 
functioning. However, I think that something like Becker's definition must be correct 
- for, working within a biological framework, we must agree that some parts of an 
organism may die without causing the death of the organism as such. Tonsils, 
appendixes, and assorted other organs may be removed such that not a single one 
of the cells which constitute that organ remains functioning, without this causing any 
(lasting) harm to the organism considered as a whole (indeed the removal of an 
aberrant appendix is positively beneficial as leaving it in situ may cost the organism 
its life). It is also the case that organisms are able to survive the loss of functions 
necessary for their continued existence as long as these functions are replaced by 
artefacts; some banal examples being iron lungs and renal dialysis. 
Control systems 
We need here to enter the realms of `general systems theory', in order to introduce 
the concept of a `critical system', the death of which is equivalent to the death of the 
organism `as a whole'. Organisms are examples of `open systems'. An open 
system may be defined as a nonstatic system which exchanges both matter and 
energy with the environment but tends towards a steady state by keeping entropy to 
a minimum ('entropy' may be defined as a measure of disorganisation). In other 
words, an open system, such as a living thing, maintains itself in a quasi-steady 
state by means of the continual import and export of material to and from the 
environment. 
Ludwig Von Bertalanffy puts it this way: 
The character of the organism as a system in a steady (or rather 
quasi-steady) state is one of its primary criteria. In a general way, 
the fundamental phenomena of life can be considered as 
consequences of this fact. Considering the organism over a 
shorter span of time, it appears as a configuration maintained in a 
steady state by the exchange of components... Superimposed on 
the steady state are smaller process waves of basically two kinds. 
First there are periodic processes originating in the system itself 
and hence autonomic (eg automatic movements of the organs of 
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respiration, circulation, and digestion; automatic-rhythmic electrical 
activities of nerve-centres and the brain supposedly resulting from 
rhythmic chemical discharges; automatic movements of the 
organism as a whole). Secondly, the organism reacts to temporary 
changes in environment, to `stimuli', with reversible fluctuations of 
its steady state. This is the group of processes caused by 
changes of external conditions and hence heteronomic subsumed 
in physiology of excitation. They can be considered as temporary 
disturbances of the steady state from which the organism returns 
to `equilibrium', to the equal flow of the steady state. 10 
Open systems contain internal mechanisms which operate on the energy and 
matter entering and leaving the system to lower the amount of entropy, which 
causes the system to become more organised while the environment becomes 
disorganised. The `control system' is this reciprocal system of internal mechanisms. 
To return to Becker for a moment; his definition of death stated that "a human 
organism is dead when ... the system of those reciprocally dependent processes 
which assimilate oxygen, metabolise food, eliminate wastes, and keep the organism 
in relative homeostasis are arrested in a way which the organism itself cannot 
reverse". 11 The central notion here is that of the functioning body as a system. 
When the control system, in virtue of its network of complex biofeedback 
mechanisms, detects a change in one of the many regulatory systems of the body 
(whether caused by stimuli from without, or by internal process waves), it causes 
appropriate changes in other mechanisms in order to maintain equilibrium. As a 
pair of examples among the many thousands available; in humans, the control 
system causes peripheral blood vessels to dilate, pores to open and sweat to be 
produced in the presence of a rising internal body temperature; in plants the control 
system causes the petals of flowers to turn towards the sun. The notions of a 
thermostat or the Watt steam governor may prove helpful here. This latter is 
equipped with a rudimentary device which measures the discrepancy between the 
way things currently are and the `optimum' state. It then acts in such a way as to 
bring about the desired state. The machine is manufactured in such a way that the 
greater the discrepancy, the harder it works. Thus the machine automatically tends 
to reduce the discrepancy and may come to rest if the `desired state' is reached. 
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The Watt governor consists of a pair of balls which are whirled 
round by a steam engine. Each ball is on the end of a hinged arm. 
The faster the balls fly round, the more does centrifugal force push 
the arms towards a horizontal position, this tendency being 
resisted by gravity. The arms are connected to the steam valve 
feeding the engine, in such a way that the steam tends to be shut 
off when the arms approach the horizontal position. So, if the 
engine goes too fast, some of its steam will be shut off, and it will 
tend to slow down. If it slows down too much, more steam will 
automatically be fed to it by the valve, and it will speed up again. 
From Richard Dawkins, "The Selfish Gene". 12 
In simple organisms almost the whole system is the control system. More complex 
organisms develop specific structures to create a master control system 
superseding all subsidiary structures. In human beings the brain is the control 
system. 
Caution is required here; all I wish to say is that if we are searching for a biological 
analysis of the concept of death it seems that the sort of thing we are looking for is 
something like the definition offered by Becker, for the reasons outlined above. I 
think that Becker's definition utilises the concept of control or critical systems 
although he does not explicitly recognise it. I further think that all biological beings 
have some form of critical system, the loss of which constitutes the death of that 
being. 
However, the use of the brain as the critical system in humankind is criterial rather 
than definitive: brain death is indicative of death, but does not itself constitute death. 
Had evolution progressed otherwise perhaps human life could have been based 
around some complex process of photosynthesis in the manner of the humanoid 
plant Zhaan in the television series `Farscape'. And, although our best medical 
knowledge certainly seems to indicate that the brain is indeed the control system in 
man it could be that, just as the old heart-lung criteria of death were superseded by 
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brain death, in the future brain-based criteria are ousted in favour of better 
(because more reliable) criteria; perhaps it may transpire that the human brain is in 
fact regulated and organised by activity in the soul which can only be measured 
using futuristic technology. For this reason, it is no objection to the use of brain- 
based biological criteria of human death to point out that plants and trees do not 
have brains, although they are clearly biological organisms which die in a relevantly 
similar way to the way humans die. It is sufficient to note that the same concept of 
death applies to all biological beings; roughly, the irreversible (or usually 
irreversible, barring extreme cases involving the use of cryogenic technology and 
the like) loss of the interdependent regulatory processes which together prevent the 
organism from disintegrating. 
Becker believes that some biological functions can be mechanically replaced 
without the organism therefore being classified as `dead'; I agree with him on this 
point. Certainly, people may be dependent upon artefacts to replace some (or 
many) of their vital processes without which they would undoubtedly die rapidly, 
without thus qualifying as being `dead'. It must be noted that Becker's position 
seems a little muddled at this point: he stipulates both that for death to have 
occurred organic functioning must have ceased in a way in which the organism 
cannot reverse, and that an organism still qualifies as `alive' so long as `functions 
necessary to survival' are replaced by artefacts. It is surely the case, though, that 
when someone has irreversibly lost the capacity to respire spontaneously and is 
maintained on a ventilator, this is an example of a cessation of spontaneous organic 
functioning which the unfortunate victim cannot reverse. This does not count as a 
point against a `critical system' biologically-based concept of death however. In 
order for a biological organism to count as `dead' it is necessary and sufficient that 
that being's critical system has irreversibly ceased to function spontaneously. My 
position requires only the cessation of spontaneous organic functioning; in a 
moment I shall elaborate on why I believe this to be the correct approach. Further, 
my concept of death encompasses those (currently science fiction) situations in 
which all the functions of the critical system may be replaced by artefacts. In order 
to more clearly elucidate what this means, it is time to present in a little more detail 
my case for claiming that, in humans, the brain is the critical system. 
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The brain as a 'critical system' 
Currently, none of the functions of the brain that are deemed important to my or to 
other people's concepts of death (such as vegetative functions and the capacity for 
and content of consciousness), can be adequately artificially reproduced. Whilst I 
am interested in the question of whether consciousness could ever exist in an 
artificial brain, the majority of the literature on this subject tends to concentrate on 
the autonomic processes, and so I shall largely restrict my enquiries here to the 
question of whether it is necessary for these so-called `vegetative' functions of the 
brain to be `spontaneously' produced and not the result of human artifice in order for 
a person to be considered `alive'. However, part of the human critical system, at 
least, consists of what Von Bertalanffy calls "heteronomic processes subsumed in 
the physiology of excitation", ie the organism's response to the environment. 
Although this is a very reductionist way of viewing the importance of consciousness 
to human mental life it provides the basis of my argument that the claims of some 
commentators that life support technology is able to completely replace the human 
brain as the body's `control system' are flawed: current medical technology does not 
even begin to address the issue of replacing the organism's sensory processes and 
responses to the environment. 
I have argued that the critical system in man is the brain, as this organ not only 
controls man's ability to unconsciously regulate all the interrelated systems which 
prevent the bodily system from becoming chaotic, but also forms the seat of his 
responses to the environment. However, from this point a further problem arises: 
what constitutes the death of the brain? Given that a system is composed of 
smaller systems, critics are entitled to enquire just what constitutes the critical 
system of the critical system (for example, see Martyn Evans, 1995). It is my belief 
that an area of the lower brain known as the brainstem is this critical system, as it 
forms the anatomical substratum of the capacities for both integrative and 
conscious activity. 
20 
The 'critical system of the critical system' 
Brainstem criteria for human death, as tested for in ITUs in this country, consists in 
two main features: the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness and the 
irreversible loss of the capacity to breathe spontaneously. These properties do not 
exhaust the notion of a critical system, there are many other regulatory mechanisms 
which can be lost, however they are probably the most simple to diagnose, and fit 
neatly with folk beliefs of death as the `departure of the soul from the body' and as 
the `loss of the breath of life'. There are good reasons for excluding some other 
functions of the brain (most notably the content of consciousness; beliefs, desires 
and a host of other mental states, as (loosely) located in the cerebral hemispheres) 
from the critical system: without exception, patients who have been correctly 
diagnosed as brainstem dead proceed to circulatory collapse, even when 
electroencephalographic activity was detectable elsewhere in the brain at the time 
of diagnosis. 13 Of course, this argument is open to the response, by those who do 
not accept brainstem criteria, that even if every patient diagnosed as brainstem 
death goes on to develop asystole, this does not provide evidence to support the 
contention that human death occurs at the moment brainstem death develops. 
Rather, according to these critics, it shows that brainstem death is an infallible 
prognostic indicator that death is going to occur. Making the prediction that 
someone is going to die is not the same as proving that they are already dead. I 
see no way of decisively refuting this objection without merely stipulating that 
brainstem death is death; it has been propounded both by those who share a 
biological concept of death, but wish to advocate different criteria (such as a heart- 
lung based collection), and by those whose concept of death is opposed to the 
biological concept (such as those who wish to define human death in terms of `the 
conditions of existence of persons'). And it is not exclusive to philosophers critical 
of brainstem death, doctors also speak in these terms at times. Doctors Ben 
Jameson and Stephen Bonner write "relatives need to understand that brain stem 
death is an irretrievable state, with somatic death an inevitable consequence, 
despite all available supportive measures". 14 (Although to be fair to Jameson and 
Bonner, I think this is a slip of the tongue rather than a belief that brainstem death is 
not truly death - they also say "[relatives] need to also understand that it is a legal 
definition of death in the UK". 15) Fortunately, I have a second reason for delimiting 
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the critical system as I do. 
As I mentioned above, the lower brain contains the anatomical basis of the 
`capacity' for consciousness; a structure known as the Ascending Reticular 
Activating System which runs up the brainstem. Clinical and experimental work has 
shown that lesions in this area of the brain produce irreversible unconsciousness, 
even if all other brain structures are intact. Given that it is presently impossible for 
this consciousness-producing element of the brain to be artificially reproduced, an 
individual who has suffered this kind of damage has, in practice, irreversibly lost the 
capacity for consciousness. John Searle states "when we describe something as 
an unconscious intentional state, we are characterising an objective ontology in 
virtue of its causal capacity to produce consciousness. But the existence of these 
causal features is consistent with the fact that in any given case their causal power 
may be blocked by some other interfering causes, such as psychological repression 
or brain damage ... any unconscious state 
is the sort of thing that is in principle 
accessible to consciousness". 16 Even if, as in the damaged ARAS case, a person 
is unable to ever again bring any of these intentional states to consciousness, these 
states must still be the sorts of things that are capable, in principle, of being brought 
to consciousness. In practice, however, the irreversible loss of brainstem function 
is all that is required to render the patient permanently unconscious. In principle, of 
course, only the complete destruction of the cerebral hemispheres, the anatomical 
locus of the content of consciousness, would be sufficient to allow us to refer to an 
individual as irreversibly unconscious. So my criterion appears open to the 
objection that if, in the future, it becomes possible to artificially reproduce the 
function of the ARAS as the `on/off' switch for consciousness, the concept of the 
`critical system of the critical system' will have to be modified to reflect the fact that 
only the complete destruction of the higher brain areas causes the irreversible loss 
of consciousness. However, as I offer the brainstem theory only as a criterion of 
death rather than a definition, the postulation of future technological advances does 
not constitute a knock down argument against my position. Criteria, as discussed 
above, are open to revision, and revisions of the sort discussed above do no harm 
to the overall concept of death as the cessation of the critical system. 
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Two arguments for the use of the death of the brainstem as 
the criterion of biological death 
My argument that the death of the brainstem at present constitutes our `best guess' 
criterion of death takes two (related) forms. First, it is the case that, when the 
brainstem is destroyed or irreversibly ceases to function (the difference is not 
important for our purposes), consciousness is irretrievably lost and the homeostatic 
mechanisms of the body rapidly lose integration. I argued above that this is 
because, in man, the brainstem is `the critical system of the critical system' - the 
supreme regulator of the body. When the brainstem is lost, the remaining functions 
of the body become mere `artefacts of vital processes' (to use Becker's term), and 
are no more indicative of `continued life' than the growth of the hair or fingernails. 
This is the keystone of my argument, and I shall offer it in more detail presently. 
Before doing this I wish to examine a more pragmatic answer to the question of why 
we should take the death of the brainstem to be criterial of death. 
The pragmatic argument 
At the present time, the period for which the body of a person whose brainstem has 
been irreversibly destroyed or has irreversibly ceased to function can be maintained 
is severely limited; "despite the most aggressive support, the adult heart stops 
within a week of brainstem death and that of a child within two weeks". 17 It appears 
that when the `spontaneity' underlying the vegetative functions is irreversibly lost 
asystole is the inevitable result. However, is this an unalterable fact, or merely a 
product of the limitations of medical science? 
As seen from the above quote, Lamb, writing in the mid-eighties, certainly believed 
that, regardless of the treatment given, the body of a brain dead person could not 
be maintained for more than a few days. This view is shared by other leading 
contributors to this debate, such as the President's Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine18 and Korein19 who states that "no investigator ... has 
presented evidence that irreversible cardiac arrest may be postponed more than a 
week (exclusive of that in infants and children) and most often these final 
irreversible changes occur prior to 48 and even 24 hours after brain death". 
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However, at around the time that Lamb was writing, research was being conducted 
which indicates that the development of asystole following the death of the brain is 
merely a contingent fact, stemming from the inadequate replication of the functions 
of the lower brain by life support technology rather than being an unalterable fact of 
physiology. The most quoted study is by a team of Japanese researchers who 
found that brainstem dead patients lacked an antidiuretic hormone normally made 
by the brain: when the hormone was administered intravenously it became possible 
to maintain the patients for an average of twenty three days after brain death 
instead of the week that had been the norm. 20 Singer also cites cases of brain 
dead pregnant women who were able to carry their child to term as proof that "The 
coordinated forces of modern intensive care medicine have replaced the role of the 
brain in regulating the body". 21 
Despite these great advances, the current situation is that the `forces of modern 
intensive care medicine' can still only imperfectly replace the vegetative functions of 
the lower brain: the longest period of time for which a brain dead ex-patient has 
been maintained is 201 days - hardly a lifetime. 22 However it is conceivable that, in 
the near future, brainstem dead ex-patients could be maintained in ITUs for long 
periods, perhaps indefinitely (let us assume indefinitely in order to present the 
strongest case against my position). This is of course only a possibility at the 
moment and, as such, has not been addressed by the major proponents of a 
brainstem definition of death (Lamb, Bartlett and Youngner and even Pallis, the 
author of the intensive care doctor's handbook on the subject). However, medical 
evidence demonstrates that improvements in technological, anatomical and 
physiological knowledge are increasing the amount of time the bodies of brainstem 
dead ex-patients can be sustained. This issue and its implications for brain death 
as a criterion of death urgently needs to be addressed. The pragmatic argument 
that brainstem dead patients cannot be sustained for very long may be overturned 
by advances in technology, and so we need another argument to support the 
contention that brainstem death criteria should retain a central place in our thinking 
even if these science fiction cases become reality. 
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The irrelevance of `artefacts of vital processes' 
I should re-emphasise, at this juncture, that I believe that the biological concept of 
death involves more than the presence or absence of vegetative autonomic 
functions. Part of the notion of the critical system involves the organism's ability to 
respond to changes in the environment. In the case of humans, this 
responsiveness has become extremely highly developed, from mere `sensation' we 
have developed perception, self consciousness and so on. 23 Because such a 
definition permits consciousness to enter the equation, some of the problems raised 
by the `spontaneity' issue can be avoided by my presentation of the death of the 
brainstem as indicative of human death. For example I believe that my criterion 
evades one of the charges brought by Josef Seifert24 who raises the question of 
how to categorise those who are dependent on technology for their bodily 
maintenance yet who remain conscious. Seifert states that "if this dependence (on 
a ventilator) meant death, many persons who depend on dialysis, heart-machines 
(sic), etc. for reasons other than brain death would likewise be dead. The question 
of whether such a dependence is irreversible or not makes no difference. Would a 
man whose lungs are irremediably paralysed and who remains conscious be dead 
because he needs ventilation? " (See also Bartlett and Youngner12). In the case of 
human beings, the loss of the system of autonomic and heteronomic processes 
entailed by the loss of the critical system takes the form of the irreversible loss of 
not only vegetative functions, but of the capacity for (and, in practice, the content of) 
consciousness and thus does not succumb to these objections. 
The problems really arise when we consider possible future situations concerning 
patients in whom the capacities for consciousness and for spontaneous autonomic 
processes have been irreversibly destroyed but in whom the latter, at least, may be 
mimicked by an artefact. 
With our exclusion of the possibility that these patients are victims of a deefferented 
or `locked in' syndrome such as described by Seifert and Bartlett and Youngner 
above, the attractiveness of defining them as `alive' certainly wanes. However, we 
should certainly not allow our distaste for the idea of permanently maintaining these 
beings to cloud our judgement concerning the definition of life and death. If it were 
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possible to maintain the vegetative functions of an irreversibly unconscious person 
artificially (we shall suppose indefinitely to preclude the argument that these people 
are merely dying), are such patients really in any different a situation than those 
who are irreversibly unconscious yet who respire etc. spontaneously? (And who 
are, thus, alive. ) 
Seifert clearly believes that the mere fact of machine dependence is insufficient to 
declare someone dead, whether the dysfunctional part is the brain or some other 
vital subsystem. Similar arguments are advanced by Skegg26, Green and Wikler27 
and Gervais28 who ask why it is that a brainstem dead patient maintained on a 
ventilator should be classed as dead. To quote Gervais, "To say that the functioning 
is no longer natural is not to answer the central question... Why should we consider 
the brain-dead, respirator-driven body a corpse and not a living, mechanically 
sustained patient? ". These arguments forcefully make the point that it may not 
matter that the control system is lost, and that the organism no longer functions as 
an integrated whole so long as the artefacts do their job. Regardless of whether the 
patient relies on a team of medical and nursing staff to make minute adjustments to 
their life support systems or whether they are able to do this themselves, according 
to these critics, all that matters is that it is possible to maintain the patient 
indefinitely. If I wish to argue that someone in the sort of condition described above 
is dead, I must justify my claim. 
In perhaps the most clearly stated argument of the above sort, Green and Wikler (in 
Cohen et al (1981)) argue against the unique importance of the lower brain. (In fact 
they argue against the biological importance of the brain as a whole, but their 
argument, in this section, refers mainly to vegetative functions. ) They accept that 
the brain is "the organiser, the integrator" and that "the other organs form the work- 
force regulated by its commands"29. However, they still deny the irreplaceability of 
the brain, arguing that "the respirators and other life-supports which maintain body 
functioning after lower brain death collectively constitute a sort of artificial lower 
brain"30 - the development of a more perfect mechanical substitute is, they assert, 
only a matter of time. Thus, when the job of the brainstem is performed by these 
artefacts, "the body's life-system continues to function as a system". 31 
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What `an artificial lower brain' would entail 
Interestingly, neither Green and Wikler or any other of the above authors discuss 
whether their proposed technological advances would involve simply machines 
which, with human input, could maintain brainstem dead patients indefinitely or 
whether they propound the much more radical concept of machines which are able 
to make the necessary adjustments themselves. It is vitally important to clarify the 
type of position adhered to by these authors: I believe it makes the difference 
between life and death. 
The first of the two possible interpretations above seems to be the most plausible 
interpretation of what Green and Wikler have in mind. This possibility entails 
modest increases in medical knowledge and the use of technology which, although 
not currently available, is not considered to be complete science fiction by those 
involved in such matters. It is suggested that in the relatively near future doctors 
will be able to maintain a brainstem dead patient indefinitely in an ITU - in short, 
aggressive support after a diagnosis of brainstem death will remove the inevitability 
of the development of asystole. I am willing to accept that those functions of the 
lower brain which are responsible for autonomic processes are, in principle, 
amenable to replacement by artefacts. However, I would hotly contest the 
suggestion that such machines would together constitute an artificial system. True, 
highly trained medical and nursing staff would leap into action every time an alarm 
went off, titrating drug levels and adjusting gas pressures, but they would not 
constitute an open system in the sense defined above. I think stretching the 
concept of a patient's bodily system to include other people would be unwarranted. 
The system would no longer be metastable, but would consist of a variety of 
discrete elements which, outside an ITU, could not support life. If this interpretation 
of Green and Wikler's claim that the ventilator, inotropes, and so on collectively 
constitute a `sort of artificial lower brain' is correct, I believe I would be justified in 
retorting that their assertion stems from an inadequate and crudely reductionist 
understanding of the functions of the lower brain. As the President's Commission 
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research (1981) states: 
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While the respirator and its associated medical techniques do 
substitute for the functions of the intercostal muscles and the 
diaphragm, which without neuronal stimulation from the brain 
cannot function spontaneously, they cannot replace the myriad 
functions of the brainstem or of the rest of the brain. 32 
Let me explain this a little more. Ventilation of the respiratory system in man is 
controlled by a centre located in the medulla oblongata, a region of the brainstem. 
This centre comprises two portions, an inspiratory and an expiratory centre. 
Information concerning changes in the carbon dioxide tension in the blood is fed to 
these centres from chemoreceptors in the carotid and aortic arteries. When the 
level in the blood rises, impulses from the chemoreceptors stimulate the inspiratory 
centre, which in turn sends impulses along the phrenic and thoracic nerves to the 
intercostal muscles and the diaphragm. The increased rate of contraction of these 
bodies increases the rate of inspiration, increasing ventilation of the respiratory 
surfaces and removing the excess carbon dioxide. Each inhalation and exhalation 
is minutely controlled by the brainstem. As the lungs fill and expand `stretch 
receptors' in their walls are stimulated and send impulses along the vagus nerve to 
the expiratory centre in the medulla. This `switches off' the inspiratory centre, 
causing the muscles to relax and expiration to take place. The stretch receptors are 
no longer stimulated, the expiratory centre is `switched off', and the inspiratory 
centre is once more `switched on'. Inspiration takes place again. 33 This method is 
in fact one of two homeostatic mechanisms controlling respiration, a fall in the 
oxygen saturation of the blood stimulates breathing in a different way. However, 
this is a philosophical not a biological work and I shall not dwell on the details of this 
here. 
Suffice it to say, neither of the two mechanisms controlling respiration in the normal 
brainstem even remotely resemble the way in which it is controlled by a ventilator in 
an ITU. Positive pressure ventilators effectively consist of a large set of bellows 
which force mixtures of oxygen and air (or any other gas you like) into a patient's 
lungs. The number of respirations is not adjusted automatically in response to a 
rising carbon dioxide tension, although the change will set off an alarm to alert the 
medical staff tending the machine. Nor is the switch from inspiratory to expiratory 
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breath made spontaneously; it occurs simply as a result of staff setting the machine 
to blow air into the lungs at a set rate. Given this, I do not believe that it is plausible 
to claim that a being maintained under such circumstances continues to function as 
a system. 
Let us now consider the science fiction interpretation of Green and Wikler's claim: a 
machine which is able to replace all the functions of the brainstem, maintaining 
equilibrium between all the various bodily processes. It is conceivable that in the 
distant future, everything there is to know will be known about the functions of the 
brainstem. In addition let us imagine that technological advances continue at the 
current pace, and that micro-electronic engineering will continue to produce ever- 
smaller and more powerful devices. Doctors faced with a brainstem dead individual 
could implant a massively more complex version of the Watt governor into the 
space previously occupied by the organic brainstem. Such a machine would control 
and regulate all the diverse functions of the body, reacting to changes in the status 
of one function by adjusting the status of one or more other functions. However, 
even on this reading of Green and Wikler's argument, all that could be assumed is 
that we are talking about the very limited case of those individuals unfortunate 
enough to have permanently lost consciousness but who have been fitted with a 
sophisticated mechanical artefact replacing the autonomic processes of the 
brainstem. In such a situation, the other function of the brainstem, the generation of 
the capacity for consciousness is still absent. Although the creation of a machine 
which may, with assistance, maintain the autonomic essentials of human life may be 
possible, it is misleading to suggest that such a machine would be fulfilling all the 
roles of the brainstem, a point which Green and Wikler's account singularly fails to 
address. Their notion of an artificial lower brain is very impoverished compared to 
the real thing. 
However, it seems that medical scientists may already have discovered a way to at 
least partially replicate the consciousness-generating function of the brainstem. An 
article in The Sunday Times of 1st March 1998 discusses an electronic `pacemaker' 
which delivers electrical pulses to the brain and appears to mimic the function of the 
ARAS in patients in persistent vegetative states (PVS). The report notes that "Most 
PVS cases are associated with damage in the lower part of the brain which does 
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not then communicate with the upper part, responsible for thinking and higher 
consciousness. It seems that the pacemaker is able to bridge the gap and stimulate 
the revival of higher brain functions". 34 When the electro-stimulation is active, 
patients may be able to move and speak; lapsing back into unconsciousness when 
the current is turned off. Of course, such technology is in its infancy; it does not 
work on all patients and its creator, Francois Cohadon, professor of neurosurgery at 
Bordeaux University, reports that the technique is `very crude'. However, such 
devices are becoming a reality. 
If this sort of tool could be combined with a machine which could replicate the 
autonomic functions of the brainstem, then I would be prepared to call individuals 
fitted with such devices `alive'. Such a combination would seem to meet the criteria 
of an `open system'. (Another motive for not writing off the notion of electro- 
mechanical brains as impossible is the desire to avoid the species-chauvinistic 
claim that `living' beings can only take carbon-based forms. ) If advances of this sort 
were to become a reality, then the criterion of brainstem death as human biological 
death as propounded above would have to be revised or abandoned. Note 
however, that this need not harm the general biological definition of death as offered 
above; we would merely have to work out a new set of criteria. (Of course, if the 
creation of artefacts able to take over the functions of parts of the body other than 
the brain proceeded at the same pace, we may create a group of beings whose 
organic body has been completely replaced, and who are, thus, immortal. Similarly, 
we may need to revise the murder laws to cover cases of people maliciously 
switching electricity supplies off, or removing batteries. However, a discussion of 
these situations is beyond the limited scope of this thesis. ) 
In short, I agree with Green and Wikler that improvements in intensive care 
technology may indeed allow the body of a brainstem dead individual to continue to 
function indefinitely. However, except in the very specialised situation described 
above I would take issue with the idea that this means that the person is still alive. 
A person maintained by the discrete functions of many independent life support 
engines no longer functions as a system. 
Let us recap. I believe that a biological concept of human death, taking the form of 
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(something like) "a human being is dead when his or her critical system irreversibly 
ceases to function" is correct. Further, I believe that, in humans, the brain (and 
more specifically, the brainstem) forms this critical system. I hope I have provided 
an argument which justifies the claim that brain death is human death, and that I 
have set out what the use of brainstem criteria would involve. However, I have not 
yet made explicit why it is that I believe that a biological concept of death trumps all 
other possible concepts. 
An alternative concept of death 
The above proposal holds that a state which does not (or certainly need not) 
correspond to the comprehensive destruction of the whole brain constitutes `brain 
death'. It is hardly surprising then that other authors have proposed different criteria 
for brain death, based on the loss of other brain functions, most frequently the loss 
of the `higher brain' functions. Here I wish to present two arguments which may be 
loosely termed `higher brain' concepts of death as brain death. They pertain, 
respectively, to the loss of psychological continuity or `personhood' as criterial of 
death, and to the permanent loss of consciousness. I wish to show how both of 
these concepts, although certainly necessary in order for us to declare that death 
has occurred, are not, by themselves, sufficient. I begin by examining the 
ontological argument of Green and Wikler; and attempt to show why I believe that 
such an account is the wrong way of looking at the nature of human death. 
The argument begins as follows: "To state that an ailing patient, Jones, is still alive, 
is in fact to make two claims; the second of which is usually taken for granted. One 
is that the patient is alive. The other is that the patient is (remains) Jones". 35 
Further, "If we do establish that the patient, even if alive, is not Jones, and if no one 
else is Jones, then we will have established that Jones does not exist. And this, of 
course, establishes that Jones is dead". 35 
Something seems odd here - Green and Wikler apparently want to differentiate the 
living body of Jones which may continue to exist after Jones has ceased to be (in 
the sense of having lost his unique psychological characteristics) from Jones 
himself. Hence, the patient may be alive but not be Jones if Jones has irreversibly 
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lost his personal identity, or, more usually, Jones may cease to exist at the time the 
patient (retaining Jones' traits) dies - "The death of persons, unlike that of bodies, 
regularly consists in their ceasing to exist". 37 This dualism is brought out more 
clearly in Green and Wikler's discussion of beings which have never had, and which 
never will have, a personal identity in this sense. Referring to anencephalic infants, 
the authors note that such beings will never develop consciousness. They note that 
"it does not follow from our argument that all humans lacking the substrate of 
consciousness are dead... We ... need only point out that the identity criteria for the 
anencephalic, never-to-become conscious infant do not involve the causal 
substrates for higher level psychological continuity. The conditions for life and 
existence will be those of human bodies rather than those of persons38 (my italics). 
There are at least three problems with this argument. First, Green and Wikler do 
not discuss what `the conditions of existence for human bodies' consists in. 
Perhaps they do not consider it a sufficiently interesting question to merit a 
discussion. However, given that anencephalic infants are, none the less, human, 
we still need an account of what it is for them to die, which Green and Wikler do not 
provide. Second, we need to know why anencephalic infants die according to the 
conditions of existence for human bodies whilst brainstem dead adults die 
according to the conditions of existence for persons. Green and Wikler provide no 
argument for this vital distinction. Third, although the authors state that the patient, 
Jones, may be `divided up' into Jones' organism and Jones' psychological 
predicates; and although they further assert that, in some cases, Jones may cease 
to exist while his organism continues to function, they provide no argument to 
support the latter claim. Yet as long as Jones' organism continues to exist, it is 
surely open to the proponents of biological concepts of death to enquire just why 
the persistence of biological activity is not relevant in a declaration of death. Green 
and Wikler provide no argument to support their claim that the death of a human 
being should be taken as the death of the person, yet as their position throws up the 
anomalous situations of some members of the same species being said to die 
according to different criteria than others merely because of a biological defect, 
some supporting work is obviously needed. 
Following up this point I contend that Green and Wikler's position seems somewhat 
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absurd when viewed from the perspective of evolutionary biology. Consider a 
situation in which a man and a dog sustain relevantly similar injuries to the higher 
areas of their brains, which causes both of them irreversibly to lose consciousness 
yet be able to spontaneously control their internal milieu. According to Green and 
Wikler's account, in such a circumstance the man would have ceased to exist 
whereas the dog, having never possessed the "causal substrates for higher level 
psychological continuity", continues to live. But, according to evolutionary theory, 
the development of our cerebral hemispheres to the point at which they provide the 
locus for personal identity is merely the product of evolution. Man and dog are, in 
many ways, relevantly similar - the man is simply further up the phylogenetic scale 
rather than on a different scale altogether. Of course, supporters of theories of the 
above type could counter by stating that, although humans and dogs may be 
relevantly similar in many biological ways, it is man's greater psychological 
capabilities which set him apart and mean that his death must be determined in a 
way unlike the death of other biological beings. However, this Green and Wikler do 
not do. 39 
As noted above, `personal identity', on this account, is anatomically sited in the 
higher brain areas "a given person ceases to exist with the destruction of whatever 
processes there are which normally underlie that person's psychological continuity 
and connectedness. We know these processes are essentially neurological, so that 
irreversible cessation of upper-brain functioning constitutes the death of that 
person". 40 Green and Wikler thus offer an account of human death based around 
the loss of personal identity which occurs when the anatomical substratum of 
consciousness, the `higher brain', irreversibly ceases to function. In the case of 
brain death or brain excision, "the resulting body cannot have the kind of causal 
relation to earlier person-body stages which is required for the personal identity to 
hold". 41 
Until now, I have been using Green and Wikler's term "the upper (or higher) brain" 
without question. In a footnote, the authors state "We will use the terms "upper" and 
"lower" to designate the parts of the brain which sponsor cognitive and regulative 
functions, respectively. These are not terms of the physiologist's art; it is possible 
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that this neat division of brain parts is false to the facts and that some sections of 
the brain are involved in both kinds of activity, but we do not see how the present 
discussion would be thereby undermined". 42 The argument is undermined because 
there is no clear anatomical substratum of brain death when thought of in terms of 
the loss of psychological characteristics. Although a definition of death need not be 
`useful' in itself, although it is not set out to solve practical problems, it serves no 
purpose if we cannot derive from it criteria indicative of death's occurrence. Without 
such criteria a proposed concept is useless as it leaves the matter of declaring 
death open to interpretation. 
Certainly, the cerebral hemispheres and cortex seem to be the locus for most of the 
features which make up a person's psychological characteristics and confer a sense 
of identity over time. Within such structures may be found most of the features 
relating to human cognitive and affective capacities. However, subsumed under the 
general heading of "damage to the upper brain" are discrete conditions such as 
cerebral death, which entails "irreversible destruction of both cerebral hemispheres 
exclusive of the brain stem and cerebellum", and neocortical death which entails 
"the destruction of cortical neurons bilaterally while deep structures of the cerebral 
hemispheres such as the thalamus and basal ganglia may be intact along with the 
brain stem and cerebellum". 43 It is not yet understood which of these structures are 
essential for the possession of personal identity. 
Oliver Sacks (in "An Anthropologist on Mars"), describes the case of a boy who 
developed a brain tumour which had destroyed his pituitary gland, optic chiasma 
and tracts and extended into both frontal lobes. In addition it had invaded the 
temporal lobes and the diencephalon, or forebrain. Damage to the temporal lobe, 
the seat of the memory system in man, prevents the brain from consciously 
registering new events: Sacks' unfortunate patient was unable to recall information 
presented to him only a minute previously. The tumour had also caused retrograde 
amnesia, a gradual erosion of memories going back several years prior to the 
development of the tumour. Sacks reports "There was not an absolutely sharp cut- 
off here, but rather a temporal gradient, so that figures and events from 1966 and 
1967 were fully remembered, events from 1968 and 1969 partially or occasionally 
remembered, and events after 1970 almost never remembered". 44 I think a strong 
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case can be made for claiming that many of the processes which underlay this 
patient's psychological continuity and connectedness were destroyed; the patient 
had no (conscious) memory of events occurring later than 1970 (Oliver Sacks was 
first introduced to him in 1977). Sacks notes "whereas for the rest of us the present 
is given its meaning and depth by the past..., as well as being given potential and 
tension by the future, for Greg it was flat and (in its meagre way) complete". 45 Yet 
clearly the patient was not dead, indeed he possessed "a cheeriness, an 
inventiveness, a directness, an exuberance, which other patients, and indeed the 
rest of us, found delightful in small doses". 46 
Green and Wikier's argument depends on our acceptance of Jones as being 
"essentially an entity with psychological properties"; yet the case described above 
casts doubt on their assertion that a patient "ceasing to be Jones" whilst retaining a 
functioning organism is sufficient for declaring Jones to be dead. As Gervais notes, 
a patient may lose his unique psychological characteristics in circumstances other 
than brain death. Hence we could imagine a patient more damaged than Greg 
developing total amnesia with no memory of who he was or had been. Gervais 
states "We might then say that the patient has ceased to be Jones because Jones' 
psychological history has been erased, yet be unhappy with the conclusion that 
Jones is dead, because some mental life remains, supported by Jones' body. 
Jones' mental life, however impoverished or altered, is still Jones' mental life". 47 
Thus, ceasing to be Jones is a necessary condition for Jones' death, but not a 
sufficient one. Personal identity is retained so long as the patient retains the 
capacity for mental life; and such identity does not require the continuation of a 
particular psychological history. 
Gervais' Ontological Theory 
By offering "a theory that reduces to the demand that personal identity is retained as 
long as conscious functioning is retained", 48 Gervais avoids the problems identified 
above for Green and Wikler, (the facts that, firstly, we are uncomfortable with the 
prospect of identifying someone who has irreversibly lost their unique personal 
identity but who remains conscious as being dead and, secondly, that no-one 
seems entirely sure whereabouts in the brain the "anatomical substrate of personal 
35 
identity" resides). Like Green and Wi'kler, Gervais presents a notion of human death 
as brain death, with the importance of brain death stemming from its implications for 
the death of the person. This is claimed to be a `neocortical death' theory -- "a 
neocortical-death criterion is one example of a persistent-vegetative state criterion 
for declaring death". 49 However, problems arise from Gervais' rather incautious use 
of the terms `neocortical death' and `persistent vegetative state'. As David Lamb 
(1990) notes "Gervais appears to equate neocortical death (a neuropathological 
concept) with the persistent vegetative state (a clinical concept)". 50 Neocortical 
death requires an isoelectric EEG - as I shall discuss in a moment, few persistently 
vegetative patients meet this criterion. 
Gervais presents her theory thus: "Consciousness, a necessary condition for 
psychological continuity, is the sine qua non of personal existence. Since upper- 
brain death results in the permanent absence of consciousness, it is the death of 
the person". 51 This proposal certainly seems to be more workable than Green and 
Wikler's suggestion: indeed it incorporates the essential insight of Green and 
Wikler's position without succumbing to many of the problems. For if a patient is 
permanently unconscious one may say with certainty that he or she will have lost 
his or her unique psychological characteristics. Hence, Gervais' position evades 
most of our worries concerning victims of total retrograde amnesia, senile dementia, 
and suchlike, wherein the essence of the personality has been lost but the brain 
retains the capacity to support consciousness. 
Perhaps if Gervais had left her argument here it may have held some water 
(although not much; I shall argue below why I believe that the permanent absence 
of consciousness is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for, death). It does, 
however, succumb to what I believe to be a fatal flaw. Gervais states "We must 
think of human death not in terms of what it has in common with canine death or 
feline death, but in terms of what it represents for human relationships; 
abandonment of all roles, the end of all interactions, and the reconstituting of rights 
and obligations. Permanent unconsciousness, whatever its basis, represents these 
changes" (my italics). 52 Gervais criticises Green and Wikler's stipulation that the 
upper brain is the only portion of the brain involved with personal identity as being 
unacceptably narrow. Instead, she holds that "human death, understood as the 
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death of a person, is a state in which the function of consciousness has been 
irreversibly lost as a result of one of several possible combinations of damage to the 
brain substratum". 53 
I believe that this sort of analysis of death fails for a number of reasons. First, as I 
discussed above, limitations in medical technology mean that, in practice, an 
irreversible coma will result from the loss of the Ascending Reticular Activating 
System whilst the areas of the brain which house the contents of consciousness, 
the cerebral hemispheres, remain intact but inaccessible. Gervais must class 
people whose unconsciousness can be traced to this sort of malfunction as dead. 
However, unconsciousness of this sort is only irreversible due to the limitations of 
current medical technology. Indeed reversal of such states may not be wholly 
science fiction, if the article quoted above from The Times is to be believed. It is 
only when those brain areas which form the anatomical substratum of the mind, the 
seat of memory, emotions etc., have been destroyed that we can truly claim that 
consciousness and personal identity have, necessarily and in principle, been lost. 
By making permanent unconsciousness, whatever its basis, her criterion of death 
as death of the person, Gervais allows too much. By including cases where 
unconsciousness is contingent upon the loss of support systems such as the ARAS 
rather than being the necessary result of the destruction of the anatomical seat of 
consciousness Gervais' theory shows itself to be inadequate. 
I think the above constitutes a refutation of Gervais' position; however I have, in 
addition, several other objections. 
First, as David Lamb notes, there are clinical objections to making a diagnosis of 
death when the brainstem continues to function, as it is "still uncertain whether 
fragments of consciousness or awareness may be mediated by sub-cortical 
structures". 54 Diagnosing death in terms of the irreversible loss of sentience is 
difficult for several reasons. Compared to the diagnosis of brain stem death a 
longer time scale is involved - whereas brain stem death manifests itself within 
hours or days, months may pass before the clinician is confident that the cerebral 
cortex has been irreversibly destroyed. 55 One of the biggest barriers to accurate 
diagnosis is the nonhomogeneity of the class of `unconscious' patients. For 
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example, people in persistent vegetative states may display a variety of responses 
to stimuli: 
Nearly all regain sleep-wake cycles; many display the facial 
appearance of interest; and some even show emotional 
fluctuations with occasional infant-like tearing or smiling in 
response to non-verbal stimuli. Although none follow moving 
objects consistently, some occasionally move the eyes slowly 
towards visual stimuli. Others blink inconsistently to visual threat, 
startle or close the eyes in response to sudden noises, or 
demonstrate reflex groping or sucking. 56 
However in its most severe form the condition involves "a complete unawareness of 
the self and the environment" and also involves a terminological change from 
`persistent' to 'permanent'"... when irreversible PVS can be diagnosed with clinical 
certainty". 57 
Problems in the diagnosis of a consciousness-oriented concept of death may not 
prove insurmountable for Gervais' account; she argues that the burden of proving 
that consciousness is irreversibly lost under certain circumstances of brain 
destruction is a medical, not a philosophical, problem. And I do not wish to deny 
that some patients, those in the most severe form of PVS, are completely insensible 
(I discuss the difficulties involved in accurately diagnosing irreversible 
unconsciousness in chapter four). However, I think that the dissimilarity of patients 
grouped together as `unconscious' by Gervais poses serious problems for her 
account. The responsiveness to stimuli of some patients in persistent vegetative 
states may be dismissed as simple reflexes: alternatively it may represent 
awareness, albeit in a much attenuated form. I am not sure that Gervais' exclusion 
of the above sort of responsiveness from the category of consciousness is 
legitimate (indeed, a large problem with Gervais' account is that she fails to define 
what she means by `consciousness' yet her account turns on the notion). She 
states "Experiencing per se, however limited it may be, defines life". 58 The 
irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness (and thus for experience) is 
death. So why does Gervais want to rule out some experiences such as the 
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unconscious response to pain? Is the response to pain of someone in a persistent 
vegetative state so different to the way a normal human responds when asleep? 
Drawing this section to a close, I believe that there are insurmountable problems 
facing any definition of death based upon the loss of consciousness or personhood. 
Some of these problems apply only to individual accounts of death so defined, such 
as those discussed above. Others apply more generally to all theories of this type. 
Chief among the latter group is the fact that loss of consciousness and personhood, 
although necessary for human death, are not sufficient. For the reasons discussed 
above I do not wish to label those who are persistently unconscious or who have 
lost their unique psychological traits as dead. Equally clearly, those who are dead 
have lost these features. However, human death consists of much more than the 
mere loss of consciousness. According to Hellenic and Christian tradition, death is 
a hybrid concept, incorporating the ideas of both the loss of the `breath of life', and 
of the `departure of the soul from the body'. Definitions of death which use loss of 
`higher brain' functions as criterial fail because they address only one of these 
components. Such definitions do not cohere, either with `folk' knowledge (hence the 
frequent claims by these authors that the public need to be corrected in their 
erroneous opinion that pink, respiring, but permanently unconscious people are 
alive), or with the majority of medical opinion on the subject: they thus leave 
themselves open to dispute. As David Lamb notes, "any criterion which, when 
fulfilled, leaves it possible for someone to say that the patient is still alive is 
unsatisfactory". 59 
The proponents of such definitions point out that their definition pinpoints what is 
unique about human death: I believe, on the contrary, that human death is a 
biological phenomenon, and should be viewed as such. Certainly the criteria used 
in declaring death in humans will be different from those used in declaring death in, 
say, tomato plants, indeed these criteria are open to revision with advances in 
medical technology. However, it seems somehow absurd to claim that, despite 
what we know about evolution and the common origins our species shares with 
other `higher' mammals, our `death' is a radically different thing to that of even the 
most sophisticated nonhuman animal, simply in virtue of our possession of 
consciousness (which we know other mammals possess) or personhood (which we 
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suspect some other mammals may possess to a limited extent (for more on this 
subject see chapter three)). 
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Chapter Two 
Restrictions on the use of dead people as 
donors (or "being human and dead is not 
sufficient") 
There is an increasing discrepancy between the number of organs available and the 
number of potential recipients. Geoff Koffman, the Editor of the British 
Transplantation Society newsletter, states "the current system [of organ 
procurement] is failing as witnessed by the declining number of cadaveric renal 
transplants performed in recent years together with the growth of the national 
waiting list". ' Emotive appeals for more organs are made by those who are dying or 
becoming debilitated whilst awaiting transplants, and this suffering is undoubtedly 
immensely distressing to the patients themselves, their families and their medical 
caregivers. It is understandable that many of those with first hand experience of 
end-stage organ failure support extremely bold policies of organ procurement. 2 
Dead people are, currently, the most common source of organs - in the year 2001 
2339 cadaveric organs were transplanted in the UK: 378 living donor organs were 
used in the same period. 3 As I noted in chapter one, taking organs from dead 
people seems, prima facie, to raise fewer ethical complications than taking organs 
from other sources. However, as the living donor figures show, death is not a 
necessary condition for the donation of organs for transplant (I shall argue in 
chapter four that the removal of organs from a living but irreversibly unconscious 
donor may also be acceptable under certain circumstances). Death is also not a 
sufficient condition, either legally or morally, for donation. In the United 'Kingdom 
organ procurement from cadaveric donors currently operates according to this 
assumption as set out in the Human Tissue Act 1961, covering England, Scotland 
and Wales and the Human Tissue Act (Northern Ireland) 1962. Donation is on an 
`opt in' basis - the fact that there is a suitable ventilated body in an intensive care 
unit does not, people think, give us free rein to do as we like with it. 4 Those who 
wish their organs to be used in the event of their death may choose to carry donor 
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cards or to place their name on the organ donor register. If they should die in such 
a manner that their organs are suitable for transplant the subject of donation is 
raised with the relatives who retain the power to override the donor's decision. In 
the case of someone who has not expressed an opinion during life the relatives are 
used as proxy decision makers. The decision of the relatives is deemed to override 
any prior wishes the donor has expressed - "Even where there is evidence, such as 
a signed donor card or registration on the NHS Organ Donor Register, that the 
deceased wished to be a donor, relatives may refuse consent. Although technically 
the doctor could proceed with the removal of organs, in practice the wishes of 
relatives will always outweigh those of the deceased". 5 In the rare circumstance 
that the relatives cannot be traced and an appropriate search for them has been 
fruitless the `responsible officer' of the hospital in which the body lies may give 
consent. Under no other circumstances may cadaveric organs legally be removed. 
It is known that this system fails to capture all potentially usable organs: each year 
people who would make very suitable donors die in hospital without being utilised. 
The precise number is very hard to estimate: data is being collected on all hospital 
deaths in a three month period in 2002 in order to gain an accurate knowledge of 
the number and of the reasons why such patients are not brought to the attention of 
the transplant teams. However, it is thought that perhaps as many as twenty five 
percent of ventilated patients declared dead according to brainstem criteria in 
Intensive Care Units are not referred to transplant services and their relatives are 
thus never approached regarding a donation. Furthermore around twenty five to 
thirty percent of families approached refuse consent for their relative's organs to be 
used (this is a figure for the UK: the US figure is thought to be as high as 50%). 6 
Thus there is a `pool' of recently deceased people whose organs are `wasted'; 
whether due to pressures on intensive care staff preventing an approach being 
made, to a very understandable unwillingness to intrude on a family's grief, or to a 
refusal by the next of kin. 
There is another, potentially larger, pool of patients who have recently come to be 
considered as a possible source of organs. Patients dying on general and 
neurosurgical units and those who come into Accident and Emergency departments 
and cannot be resuscitated - in other words patients whose deaths are determined 
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to have occurred according to non-brainstem criteria - have recently returned to 
prominence as a source of organs, having not been so considered since the 
introduction of brainstem death criteria. 
The structure of chapter two 
In this chapter I shall address the following questions. Ought transplant teams to 
have access to all physically suitable organs in order to help those with end stage 
organ failure to live? And what may be done to someone who is dying but not yet 
dead in order to prepare him for use as a donor? 
shall assume in this chapter that there exists a satisfactory definition of death 
(whether mine or not) and that the diagnosis of death is therefore not contentious. 
`Hard Law' 
In 1999 the British Transplantation Society (BTS) conducted a referendum among 
its members, assessing opinion on what they called `presumed consent/opting out' 
legislation -a series of proposals for changing the donation rules from the present 
opt in system to something `stronger'. One of these, the so called `hard law', 
proposed that organs always be harvested from suitable deceased people, 
regardless of their prior wishes, or the wishes of the family. A similar idea was also 
independently propounded by John Harris in a lecture given to the Manchester 
Institute for Nephrology and Transplantation in June 1999 and in several 
newspapers around that time. In what follows I tend to use Professor Harris' 
formulation as he goes into more detail than does the BTS (and also because the 
proposal was rejected by BTS members). Harris' claim seems to be that the law 
governing organ donation in this country ought to be changed from the current 
`opting in' policy to something much stronger. 
Harris says: 
"The donor card scheme is clearly failing us all. We must get away 
from the idea that people can allow their bodies and those of their 
relatives to be simply buried or burned when they die. This is a 
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terrible and cruel waste of organs and tissue that may save life or 
restore health... The problem is that we, as a society, have bent 
over backwards to make sure that potential donors and their 
relatives are protected against anything that might cause them 
distress or unease. But the same consideration has not been 
shown to potential organ recipients and their families. Both are 
entitled to our concern. There are then two groups of people we 
must consider, donors and recipients. If we ask what each group 
stands to lose if their preferences are not respected we get very 
different answers. One group stands to lose their lives. The other 
group have already lost theirs and at worst, will know prior to death 
that one of the many things they want to happen after their deaths 
will not come to pass". 7 
He continues: 
"One way of expressing an equality of concern for both groups of 
people, bearing in mind what both stand to lose, would be to 
ensure, through legislation, that all cadaver organs, organs from 
dead bodies, should be automatically available at death without 
any consent being required. The dead after all have no further use 
for their organs, the living do". 8 
Harris' scheme is ostensibly an opt out proposal: he says "People would not have 
the ability to register objections except for the strongest reasons. They would have 
to explain why they would wish other people to die rather than have their organs 
used. "9 However, it contains the potential for forced excision against the `donors' 
and the families' wishes if other sources of organs cannot meet demand. Harris 
draws analogies with Coroners' post mortem examinations, for which people may 
not refuse consent and in talking of people's right to conscientiously refuse consent 
says "The crunch, of course, comes when ... conscientious objection will cost lives. 
Then we have a hard choice to make. It is surely far from clear that people are 
entitled to conscientiously object to practices that will save innocent lives... Fully 
consensual schemes are always best. But when so much is at stake, thousands of 
lives in Britain alone, and hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions world-wide, we 
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must consider even mandatory schemes to prevent such needless loss of life". 10 
What, if anything, is wrong with this policy? I should begin by noting that I agree 
with Professor Harris that the number of organs available for transplant should, 
obviously, be increased if the increase can be achieved by morally acceptable 
means. I depart from him when considering what is morally acceptable -I think that 
Harris' proposed policy is too demanding. Harris is prepared to countenance the 
idea of involuntary posthumous organ excision if this is the only way of obtaining 
sufficient organs for transplant. I do not (necessarily) object to opt out policies (of 
this more later) -I do object to non opt out policies. 
According to Harris, involuntary posthumous organ excision is not only morally 
acceptable, it is morally required, under some circumstances, due to the large 
number of people waiting for organs who will die if a suitable match does not 
become available. By increasing the supply of organs we would be able greatly to 
reduce the number of deaths among those on the waiting list. Thus the right course 
of action is the one that produces this good, the action that saves the greatest 
possible number of lives while, according to Harris, nothing of comparable 
importance is lost as a result. 
Why is it wrong to remove organs from the dead against their wishes? Harris is 
clearly correct to claim that dead people can never again be aware of anything and 
so lack the experience of having been `harmed' if their organs are used after their 
death contrary to their wishes. I shall argue that Harris' talk of considering both the 
donor and thwarted recipient masks two contentious issues in the debate between 
utilitarian and other moral theories. 
Can we compare harms? 
A minor problem with Harris' claim is that I am at a loss to think of a way to compare 
the losses to potential donor and thwarted recipient except in a very rough intuitive 
manner. How does one compare having one's posthumous wishes disrespected to 
dying? These seem to me to be harms from completely different realms and I am 
unable to conceive how we might find a scale on which to order them. 
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Need we compare harms? 
The problem with Harris's `equal consideration for the potential donor and the 
recipient' requirement is wider than the specific case of organ donation. It is, rather, 
a particular example of the ongoing debate in moral philosophy about the relative 
primacy of `the right' and `the good'. The response to Harris' claim, then, goes much 
deeper than this particular problem in applied ethics, and forms an objection to 
utilitarianism considered as a whole. The objections take two main forms, I call 
them `the problem of distributive justice' and `the problem of non-moral space'. Both 
objections stem, essentially, from the fact that utilitarianism denies autonomy to 
moral agents: first because it requires that they be used as means to another's end 
if the consequences are sufficiently good and second because they are compelled 
at all times to maximise good results. In opposition to this we might say, with 
Charles Fried, that "right and wrong have an independent and overriding status 
because they establish our basic position as freely choosing entities. That is why 
nothing we choose can be more important than the ground - right and wrong - for 
our choosing. Right and wrong are the expressions of respect for persons - respect 
for others and self-respect". 11 Because this discussion forms only part of what 
wish to say in this chapter I do not present a full argument for the claim that the right 
overrides the good -I merely offer a synopsis. 
The problem of distributive justice 
The first problem is that while it is rational within a life to suffer harm in order to 
obtain some benefit this principle cannot straightforwardly be applied between 
people in the manner which Harris attempts here. (nb I hope that my use of the 
definite article here is not misleading: I do not wish to imply this is the only `problem 
of distributive justice' - simply that it is the problem distributive justice raises for 
Professor Harris' policy. ) As Norman Daniels puts it: "it is rational and prudent that I 
take from one stage of my life to give to another, in order to make my life as a whole 
better. But it is morally problematic just when society can take from one person to 
give to another in order to maximise, say, total happiness"12 John Rawls sets out 
the utilitarian position as follows: "a society is properly arranged when its institutions 
maximise the net balance of satisfaction. The principle of choice for an association 
49 
of men is interpreted as an extension of the principle of choice for one man". 13 
Making this extension work requires "conflating all persons into one through the 
imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator" and so the fundamental 
objection is that "Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons". 14 Or, as Robert Nozick puts it, "Individually, we each choose to undergo 
some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm... Why not, 
similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other 
persons more, for the sake of the overall social good? But there is no social entity 
with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only 
individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives". 15 
We (usually) think that courses of action that involve harming innocent people (as 
well as others such as lying and stealing) are morally unavailable to us even if our 
goal is to help others: this thought is denied by the utilitarian. The objection, then, is 
that utilitarianism yields some very counter-intuitive solutions to questions of 
distributive justice. 
How might we defend the claim that we must not harm people even to save the 
lives of others? Nonutilitarian theorists would dispute the claim that the pursuit of 
utility (in this case maximising the number of lives saved) should be the 
fundamental objective that guides our actions. The basic normative principle of 
John Rawls' contractualism is that agents behind the veil of ignorance would agree 
to respect autonomy. "They would agree not to interfere with one another's 
projects, except where this is necessary to prevent a similar interference with their 
own". 16 Rawls says that "it has seemed to many philosophers, and it appears to be 
supported by the convictions of common sense, that we distinguish as a matter of 
principle between the claims of liberty and right on the one hand and the desirability 
of increasing aggregate social welfare on the other; and that we give a certain 
priority, if not absolute weight, to the former. Each member of society is thought to 
have an inviolability founded on justice or, as some say, on natural right, which even 
the welfare of everyone else cannot override". 17 Although Rawls thinks that the 
above is common sense he also provides an elaborate philosophical defence of the 
idea by arguing that these restrictions are the consequences of the principles which 
would be chosen by people with diverse goals making choices from behind his veil 
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of ignorance. Because people are broadly motivated by self interest (desiring 
happiness, freedom and so on), the agents operating behind the veil of ignorance 
are motivated in the same way and they know they will retain these desires 
whatever specific desires and interests they develop in life. "The agents will know 
that, whatever they want, they will want their most important desires to be satisfied, 
they will want the freedom to satisfy them, and they will want the power to do so". 18 
People operating behind the veil of ignorance, motivated by their discrete ends, 
would choose a more-or-less equal distribution of goods and services, deviating 
from this only when the new arrangement is better for the worst-off than under any 
other arrangement (the `difference principle'). "Since agents in the original position 
are to be ignorant of their place within the structure of the society that will result 
from their choice of basic rule, there is an initial presumption in favour of equality of 
distribution of goods and duties. For none will wish to be disadvantaged. They may 
rationally accept deviations from this basic equality however, provided that the 
resulting increase in efficiency leaves the worst-off person under the new system 
better off'. 19 So Rawlsian contractualism resolves the problem of distributive justice 
- avoids having to claim that innocent people ought to be harmed, or that we should 
lie or cheat, if so doing led to an overall good result - as rational agents in the 
original position would not agree to such a principle. 
The dead are harmed by involuntary organ excision. And the 
benefit to organ recipients does not outweigh the harm. 
shall argue that dead people are harmed by being used as organ donors against 
their wishes. Harris notes that the dead have already lost their lives - they cannot 
ever again be aware of any harm done to them. He believes it follows from this that 
the worst thing that can happen to them is knowing premortem that their wishes will 
not be respected. I disagree: I wish to argue that the dead have `surviving interests' 
which are harmed when they are used as unwilling organ donors. And the harm 
done is not outweighed by the benefit conferred upon the recipients of organs 
obtained in this way. 
In order to establish this, I need first establish that it matters in any way to the dead 
person what happens to them after death. This will involve a digression away from 
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the case at hand into the more general question of what constitutes an interest and 
how interests confer obligations upon other people. 
Interests 
The account of interests and harms to interests which I shall utilise throughout this 
work is the theory propounded by Joel Feinberg in his 1984 book `Harm to Others'. 
Feinberg says "One's interests, then, taken as a miscellaneous collection, consist of 
all those things in which one has a stake, whereas one's interest in the singular, 
one's personal interest or self-interest, consists in the harmonious advancement of 
all one's interests in the plural. These interests, or perhaps more accurately, the 
things these interests are in, are distinguishable components of a person's well- 
being". 20 
What sort of things have interests? A popular approach, and one which I shall 
adopt, is to say that, usually, consciousness or sentience is necessary for the 
possession of interests. Consciousness and sentience are not the same thing. As 
Mary Anne Warren notes "To be sentient is to be capable of at least some of the 
many forms of suffering and enjoyment... Because not all conscious experiences 
are either pleasurable or painful, evidence of consciousness is not necessarily 
evidence of sentience". 21 However, as she also notes, the two capacities do tend to 
co-exist: conferring, as they do, a joint survival advantage. There is little point in 
being able to feel pain if one is unable to recognise the source of the pain and 
remember to avoid it in future. In what follows I generally refer to consciousness as 
being that which confers interests. 22 
It is important to recognise the limited scope of what is being claimed here: to say 
that only conscious beings have interests is not to say that nonconscious living 
things cannot have welfare needs. It is to say only that they themselves cannot 
care about their welfare. 
"If we think of interests as stakes in things, and understand what 
we have a stake in as defined by our concerns, by what matters to 
us, then the connection between interests and the capacity for 
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conscious awareness becomes clear. Without conscious 
awareness beings cannot care about anything. Conscious 
awareness is a prerequisite to desires, preferences, hopes, aims 
and goals. Nothing matters to nonsentient nonconscious beings. 
Whether they are preserved or destroyed, cherished or neglected, 
is of no concern to them". 23 
`Harming' as a setback to interests 
Harming, according to Feinberg, is "the thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an 
interest"24 - we are harmed when something in which we had a stake is damaged. 
Harming need not come only from the action of an agent - interests can be blocked 
or defeated by ill luck without any agency being involved. However interests can be 
invaded only by human beings, whether acting intentionally or through culpable 
omissions: this is the type of harm that concerns us here. "One person harms 
another in the present sense then by invading, and thereby thwarting or setting 
back, his interest". 25 "An invasion is a (usually hostile) crossing of another person's 
boundaries, an encroachment on the other's territory. To enter wrongfully the 
sphere of another person's self-government is to violate his autonomy, that is to 
infringe his right of self-determination". 26 Those with end stage organ failure are 
harmed - their interests are set back or impeded - by their illnesses and if they die 
of them then their interests are defeated. However, does the possibility of 
overcoming these harms justify an invasion of the interests of others? 
I realise that this brief discussion of interests leaves some unanswered questions -I 
will explore the interests of the living in more detail in chapter three. In this chapter I 
intend to explore only the special sort of interests - `surviving interests' - which can 
be ascribed to the dead. I restrict the discussion in this way as these interests are 
on the periphery of the concept: the idea that the dead can have stakes in things 
seems somewhat odd. I think that little light will be shed on these special sorts of 
interests by a discussion of less controversial interests. That said, I believe that 
surviving interests, like the interests of the living, confer moral status on their 
possessors. 
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The link between consciousness, interests and moral status 
According to the Feinberg/Steinbock account, interests and consciousness are 
(usually) necessary and sufficient conditions for the attribution of moral status to a 
being. "It is ... [the] ... notion of mattering that is key to moral status. Beings that 
have moral status must be capable of caring about what is done to them. They 
must be capable of being made, even if only in a rudimentary sense, happy or 
miserable, comfortable or distressed". 27 
`Moral status' will be made to do quite a lot of work in this piece of writing so I ought 
to explain what I mean when I use it. The concept of moral status is, according to 
Mary Anne Warren, "a means of specifying those entities towards which we believe 
ourselves to have moral obligations, as well as something of what we take these 
obligations to be". 28 I shall follow Warren's definition of moral status as being 
simply something which generates obligations in others in what follows (rather than, 
as other authors have done, discussing whether moral status also confers duties on 
those who possess it. 29) This is because the entities whose moral status I shall 
discuss in this work - dead and irreparably unconscious human beings and non 
human animals are all incapable of having duties to others. 
I should note that in this work I talk of `moral status' but not of `rights'. In so doing I 
am following Bonnie Steinbock in attempting to evade the quagmire that is the rights 
debate. Steinbock states: 
"The question of who counts morally is more basic [than the 
question of who has rights or what sort of rights] in that it is an 
issue for all moral views even those that reject rights... Interests 
are the content of rights; without interests, there would be nothing 
for rights to protect. Equally, if a being has no interests, it can 
have no claim against others, nothing that they are required to 
consider from a moral perspective. The possession of interests is 
therefore a minimal condition for both rights and moral status. All 
beings who can have rights have moral status. "30 
A second reason for wanting to avoid the matter is that the ascription of rights to 
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many of the creatures I shall discuss: the dead, the irreversibly unconscious, and 
animals is likely to arouse controversy. Because of anxieties of this sort I prefer to 
introduce the idea of moral status in terms of obligations, not rights. As John 
Jetlesen says "Even if a subject is not ascribed rights, other agents may have 
direct duties towards it, and this is the main thing". 31 I leave the question of whether 
there really are such things as moral rights, and who possesses them, 
unaddressed. My concern here is with the interests which confer moral status, 
those which confer duties upon others: their nature and from whence they derive. 
A criterion for moral standing must satisfy certain conditions if it is to be defensible. 
The first of these is that the properties which admit a being to the class of creatures 
possessing moral standing must be empirical properties. As LW Sumner states 
"The function of a criterion is to distribute a certain moral right [or moral standing] 
among the entities in the world in accordance with their possession or lack of 
certain properties. It cannot serve this function unless we have some independent 
means of ascertaining which entities possess the properties in question". 32 The 
second condition is that the criterion must be general, "it must be capable of 
resolving most (preferably all) questions of moral standing". 33 I hope that the 
`interests view' will demonstrate that standing ought to be conferred on the dead, 
animals and irreversibly unconscious human beings. Steinbock hopes it also 
applies to future (as yet undetermined) people and to foetuses too, but such 
applications are beyond my remit here. The final requirement is that a criterion for 
moral standing must be morally relevant. "There must ... be some reason 
for 
thinking that it is in virtue of an entity's possessing just these properties that it has 
such rights [or, still trying to avoid the language of rights, that it must or must not be 
treated in certain ways], that these properties mark the crucial watershed between 
entities with these rights and entities without them". 34 
The limits of moral status as a source of obligations 
A moral status theory cannot, of course, account for all our questions about human 
moral obligations. Warren states "Many of our obligations are based not only on the 
moral status of those towards whom we are obliged, but also upon situational 
factors, such as a promise we have made, a personal relationship in which we are 
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involved"35 and so on. Ascriptions of moral status simply represent very general 
claims about the way we ought to conduct ourselves regarding certain sorts of 
beings and the obligations we owe to such entities. 
The dead as a problem case 
How does the `interests view' of moral status confer moral status on dead people? 
Although there is a clear connection between interests and consciousness, although 
the standard case of an interest-holder in this sense would be a conscious being, 
this does not account for all our intuitions concerning the sort of being which is 
typically conscious but for some reason is not in the present case. More 
specifically, following Feinberg, I would like to extend the class of interest-bearers to 
those beings which are, were, or will be, conscious (although in this piece of writing 
I am concerned only with those who were). In other words, following Feinberg, I 
consider going against someone's posthumous wishes regarding organ donation to 
be a `harm' rather than simply a `wrong', although it is also a wrong. It is a harm, I 
shall argue, because it is an invasion of interests which survive their death. But the 
notion of `harming' seems to imply a change in state of the person affected, at least 
in our common sense understanding of the word. So it is difficult to apply this 
notion to those whose lives have ended: surely nothing can ever again change for 
them (either for better or worse)? 
This is problematic - nonconscious things with a `welfare' such as plants are denied 
interests on the Feinberg/Steinbock account - they do not have moral status in 
themselves because they themselves do not care what happens to them (although 
this need not mean we have no moral obligations regarding them). If non conscious 
entities do not possess moral status why should we make an exception simply 
because a given non conscious entity was once conscious? My argument that 
dead humans are relevantly different from plants and inanimate objects has two 
parts. In this chapter I present my argument for dead people having some direct 
moral status by arguing that some interests survive death and so can be harmed. 
And I discuss why plants and machines lack moral status in my discussion of more 
`usual' interests in chapter three. 
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Posthumous harming as a `puzzle case' 
How can something happening after death be a harm to the dead person? This is a 
tricky problem as intuitions pull in both directions. On the one hand we do feel sorry 
for a dead person if a project to which they devoted their lives collapses in ruins 
soon after their death, on the other hand we are acutely conscious of the fact that 
they can never know of it. In what follows I draw heavily on the account of 
posthumous harms given by Joel Feinberg and George Pitcher: I have little original 
to say. The idea of posthumous harming is a very perplexing one: Pitcher says "On 
the one hand, we think that if the business Mrs White established and was proud of 
in her lifetime should collapse in ruins soon after her death, that really can't be a 
disaster for her. She is beyond disasters of any kind. On the other hand, we 
cannot rest quite content there: we think that in some way we do not wholly 
understand, it would have been better for Mrs White if her business had not failed 
so soon after her death. "36 
How can interests survive death? Feinberg distinguishes between `want-fulfilment' 
and `want satisfaction': only the latter involves an experiential requirement. "The 
fulfilment of a want is simply the coming into existence of that which is desired. The 
satisfaction of a want is the pleasant experience of contentment or gratification that 
normally occurs in the mind of the desirer when he believes that his desire has been 
fulfilled. "37 We usually think that want-satisfaction is less important than want- 
fulfilment. Feinberg says "The pleasure that normally attends want-fulfilment is a 
welcome dividend, but the object of our efforts is to fulfil our wants in the external 
world, not to bring about states of our own minds". 38 "Because the objects of a 
person's interests are usually wanted or aimed-at events that occur outside his 
immediate experience and at some future time, the area of a person's good or harm 
is necessarily wider than his subjective experience and longer than his biological 
life... When death thwarts an interest, the harm can be ascribed to the person who 
is no more, charged as it were to his "moral estate"". 38 George Pitcher invites us to 
reflect on this by considering two possible worlds: in World Ia philosopher is feted 
after his death, in World II a disgruntled neighbour burns down his house and 
destroys his life's work, preventing anyone ever seeing it. Pitcher says "we would 
all, I think, judge that the philosopher's life in World I is better than his life in World 
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II, and that the neighbor's vicious action on World II really harms the philosopher". 40 
There seem to be two separate problems with the idea that people can be harmed 
after their deaths. 
The experience problem 
The first (which is usually called the `experience requirement' or `experience 
problem') is the problem we face in making sense of the idea that someone can 
undergo a harm and not be aware of it. The dead obviously cannot be aware of 
anything bad that happens after their death. However, I think this seeming problem 
in ascribing interests to the dead is not in fact a problem. For we can think of 
circumstances in which we would want to describe a living person as being harmed, 
even if the victim is not aware of it. 
The experience requirement for harming applies to persons still living who are 
betrayed, deceived, ridiculed behind their back, or whose life's work collapses, as 
Mrs White's did, even if their lack of awareness is due to something of rather less 
consequence than death - say perhaps they are on holiday on a remote island with 
no telecommunications. And in such a case of harm to a living but ignorant person 
we do not usually think that the harm is done only when it is discovered. If the act 
itself were not harmful then the discovery of it would not be a bad thing. Nagel says 
"Loss, betrayal, deception, and ridicule are on this view bad because people suffer 
when they learn of them... For the natural view is that the discovery of betrayal 
makes us unhappy because it is bad to be betrayed -- not that betrayal is bad 
because its discovery makes us unhappy". 41 Strong intuitions, then, pull in favour 
of something more than simply experience being important. 
Conversely, we do not think that mere experiences, in the absence of 'real' events in 
the world, are somehow as rewarding as the real thing. As Jeff McMahon points 
out, it also counts heavily against the experience requirement that experiential 
states are sometimes irrational or inappropriate, and that it is possible to induce 
false beliefs of harm or benefit. 42 Consider the famous Experience Machine of 
Robert Nozick, capable of simulating any desired experience to a passive user 
58 
floating in a tank. Nozick asserts (correctly, I feel) that we would not want to plug 
into the machine because "we want to do certain things, and not just have the 
experience of doing them. In the case of certain experiences, it is only because first 
we want to do the actions that we want the experience of doing them ... [and 
because] 
... we want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person. Someone 
floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob". 43 To be sure, in most cases of harming, 
the victim is aware that he or she has been harmed. That does not mean that these 
fringe cases of inexperienced harms cannot count as harms. 
So it seems relatively easy to dismiss this first problem: the requirement that all 
harms must be experienced harms. Why should the fact that the victim can 
definitely never become aware of the matter differ from a case where, as a matter of 
contingent fact, he does not become aware of it? For these reasons, Feinberg 
contends, "harm to an interest is better defined in terms of the objective blocking of 
goals and thwarting of desires than in subjective terms; and the enhancement or 
advancing of an interest is likewise best defined in terms of the objective fulfilment 
of well-considered wants rather than in terms of subjective states of pleasure". 44 
However, to say that the dead have interests capable of being harmed still seems 
odd in a way that talk of unexperienced harm to the living does not. Perhaps the 
problem lies in the fact that the dead person no longer exists. Who is the subject of 
these harms? 
The `no subject' problem 
In what sense can we owe an obligation to someone who no longer exists? Even if 
someone expresses an objection during life to the removal of their organs after 
death for transplant purposes, once they are dead not only is there no longer a 
person who holds these opinions or objections, but also there is nobody to be 
distressed if the wishes are violated. (The family of the decedent may be 
distressed, and may possess certain rights which serve as reasons why the body 
should not be used, but that is a different matter and will be discussed below. ) The 
second problem, then, concerns who is the subject of such a harm - as long as one 
is alive one's posthumous wishes are not in a position to be damaged, once one 
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dies there is no `you' remaining to be harmed. 
In Tom Stoppard's `Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead' the protagonists 
debate the `no subject' problem. 
Rosencrantz: We might as well be dead. Do you think death could 
possibly be a boat? 
Guildenstern: "No, no, no... Death is ... not. Death isn't. You take my 
meaning. Death is the ultimate negative. Not-being. You 
can't not-be on a boat. 
Rosencrantz: I've frequently not been on boats. 
Guildenstern: No, no, no - what you've been is not on boats. 45 
This dialogue I think neatly captures the Epicurean idea that "death, the most 
terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist death is not with us; but 
when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living 
or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more". 46 
How can the now dead person be harmed? All that remains of him is his material 
body. To avoid this problem we must think of the person not simply in terms of his 
present condition but from an objective and timeless perspective. Feinberg writes 
"The view I would like to defend is that the interests harmed by events that occur at 
or after the moment a person's nonexistence commences are interests of the living 
person who is no longer with us, not the interests of the decaying body he left 
behind". 47 The account of harming the dead to which I adhere, following such 
authors as Feinberg, George Pitcher, Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and others 
involves considering more than just the subject of the harm's present state when 
deciding whether or not to call an occurrence harmful. Nagel says "most good and 
ill fortune has as its subject a person identified by his history and possibilities, rather 
than merely by his categorical state of the moment - and ... while this subject can 
be exactly located in a sequence of places and times, the same is not necessarily 
true of the goods and ills that befall him". 48 On this account, harms of which we are 
unaware, even harms after death, "constitute a perfectly intelligible catastrophe". 49 
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This helps us to begin to make sense of the idea of posthumous harming. Feinberg 
says "All interests are the interests of some person or other, and a person's 
surviving interests are simply the ones that we identify by naming him, the person 
whose interests they were. He is of course at this moment dead but that does not 
prevent us from referring now, in the present tense, to his interests, if they are still 
capable of being blocked or fulfilled, just as we refer to his outstanding debts or 
claims, as if they are still capable of being paid. The final tally book on a person's 
life is not closed until some time after his death". 50 
The idea that posthumous events can constitute harms has enormous intuitive 
plausibility. Most people (even philosophers who hold that harms, generally, must 
be experienced to count as harms, for example, Peter Carruthers51), think that 
death is a harm. More than that, they think that death is often the worst harm 
imaginable (this depends on factors such as the age of the dying person, and their 
condition - the death of someone in intractable pain may not be seen as a worse 
harm than continued life). 52 Yet the `no subject problem' applies with equal force to 
the idea that death is a harm as it does to the notion of a posthumous harm: if one 
denies that the latter can be harmful one must also deny that the former can be. 
And consider our everyday thoughts about murder: we do usually think that this is a 
great evil. But if the murder is instantaneous and painless then, according to the no 
subject problem, where is the harm? This seems very counterintuitive. We need to 
be aware, also, that the `no subject problem' applies to some unfortunate people 
who are not dead. Consider someone rendered irreversibly unconscious: such a 
condition is, subjectively, identical with death. That is to say, unlike the living but 
ignorant who could theoretically be made aware of their situation, these people can 
never know about things occurring after they lose consciousness for the last time. 
Our pretheoretical feelings when we think about such things are not only sympathy 
for the family of the victim of such an accident, we also feel sorry for the victim 
himself: we feel that a terrible thing has befallen him even if he himself is not aware 
of it. I hope the above discussion has been sufficiently compelling to establish that 
there is at least `something in' the idea that one can be harmed by events occurring 
after one's death, although, given the seemingly intractable debate on the matter, I 
am sure they do not provide a final solution. 
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What sorts of interests survive death? 
Of course, not all interests can survive death: only the type which Regan calls 
`preference interests' - interests in things - are really plausible candidates (I discuss 
welfare and preference interests in much more detail in the next chapter). And the 
category needs to be restricted still further: the sort of preference interests that 
require a change in the person's state will necessarily expire with their owners. So, 
for example, a desire that I finish a project (not that my project be finished) will die 
with me, as will my interest in enjoying myself and in avoiding pain. The interests 
which survive are those which do not involve the deceased taking an active role - 
say an interest in one's children or one's business flourishing. I think that concerns 
regarding the disposal of one's body are of this sort. 
Harming the antemortem person 
Having established, I trust, the intuitive plausibility of the idea that a dead person 
can be harmed by having his surviving interests invaded, it is now open to me to 
ask in what way can they be harmed? George Pitcher and Joel Feinberg 
distinguish ways of thinking about the deceased into two categories: the 
postmortem person and the antemortem person. The former would be a description 
of the dead person as they are now - dead matter; the latter a description of the 
person as they were while living. As Pitcher writes: "no one would want to argue 
seriously that a postmortem person can be harmed after his death... A serious 
question can arise only over the issue of whether or not an antemortem person can 
be harmed after his death. The question is this: is it possible for something to 
happen after a person's death that harms the living person he was before he 
died? ". 53 
`Backward causation' 
There is an obvious problem with this sort of account however: "If the interests are 
those of the living person who is no more, then the problem is to explain how his lot 
can be made better or worse, as it were retroactively'. 54 The solution to this 
apparent paradox is that "posthumous harms do not entail backward causation 
because they ... do not entail physical causation at all... The occurrence of the 
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harmful posthumous event ... makes it true that the antemortem person is harmed, 
and that occurrence is in a sense responsible for the antemortem harm". 55 Pitcher 
offers the analogy of harm caused by events occurring some distance away: if a 
man, Black, loses his son in a plane crash in some remote part of the world we 
would still say that he is harmed without needing to postulate "the plane crash 
sending out infinitely rapid waves of horror, diminishing Black's metaphysical 
condition". 56 
Problems remain of course: there are, for example, problems in determining when 
an antemortem person begins to be harmed by a posthumous event. 57 Feinberg 
notes that "we would be well advised not to seek more precision in answer to such 
questions than the subject matter permits"58, which may or may not be a cop out. 
And, despite its slight incongruity, this account seems to me to be the best way of 
capturing the important intuition that the dead are harmed by events occurring after 
their deaths. Feinbergs' earlier work, which involved interests surviving their owner 
as free floating entities, was comprehensively refuted by Ernest Partridge (1981). 
To conclude this section, I believe that we have direct moral obligations to the dead 
based on properties of the people themselves. If I am correct then the removal of 
organs against the wishes of the deceased seem to be a definite case of 
posthumous harm. 
Are `surviving interests' sufficient to outweigh the benefit to 
potential recipients? 
Surviving interests confer moral status upon the dead just as more usual interests 
confer moral status upon the living - they give us moral reasons to do with the 
person themselves not to do certain things to them. But how strong are the 
obligations conferred by surviving interests? As an analogy, in chapter three I will 
argue that animals have interests and so possess moral status and that we thus 
have prima facie reasons not to cause them pain or to kill them. Yet I still believe 
that it is morally permissible to kill them in order to give their organs to humans - 
the enormous benefit of saving a human life trumps the obligation to (usually) 
refrain from taking animal life. By the same token is it not open to Professor Harris 
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to concede that the dead have surviving interests but still to claim that these 
interests are overridden by the interest in continued life of those in need of organs? 
I need to provide further argument if I am to convincingly argue that we are morally 
prohibited from excising organs from the unwilling dead. 
I do not think that harming `surviving interests' is the only thing which makes Harris' 
policy morally impermissible. I also object to it on the grounds that using the dead 
against their wishes causes moral problems for the living and, more fundamentally, 
because I do not believe that the situations of people living with organ failure and of 
potential donors need to be compared in the way that Harris believes they ought. 
The former is a small point, so I begin with this. The second is what I call `the 
problem of non-moral space' and is given a detailed discussion in a few pages' time. 
Harm to the living 
It is possible to argue that there are some things which it is wrong to do after a 
person's death whilst denying Feinberg's claim that the dead are `harmed'. These 
arguments take several forms, the following may not exhaust the possibilities: (1) 
that failing to respect the wishes of the dead damages an important social institution 
and so constitutes a harm to the living and (2) that regardless of the damage done 
to the institution of promising we simply ought to respect a promise made to the 
dead, just as we ought to respect promises made to the living. For reasons of 
space I cannot go into detail on these points, but offer a brief synopsis of each. 
Regarding point (1), it seems plausible that to fail to respect the wishes of a given 
dead person would damage the institution of respecting the wishes of the dead 
(more formally, the institutions of keeping promises to the dead, or of respecting 
wills) and would leave presently living agents wondering whether their, as it were, 
`to-be-deceased' wishes would be respected. As Partridge says "Formal contracts 
such as wills, and informal contracts such as promises, can thus purposefully and 
intelligibly be drawn to protect the interest of the living, while alive, to affect events 
beyond their death. The survivors, having similar motives, are well advised to 
protect their interests by respecting the wishes of the deceased, thus strengthening 
the just traditions and social contracts that protect the interests and expectations of 
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all, while alive, to have posthumous interests". 59 Respect for the living, then, gives 
us a reason why posthumous wishes ought to be respected. If a will is violated on 
the grounds that the will writer is dead and so `beyond harm, ' "those who violated 
the will would lessen their own expectations that their wills, in time, would be secure 
after their deaths". 60 And regarding point (2) it also seems plausible that, for similar 
reasons to those discussed above, promises can survive the death of the promisee. 
Barring an unforeseen change in circumstances the promiser ought still to carry out 
his promise. The analogy with debts may be useful here: we talk of a person's 
debts (or assets) as surviving them, even though they themselves are no longer 
capable of paying them back, or of caring if their assets are squandered. 
These ways of respecting the wishes of the dead for reasons not directly concerning 
the dead are very useful - they avoid the lingering doubts about how the dead can 
be harmed and provides further ammunition against a possible Harris rejoinder that 
organs should be taken from the dead even if doing so harms them. However I 
prefer to think of these arguments as constituting additional reasons against 
disrespecting the wishes of a dead person, working in conjunction with the theory of 
posthumous harming, rather than in isolation. The idea that certain things done to a 
dead person damage them, the dead person, underlies certain common sense 
intuitions which we are loath to relinquish. 
Conclusion to the `agent centred restrictions' section 
The first objection to Harris' proposal then is that it can involve harming some 
people in order to benefit others, an idea that strikes many people as being wrong 
and which is also backed up by moral argument. There are some things we must 
not do to people, just to benefit others. This does not mean that it is always wrong 
to harm some to benefit others of course. Whether it is wrong will depend partly on 
the nature of the harm, on the significance of the benefit and on the alternatives 
available. I discuss some circumstances under which it may be morally desirable to 
harm some people for the sake of others in the next section and hope from that 
discussion to make it clear why the plight of those needing organs, although terribly 
sad, is not a circumstance that justifies the unwilling excision of organs from the 
dead. Before I explain this, I wish to briefly explore a small side argument which 
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Harris employs to support his claim that organs ought always to be removed. 
The argument from precedent: Coroners' postmortems 
Harris is prepared for the sorts of response I made above. Because of this he 
argues that, although we may commonsensically believe in such `agent centred' 
restrictions on action, there is in fact a precedent for going against the wishes of the 
dead with regard to what is done with their bodies: it is not possible to refuse 
consent for a Coroner's postmortem examination. "Postmortems can be ordered in 
the public interest. If there's a public interest in finding out the cause of death - and 
... 
[the 1999 Alder Hey and Bristol organ retention scandals] ... show not all the 
bits 
are put back - how much greater is the public interest in saving the life of a citizen 
at risk? ". 61 
As an aside, I think that the fact that organs were retained without consent and 
without the relatives' knowledge in Bristol and Liverpool is irrelevant to the present 
question. Harris wishes to convince us that, despite the distaste some people may 
feel for compulsory organ retrieval, it is something with which we ought to be made 
to come to terms. I do not believe anyone would accept, or that Harris is seriously 
proposing, that removing organs without informing the relatives (whether or not 
consent ought to have been obtained) is an example of a desirable practice with 
which the public ought to reconcile itself. 
However, my main objection is to Harris' styling post mortems (PMs) as being in the 
public interest. I accept that the public interest and the interests of future patients 
with the same disease is part of the reason why we wish to find out the cause of 
death in unusual cases, but it is by no means the only reason. PMs are often done 
in cases where foul play or medical negligence are suspected -I would argue that 
in these circumstances the examination is not done for the public (although the 
public obviously benefit if a murderer is caught) but for the dead person -- so that 
action may be taken against the person who harmed him, just as it would be against 
someone who harmed a still living person. D. Gareth Jones writes "it would seem 
that the nature of the consent required to carry out autopsies for audit and teaching/ 
research purposes is different from that required for coronial purposes when 
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sudden, unexplained death has occurred. In the former situation, justification for the 
autopsy stems far more from the needs of the biomedical profession than from 
those of the deceased, whereas in the latter the reverse hoids". 62 PMs are also 
often done for the purposes of easing the grief of those left behind - to tell them 
why their loved one died and also, in the case where a genetic risk factor is 
suspected, to discover whether they too are at risk. While this is a case of doing 
something for third parties, not for the dead person themselves, it is not done in the 
`public interest'. 
Another reason why the cases are not analogous is that, following a PM, all the 
organs are returned to the body to be buried or cremated (barring those infamous 
cases a few years ago), or, if they are not, consent is specifically obtained. If the 
desire to remain `whole' is what motivates many people to refuse consent to donate 
their organs (and it seems likely that it is), people with such beliefs may not have 
such a strong objection to a PM as the organs are returned to the body afterwards 
(although I accept that they are likely to find even the temporary removal of their 
organs to be offensive). 
The final point is that Coroners' postmortems are relatively rare: hospital 
postmortems (which the premortem patient or his relatives are free to refuse) are 
much more common. While the public may not object to having no right to refuse if 
they think that PMs only happen relatively rarely (or, as is also possibly the case, 
while there is no public outcry because it is not common knowledge that there is no 
right to refuse a PM), Harris' proposal would involve a much more widespread use 
of the dead and so would be more likely to provoke public displeasure, I think. 63 
Second objection to Harris: non-moral space 
My second main point of contention with Harris' theory is that, by claiming that our 
`concern' for those in need of organs justifies our removing organs from the dead 
against their wishes, it is too demanding. Let us make the strongest case for Harris 
and ignore the difficulties I think we would face in finding a scale on which to order 
these different sorts of harms. Let us agree with Harris that dying is `worse' than 
having one's interests regarding the disposal of one's body thwarted. Even if we 
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were to concede all this, it is not obvious how this would require us, ordinary people 
with no medical qualifications, to do anything to help those with failing organs. 64 
This is, I think, the strongest objection to Professor Harris' policy. One may accept 
that the benefit to the living organ recipient outweighs the harm done to the dead 
unwilling `donor' (or one may at least accept that it is problematic simply to assert 
that the harm to the dead is sufficient to rule the action out). But, even if one makes 
this concession to Harris, one is not required to accept that his policy should be put 
into practice. Regardless of the benefit obtained we need not perform involuntary 
organ removal as it requires too much. 
Utilitarianism makes no distinction between causing an event and allowing it to 
happen when it was physically within our power to prevent - we are as responsible 
for outcomes which we fail to prevent when it is in our power to do so as we are for 
events we straightforwardly cause. This is at odds with our common sense belief in 
what Peter Carruthers calls `non-moral space'. In ordinary life not many of us 
believe that we have a duty to help all those people we could possibly help (unless. 
perhaps we have caused them to be in their harmed condition, or unless perhaps 
the circumstances are extraordinary), even if it would cost us little or nothing to do 
so. So although we can agree with Harris that it is a great shame that people are 
dying for lack of organs (and who could disagree) we need not agree with his 
conclusion that this compels us to acquire organs against the wishes of their 
previous owners. 
Harris thinks that not only may people donate their organs, but that the suitable 
dead are obliged to donate their organs, or rather, that doctors are obliged to 
remove organs from all suitable cadavers without obtaining consent. He says that 
those who refuse to allow their organs to be used "would have to explain why they 
would wish other people to die rather than have their organs used"65 and talks of 
"other areas of human life [in which] we believe that we have an obligation to ensure 
the survival of the maximum number of lives possible". 66 What can we say in 
response to this? 
The importance of intention 
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The first thing to note is that, by talking of `wishing to let people die', Harris seems to 
be tacitly appealing to the utilitarian claim that there is no moral difference between 
active killing and allowing to die. In `The Marxist Conception of Violence' he makes 
this point explicit: "If we have a duty not to kill others, it would be strange indeed if 
the duty not to kill by positive actions was somehow stronger than the duty not to kill 
by negative actions. "67 But to say that those who refuse to donate their organs 
`wish other people to die' seems to be a very strange thing to say. Surely we can 
differentiate between something that we simply did not do and something we 
refrained from with the intent that a harm occur? Why does Harris think that killing 
should be equivalent to letting die in this case? 
I accept that, in those popular thought experiments in which a doctor, believing 
death to be in his patient's best interests, either acts so as to hasten death or 
refrains from acting to slow the process, if the underlying intention - that the 
patient's life is ended - remains the same, then perhaps it is difficult to speak of a 
moral difference between acts and omissions. However, someone who refuses to 
donate their organs need not have the death of the thwarted recipient as their 
intention (indeed we would be shocked if this were the case). They may well 
fervently wish that the recipient obtain an organ from another source, or that they 
miraculously recover from their illness. They may also not think in terms of thwarted 
recipients at all. All the person who refuses to donate aims at, it seems to me, is 
having their body remain whole after their death. 
So it seems to me that, in the above, Harris conflates those cases of killing/letting 
die comparisons when the intention - that the person dies - is the same, with those 
cases when a death is a foreseen but not intended consequence of one's actions. 
While I am prepared to agree with him that the acts/omissions distinction often may 
not be morally relevant I think there is a moral difference between intending a death 
and simply foreseeing that it will occur. By phrasing the refusal to donate in terms 
of the acts and omissions distinction - in terms of `wishing to let someone die' - 
Harris gives it a moral weight which it does not merit: he makes the person who 
refuses to donate appear morally culpable when, I believe, they are not (they may 
be guilty of a lack of charity but this is a moral failing of far less magnitude than 
allowing someone to die). And, in fact, in the case of those who refuse to donate 
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their organs, it may not even be correct to say that the death of the recipient is 
foreseen. As I noted in the introduction, not all transplants are lifesaving. 
Denying agents freedom 
On Harris' account the only thing that counts is the consequences: something has 
occurred which reduces the total amount of good in the world and which must be 
rectified if at all possible. But if omitting to help is thought of in these general terms 
- that the fact that there is someone, somewhere, who could be helped - it seems 
impossibly restrictive, denying agents the opportunity ever to be saintly, or to 
engage in non moral activities. The problem here is that, under utilitarianism, it 
seems impossible to do more than one ought - acts are divided into two categories: 
either morally obligatory or morally prohibited. Commonsense morality customarily 
adds a third category, supererogatory acts, which, although a very good thing to do, 
are not obligatory. We do not usually think that we are obliged to do `absolutely 
anything' to save others, even when the cost to us is relatively trivial. We do not 
give all the blood we can give (indeed 90% of the population of the UK does not 
give at all), we do not give all our spare money to charity, we do not all place 
ourselves on the bone marrow donation register. And we do not think of ourselves 
as morally blameworthy if we spend some of our time idly watching television or on 
holiday rather than working for the underprivileged. 
Bernard Williams says "It is because consequentialism attaches value ultimately to 
states of affairs, and its concern is with what states of affairs the world contains, that 
it essentially involves the notion of negative responsibility. that if I am ever 
responsible for anything, then I must be just as much responsible for things that I 
allow or fail to prevent, as I am for things that I myself, in the more everyday 
restricted sense, bring about". 68 Under a consequentialist scheme, agents are 
required to give up their personal plans and projects and, presumably, those 
obligations and rights stemming not from general duties one has to everyone but 
which arise specifically from personal situations - families, friendships, promise 
making, wronging etc., whenever doing so would increase the general good. This 
requirement in itself is not the problem for utilitarianism - almost every other moral 
theory (nonegoistic theory at least) could require great sacrifice under appropriate 
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circumstances. The problem lies in the utilitarian insistence that each agent in all 
cases produce the best available outcome. In other words, there is a discrepancy 
between "the way in which concerns and commitments are naturally generated from 
a person's point of view quite independently of the weight of those concerns in an 
inpersonal ranking of overall states affairs, and the way in which utilitarianism 
requires the agent to treat the concerns generated from his point of view as 
altogether dependent for their moral significance on their weight in such a 
ranking". 69 It is this which alienates the agent "from his actions and the source of 
his action in his own conviction and thereby ... undermine[s] his 
integrity". 70 
The oddness of thinking that reducing suffering is always the 
most important thing for us to do 
Why does the fact that there is this unfortunate state of affairs -a person whose 
organs are failing - have any consequences for what we, as uninvolved parties, not 
doctors or nurses, have to do? David Schmidtz makes this point well in a thought 
experiment he call `Fast Pain Relief'. This imagines that there is a button which, if 
pushed, will cause all sentient life to painlessly cease to exist. "You will, of course, 
minimize suffering in the process". 71 Schmidtz says, correctly I feel, that this case 
"shows us that minimizing suffering is not the only thing that matters. Nor is it 
always what matters most. Further, there are things (eg all sentient life) that ought 
not to be sacrificed merely to minimize suffering". 72 Whether minimising suffering 
matters a little or a lot in the cosmic scheme of things need not be addressed 
because "suffering could matter quite a lot without it being true that we ought to 
spend quite a lot of our lives working to put an end to it". 73 
An aside about `prevention cases' 
To say all these things does not, of course, mean that the appeal to consequences 
has no power; it would be absurd to say this. This is the intuition from which Harris' 
point derives its strength I think. Most people (nonutilitarian philosophers included) 
tend to favour something like Harris' `rule for maximising the number of lives saved' 
under certain circumstances, or at least not to rule it out. 
Under what circumstances does the appeal to consequences permit (although not, 
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think, compel) nonutilitarians to harm some people for the sake of others? Perhaps 
looking at more concrete examples of the above sort will help us reach a definite 
conclusion. I am thinking here of such well known philosophical `intuition pumps' as 
Bernard Williams' example of `Jim and the Indians', in which a tyrannical dictator 
invites Jim, a (so far) innocent bystander, to kill one of a group of hapless Indians 
who are due to be executed unjustly. If Jim kills the one the remainder will be set 
free, if he refuses all (including the one) will be shot. Or, as another example, the 
equally well known case of `the fat potholer', in which, if the fat man blocking the 
entrance to a rapidly flooding cave is not blown up and killed he, and the rest of his 
trapped party, will die. If he is blown up and the entrance thus cleared the 
remainder of the group will be rescued. If the cases are formulated this way two 
important points must be noted. The first is that the situations are extremely 
unusual. The second point is that formulating the cases this way presents the 
agents with choices in which they must choose the lesser of two evils. Everyone is 
at risk: the fat potholer and the single Indian picked out for execution are going to 
die in any case. In such extraordinary cases, where a decision has to be made if all 
are not to perish, and where we cannot save all at risk, I think we may (although we 
are still not compelled in the way Harris says we are) think it right to maximise the 
number of lives saved, even if this does involve doing harm to some people (killing 
them) to benefit others. It is this combination of a rare `one off' situation and the 
need to make a decision which will result in the death of some which makes the 
difference. 
It is not very clear how prevention cases like this can be made relevant to the 
situation in which one of the parties is dead; in the above emergencies all are at 
risk. The situation becomes more complicated when acting involves harming 
someone who was not at risk74 so it seems likely that even more complications 
would ensue when one of the parties is dead. The `extraordinary circumstances' 
condition still applies however. For example, in the event of a plane crash in a 
remote desert when one of the passengers dies but not before he tells the 
remainder that he has religious beliefs that means his body must remain whole, it 
may be that the survivors are permitted to dissect and eat the body of the dead 
person if that is their only hope of surviving until rescue arrives. But because this is 
a `one off' situation it does not lead to the conclusion that we can routinely use the 
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dead against their wishes to save the lives of others. Everyday tragedies such as 
the plight of those in end stage organ failure are sadly neither extraordinary nor 
likely to end in the foreseeable future. Thus they are not ones in which we feel a 
decision need be made - we cannot morally retrieve organs against the donors' and 
families' wishes. As Anne Maclean says "The situation ... [of people with failing 
organs] ... is not at all unusual, and it would not be perceived as one which requires 
a decision or choice". 75 
Is the case of posthumous donation unique? 
It could be argued that the case of posthumous nonvoluntary organ donation is not 
relevantly similar to other cases in which the demands of utilitarianism are seen as 
excessive (such as those in which we are compelled to donate all our money to 
famine relief until we reach the point of marginal utility) because in the case of 
donating money, although the cost is arguably trivial compared to the benefit, there 
is still a cost. Organ donation, on the other hand, does not cost the dead person 
anything at all, because they can never know of it. If, as I argued above, it makes 
sense to talk of the dead having interests and being capable of being harmed then if 
some dead people wish their bodies to remain whole after their death, they can be 
said to have an interest in their bodies remaining whole and are harmed if this is not 
respected (the antemortem person is harmed). 
But there is a second response to this objection: to think in these terms is to step 
into Harris' model of thinking - that the fact that there is something bad entails that 
we are duty bound to help. I do not believe this to always be the case. So the dead 
need not (are not compelled to) offer their remains for general use after death, just 
as the living need not offer to donate blood or give their money or time to charitable 
causes. To compel them to give up their claim to decide what ought to happen to 
their remains is to require too much, just as it requires too much to compel the living 
to forgo some things so as to make time for striving to make the world a better 
place. 
Conclusion to the discussion of Harris' `hard law' 
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Harris' theory requires too much: he needs to do more than point up the fact that 
organs are `wasted' to establish we are obliged to do something about it, especially 
when doing something about it involves causing harm. The fact that it is physically 
possible for us to change things does not mean that we are obliged to do so. Whilst 
I am sure that my brief overview of this debate cannot provide a knockdown 
argument against Harris I hope my discussion has at least cast doubt on the 
suggestion that we are obliged to compare the two groups, donors and recipients. 
Other alternatives to the opt in system of cadaveric donation 
Harris' proposal does not exhaust the possibilities for change from the current 
position in the UK. `Presumed consent' and `required request' are two other options 
which would obtain more organs than are available under the present system. 
Presumed consent can take different forms: it may be `hard', as it is in Austria, 
where the views of relatives are not taken into account (were it not for the possibility 
of opting out during life this proposal would be as strong as that of Harris) or `soft' as 
in Spain, where relatives' views are sought and are allowed to override the 
presumption in favour of donation. Required request is as it sounds: simply an 
obligation on the part of intensive care staff always to ask relatives of potential 
donors. What can be said about these schemes? The first thing to notice is that, 
like `hard law', they involve a conflict between the need to respect a patient's 
autonomy and the need to the maximise the number of lives saved. As Jones says 
"Proponents of presumed consent argue that the value of self-determination must 
be balanced by another value, that of maximising overall well-being or benefit". 76 
Arguments for presumed consent 
Presumed consent is proven to increase the number of organs available. According 
to a report presented at the International Congress of the Transplantation Society 
meeting recently, the nations with the highest per capita organ donation rates in the 
world are Spain, Austria and Belgium (all operating under presumed consent 
laws).!? Moving to such a policy would arguably also increase donor numbers 
among those declared dead according to non brainstem criteria: it would permit 
those who die in accident and emergency departments and on general wards to be 
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prepared for donation (for example by having cooling fluid introduced into their 
bodies, and by having chest compressions continued) while the relatives are being 
sought. This is not currently permitted in the UK. (I discuss these and other 
potential sources of organs from non heart beating donors in the next section. ) 
Finally it is argued that presumed consent relieves the burden on families. "Many 
families do not know the wishes of their loved ones, and when faced with the 
decision at the time of a tragic event, they do not consent to donation of their next of 
kin's organs. We believe the paperwork should be handled before, when people are 
calm and thinking clearly. This shouldn't be something that the family has to deal 
with at the time of losing a loved one". 78 
Presumed consent is, in fact, not a great conceptual distance from the present law 
in the UK as set out in the Human Tissue Act of 1961. "The Act states that if a 
person has expressed a wish in writing or orally in the presence of two or more 
witnesses during his or her last illness, that their body or any specified part may be 
used after death, the person "lawfully in possession" of their body - interpreted as 
the hospital authorities if they have died in hospital - may, unless there is reason to 
believe the request was subsequently withdrawn, authorise removal from the body 
of any part in accordance with the request. If there is no evidence of such a wish 
the person lawfully in possession of the body may still authorise the removal of the 
organs provided that, after making "reasonable enquires" there is no reason to 
believe that the deceased had expressed an objection or that the surviving spouse 
or any surviving relative objects"79 (my italics). However, "In practice, relatives are 
always consulted and asked to give explicit consent. Where they cannot be found or 
they refuse, donation does not take place". 80 
Arguments against presumed consent 
One problem with presumed consent is the risk of causing distress to relatives and, 
by so doing, creating ill will which would outweigh any advantages. If organs were 
removed and relatives subsequently came forward with objections the cause of 
transplantation could suffer adverse publicity. Offending the family's feelings could 
have a major impact on their trust and respect for the medical profession. It is also 
possible that the recipient could be exposed to medical risks if organs are removed 
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without discussion with relatives. Families are a valuable source of information 
about their loved one's previous health and lifestyle and are questioned as part of 
the donor screening process. A final concern is that if an individual does not 
register an objection this silence may indicate a lack of understanding rather than 
an agreement with the policy. As D. Gareth Jones states "If individuals and families 
are not told they can opt-out, or how they may object to organ donation, presumed 
consent could essentially become a means of avoiding consent altogether". 81 For 
these reasons, in the majority of countries operating an opt out system health care 
professionals still ask the family for consent. 82 
Required request 
Required request is the `weakest' of the proposed changes to the opt in scheme (it 
entails the smallest divergence from the present opt in system). A policy of this sort 
is already operated in parts of the United States and, according to a circular within 
the transplant profession which I received some months ago, moves are afoot to 
move to such a policy informally in the UK (although there are no plans to make it a 
legal requirement). True required referral is defined thus: "that it shall be illegal, as 
well as irresponsible and immoral to disconnect a ventilator from an individual who 
is declared dead following brain stem testing without first making proper enquiry as 
to the possibility of that individual's tissues and organs being used for the purposes 
of transplantation". 83 The policy means opportunities for donation are less likely to 
be overlooked and supporters argue that, far from being an intrusion, approaching 
all families regarding donation actually eases suffering. I am not sure that all 
families would find that donation eases their pain, but it certainly seems to be true 
that, for some people, a donation can be a great source of comfort in coming to 
terms with such a loss. As things stand at present it is possible that they will not be 
given this opportunity. The website for UK Transplant - the body which 
orchestrates and regulates transplantation in this country - phrases this rather 
strongly -- "Many individuals may be having their right to donate removed if their 
relatives are not approached. The next of kin also have a moral and legal right to 
know they can donate organs and tissue if they or the family so wish. "84 
Ought the UK to move to a presumed consent or required 
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request policy? 
The British Medical Association is in favour of opt out. The general population 
seems to be less so. "The transplant community and the population of the UK are 
divided over the issue. In an opinion poll carried out by the Department of Health in 
1999,50% of the public said they favoured the current system, 28% supported a 
shift to presumed consent and 22% expressed no preference". 85 An opt out policy 
is attractive in that it captures more donors, both of the conventional heart beating 
brainstem dead kind and by permitting interventions on newly dead people whose 
deaths did not occur in an intensive care unit. It is quite likely that a large proportion 
of the increased numbers would come from those twenty five percent of potentially 
suitable brainstem dead people whose relatives are not presently approached 
regarding donation and from non heart beating sources whose organs would be 
salvageable if a presumed consent policy allowed them to be prepared immediately 
after death. One would hope that those people who actively object to the policy 
would exercise their right to opt out. However, the concern that donation under 
such a system could be simply the result of a failure to consider the matter rather 
than an informed desire not to opt out is significant. It should be ensured that the 
policy is well advertised and people be presented with every opportunity to opt out: 
a compulsory yes/no answer section could perhaps be included on driving license 
and passport applications. The need not to cause public outrage is also very 
important. The general public has been shown not to be wholeheartedly in favour of 
the move and, especially in light of recent organ retention scandals in the UK which 
shook public faith in the medical profession, it is important for transplanters not to 
appear to be `body snatchers' as such adverse publicity can have a negative effect 
on donation rates as a whole. While neither problem perhaps gives us reason to 
rule out an opt out policy they provide significant stumbling blocks. If a presumed 
consent policy is adopted it ought to be along the lines of the Spanish system with 
scope for the relatives to refuse, rather than the Austrian policy, and perhaps 
ultimately, as Jones states, "it is preferable to increase the supply of organs by other 
means". 86 
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Preparing the dying for donation: non heart beating donors 
The various opt out policies discussed above do not exhaust all the possibilities for 
increasing the number of cadaveric donors. `Non heart beating donors' (hereafter 
NHBDs) were, prior to the establishment of brain based criteria for death, the only 
source of organs for transplantation. However, organs from a body in which 
circulation has ceased some minutes prior to excision are considerably less 
desirable than organs from the brainstem dead which (as the declaration of death 
does not require cardiac arrest and asystole) are perfused with warm oxygenated 
blood up to the moment the organs are removed. In the kidney, the only 
transplanted organ with which I have any degree of personal experience, warm 
ischaemic injury causes, in the short term, acute tubular necrosis -- delayed function 
of the transplant due to death of renal tubules, which are particularly susceptible to 
being deprived of oxygen. In the long term it is associated with suboptimal function 
and shorter graft survival times when compared to a kidney which has a short warm 
ischaemic time (all transplanted kidneys are exposed to at least a few minutes of 
warm ischaemia as they are being connected to the blood vessels of the recipient). 
Other organs may be rendered untranspiantable by being subjected to a prolonged 
period of warm ischaemia (in fact few organs other than the kidney are used from 
such donors as, while delayed function in a new kidney is survivable, delayed 
function of a heart or liver is not). For this reason, in the early years of 
transplantation when waiting lists were smaller, the non heart beating donor was 
phased out in favour of the heart beating brainstem dead donor. However, as the 
number of patients entering waiting lists continues year on year to outpace the 
number of available organs people declared dead according to cardiorespiratory 
criteria have once again begun to be considered as sources of organs. 
The variety of patients potentially considerable as NHBDs is broad, encompassing 
such diverse categories as those who suffer cardiac arrest and cannot be 
resuscitated, those who are maintained in an intensive care unit but who do not 
meet the criteria for brainstem death discussed in chapter one, and even (in the 
case of some protocols) those who are alive and competent but with sufficiently 
unpleasant medical conditions that `allowing to die' and subsequent donation is 
considered as an option. As Potts and Herdman put it: "These patients are either 
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competent with intolerable quality of life or incompetent but not brain dead, because 
of severe, generally neurological, illness or injury with an extremely poor prognosis 
as to survival or any meaningful functional status. A significant number of patients 
therefore, can be identified for whom, after proper safeguards and with informed 
consent from the competent patient or from surrogate decision maker(s) for the 
incompetent patient, life-sustaining treatment may be discontinued. "87 
NHBDs may be divided into two rough categories. (In fact, current NHS policy is to 
divide NHBDs into four categories - `dead on arrival', `unsuccessful resuscitation', 
`awaiting cardiac death' and `cardiac death in a brain dead donor'. 88 These 
subtleties are not necessary to my argument here). Controlled NHBDs are those 
whose cardiorespiratory function is being artificially supported but who cannot be 
declared dead according to brainstem death criteria - perhaps because of the 
presence in their bloodstream of drugs which could conceivably mimic some of the 
symptoms of brainstem death, or for other, more radical reasons (such as that they 
are not dead). This category is the most desirable as it allows doctors to "maintain 
as normal as possible blood and oxygen supply to organs, [to] provide organ- 
conserving interventions as necessary, discontinue breathing and circulatory 
support when a proper decision and proper consent to do so has been obtained to 
allow the irreversible cessation of cardiac and pulmonary function so as to meet the 
legal standard of death, and then to begin preserving and removing organs as soon 
as possible before they start to deteriorate". 89 Uncontrolled donors are those 
whose cardiac function has not been artificially supported. These are usually 
people brought into accident and emergency departments having suffered cardiac 
arrest, or people suffering such an arrest on a general ward. "This "uncontrolled" 
event dictates great speed in retrieving organs, early organ preservation 
interventions, or sequences of resuscitation efforts that start and stop depending on 
the status of the donor and the transplantable organs. "90 
`Uncontrolled' NHBDs 
The different categories pose discrete ethical problems. The major problem with 
uncontrolled donors is that, in order for organs to be salvageable, interventions 
aimed at preserving them "must be started so quickly after death that circumstances 
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do not allow consent to be obtained". 91 Leicester, the only UK centre to have 
recently attempted to operate an uncontrolled NHBD program, retrieved a small 
number of kidneys in this way. Although kidneys obtained by this method are not 
removed until after consent has been obtained, uncontrolled NHBDs usually have 
cannulae sited in their femoral arteries and are perfused with cold preservation fluid. 
They may also be placed on a machine which performs chest compressions and be 
given anticoagulant and vasodilating drugs. This treatment of the dead for the 
benefit of others, without knowing their wishes, seems somewhat akin to Harris' 
proposal above and the primary objection to it is the same: that it constitutes 
disrespectful treatment of the dead body (it is also relevantly similar to the practising 
of endotracheal intubation, which I mentioned at the conclusion of my discussion of 
Harris). 
If restricted to those who arrive in A&E carrying a donor card the policy is, 
technically, lawful under the present Human Tissues Act (whether or not it is ethical 
perhaps depends on whether the holder of the donor card was fully acquainted with 
the small print of the Act), which (as the reader will recall) states: "If any person, 
either in writing at any time or orally in the presence of two or more witnesses 
during his last illness, has expressed a request that his body or any specified part of 
his body be used after his death for therapeutic purposes or for purposes of medical 
education or research, the person lawfully in possession of his body after his death 
may, unless he has a reason to believe that the request was subsequently 
withdrawn, authorise the removal from the body of any part or, as the case may be, 
the specified part, for use in accordance with the request". 92 
However, the backlash among the general public was sufficiently severe to cause 
the Leicester unit to suspend its uncontrolled donor policy (controlled donors are still 
used) and it seems unlikely that retrieval from uncontrolled NHBDs will ever again 
become a practical possibility unless the law is changed to a formal presumed 
consent law which would authorise, when there is not notice to the contrary, 
"nonconsensual organ perfusion or even in some cases organ removal while 
awaiting consent for donation". 93 
Another potential objection to uncontrolled non heart beating donors is the definition 
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of death used. Potts and Herdman note that among policies in the USA the 
definitions of death employed are not constant, and that organ retrieval programmes 
"either are unclear or specify organ removal from immediately to 5 minutes after 
heart stoppage". 94 Orr et al note that a particular heart retrieval policy which they 
examined required only ""two minutes of pulselessness" which may include 
asystole, ventricular fibrillation, or electro-mechanical disassociation". 95 This does 
not sit easily with the definition of death discussed in the previous chapter as the 
irreversible cessation of the body system: the donor is declared dead according to 
cardiac criteria but then the retrieved heart is restored to function in the recipient's 
body. Orr et al observe that death would not be declared in the recipient if he or she 
underwent such a period of pulselessness while awaiting surgery. Any protocol 
which leaves itself open to the criticism that the donors are not dead yet are treated 
as such ought to be amended, in order to avoid having a negative impact on the 
public perception of transplantation. The Leicester protocol did not succumb to 
such objections, I think. Hearts were not retrieved and so the team were able to 
leave the donor body for much longer following the cessation of cardiac function -a 
minimum of ten minutes - sufficient to ensure that the heart muscle was irreversibly 
damaged. 96 This fits much more easily with a definition of death as the irreversible 
cessation of function of the body system as a whole, while allowing that parts of the 
system - the kidneys - could still be utilised. 
Controlled NHBDs 
Controlled donors, then, appear to raise the fewest problems, both technically and 
ethically. However, there are problems here too. Transplantation has (with the 
exception of living related donor programmes) always been bound by the so called 
`dead donor rule' which states that "persons who have been or may be designated 
as donors have, during a final illness, rights to health care that meets appropriate, 
prevailing medical and ethical standards... Donor patients must not be killed or 
their deaths hastened by the taking of organs ... [and] ... their welfare and care 
must not be compromised by preparation for organ retrieval. "97 
This is backed up by law: as the patient is not legally dead, doctors must act solely 
in his or her interest - to act against their interests without consent could constitute 
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legal battery. And the International Code of Medical Ethics declares that "A 
physician shall act only in the patient's interest when providing medical care which 
might have the effect of weakening the physical and mental condition of the 
patient". 98 Furthermore, "no proxy has the power to authorise otherwise". 99 The 
problem is that some of the procedures performed on controlled NHBDs are not in 
their interests: Potts and Herdman acknowledge that "there must and should be 
interventions undertaken in the management of a patient for whom consent to be an 
organ donor has been given ... that would not be undertaken 
in a nondonor patient 
with a similar medical condition". 100 These take the form both of things which 
prolong the process of dying and could, conceivably, arrest it, and of things which 
hasten the dying process. What may be said about this? 
Concerns that actions intended to optimise the conditions of organs for transplant 
may in fact prevent death in someone clinically proven to have suffered intracranial 
damage incompatible with any meaningful quality of life were partially what 
prompted the Department of Health to declare a moratorium on an NHBD 
programme practised in Exeter in the early 1990s. This policy involved admitting 
patients with rapidly deepening coma due to what the doctors considered 
"irremediable intracranial haemorrhage"101 to intensive care units for the purposes 
of `non therapeutic elective ventilation'. Shaw states that if the policy resulted in 
people entering persistent vegetative states on more than rare occasions "the 
permissibility of the practice would require review". 102 In fact, none of the patients 
enrolled in the Exeter programme survived and their lives were prolonged for no 
more than 24 hours, after which all could be declared dead according to 
conventional brainstem criteria. 103 
However, the case becomes more problematic if the procedure hastens death. 
Potts and Herdman in their 1997 report appear to believe that `allowing the donor to 
die' by removal of life support equipment is a passive rather than active means of 
bringing about death. They state that the prohibition against active euthanasia is 
one of the principles which gives "a solid ethical foundation for whatever is done in 
donation and transplantation" yet they find it appropriate for doctors to "discontinue 
breathing and circulatory support when a proper decision and proper consent to do 
so has been obtained to allow the irreversible cessation of cardiac and pulmonary 
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function so as to meet the legal standard of death". 104 Now these authorities may 
believe that the distinction between actively killing and allowing to die has moral 
significance even when the intention - that the person should die - is the same. 
However I am not so sure that the distinction as they draw it is sufficiently strong to 
bear the moral weight placed upon it. The first thing to note is that, even if the 
distinction is morally relevant, I am unsure whether it applies here - the deliberate 
removal of a ventilator and other intensive care paraphernalia seems like a 
distortion of the idea that one is passively allowing death. The second thing to note 
is that, even if the doctors' appeal to such a principle is credible, some of the active 
interventions performed on the still living patient in order to maximise the viability of 
their organs, specifically the use of vasodilating and anticoagulant drugs, can 
sometimes hasten death. Is this active euthanasia? Or worse, is it active killing in 
order that another might benefit? May such interventions be performed by 
appealing to the doctrine of double effect? 
It is my belief that those donors whose deaths are imminent and those who are 
either competent with an intolerable quality of life or incompetent with a life deemed 
by medical staff to be `not worth living' present relevantly different cases (the latter 
two cases may also differ from each other - see below). In the case of the former 
any shortening (or prolonging) of life brought about by interventions aimed at 
improving organ quality will only make a difference of a few hours or minutes - as 
mentioned above all of the patients enrolled in the Exeter protocol proceeded to 
brainstem death within 24 hours. In the case of the patient with "intolerable quality 
of life", the problem is perhaps more grave. It seems difficult to appeal to a doctrine 
of double effect here - the object is to kill the patient (or allow her to die) albeit with 
her consent. Let us consider these as two separate groups then. 
83 
Ways to ethically (and legally) use patients whose death is 
imminent and almost inevitable 
Advanced directives 
While acting against a patient's interests (conceived here in a relatively 
straightforward way as `their physical health') is illegal (and unethical), subjecting 
patients to procedures which are simply not in their interests (rather than actively 
against their interests) could perhaps be permissible, so long as such treatment 
does not cause their care to fall below that of prevailing standards or compromise 
their welfare, and so long as consent is always obtained beforehand. If this consent 
came from the patient themselves, prior to their becoming incompetent, then I think 
that such treatment could be viewed in the same light as people who freely consent 
to donate blood, bone marrow or even single kidneys - these practices are similarly 
not in the interests of the donor (although we could say they are in the `preference 
interests' of someone who freely chose to donate) but are perfectly ethically 
permissible as long as informed consent is obtained-105 Shaw notes that advanced 
directives permitting doctors to withdraw treatment from a patient if they should 
enter a condition that they deem would make life not worth living are already legally 
valid and thinks that it "would not be difficult to permit doctors to comply with 
advance directives to perform specific non-therapeutic procedures which did 
minimal harm and were important to the values of an incompetent patient". 106 
However, he is pessimistic regarding the success of this policy, suspecting that it 
might cause public revulsion and so have a negative impact upon donation as a 
whole. I am not convinced that this would be the result. I discuss my reasons for 
thinking this in a slightly different context - that of ending the lives of, and possibly 
then excising the organs of, those in irreversibly unconscious states - in chapter 
four. 
Proxy consent 
As Shaw notes, there are in fact exceptions to the rule that proxies may consent 
only to beneficial treatment. "Parents give consent to non-therapeutic research on 
their children provided both risk and harm are minimal. With similar restrictions 
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ethics committees allow research on patients unable to give consent because of 
dementia or critical illness. The justification in each case is that the harm is 
minimal, the benefit can be obtained no other way, and there is a belief that the 
patient would have consented if competent")°7 Preparing someone whose death is 
imminent to be a controlled non heart beating donor, whether it be by inadvertently 
hastening death by the use of anticoagulants or by prolonging life by maintaining 
them on a respirator while preparations are made, causes minimal, if any, harm. As 
Shaw says, such things "cause no distress to the patient himself. If the family, from 
their knowledge of the patient, believe that organ donation would have been 
desired, permitting the minimal harm entailed is ethical. "108 
Widening the scope of the term `interests' 
Shaw also notes that the UK law which bans interventions not deemed to be in the 
interests of the patient unless the patient himself consented while competent uses a 
narrow definition of interests - physical health. Shaw advocates a broader 
definition, invoking preference as well as welfare interests, which would allow 
doctors to do "what we believe incompetent persons would have wanted, and acting 
in accordance with their known values... A dead person may never regret not being 
used as an organ donor. But we all want our lives to have meaning at the end as 
well as throughout. "109 
The Doctrine of Double Effect 
It seems to me that once consent is obtained, whether from the donor or from 
proxies, the doctor's use of death hastening techniques can be justified ethically by 
appeal to the doctrine of double effect. The aim of using anticoagulants and 
vasodilators is not to hurry death, a slightly earlier death is rather a foreseen but 
unintended side effect of their desire to preserve the organs in the best possible 
condition. However, I do not think that the doctrine can be applied to the other 
category of controlled NHBDs - those whose death is not imminent. It is to those 
donors which I now turn. 
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Patients whose death is not imminent 
As well as patients who have become incompetent and are about to die, the class of 
patients eligible to become controlled donors includes patients who need not be 
dying at all. These may be those who, as quoted above, are "competent with 
intolerable quality of life or incompetent, but not brain dead, because of severe, 
generally neurological, illness or injury with an extremely poor prognosis as to ... 
any meaningful functional status". 110 (my italics) 
Potts and Herdman do not separate out the specific problems concerning these 
patients from those whose illness or injury means they are almost certain to die 
soon, but I am very unsure that they ought to be included in the group without 
further comment. For them, as Orr et al state, "continued survival is possible but is 
not desired because of the burdens of continued existence or poor quality of life". 110 
Surely, for these people, the removal of life sustaining measures is active 
euthanasia, despite Potts and Herdman's desire to avoid such claims? The 
question of whether these people may be used as controlled donors then surely 
becomes secondary to the vexed question of whether people may request 
euthanasia? Ought someone who is competent but with a proven organic medical 
condition (ie not simply depression) sufficient to render their lives `not worth living' 
be allowed to end their lives? Ought they then be allowed to donate their organs? 
And ought proxies be allowed to make these decisions for their incompetent but not 
dying relatives? 
The measures undertaken by doctors regarding these donors do not seem to fall 
under the doctrine of double effect. In the case of the patients discussed above 
whose deaths are, in any case, imminent, the introduction of coolant or 
vasodilatative drugs merely hastens an inevitable event. However, potential NHBDs 
whose death is not imminent must undergo procedures directly aimed at bringing 
about death. It is unlikely that simply vasodilating these patients would be sufficient 
to bring about death - instead they must have their ventilators or other support 
removed. Potts and Herman consider this to be `passive euthanasia'. I am inclined 
to agree with Harris and with James Rachels that, in circumstances when the 
doctor's aim is to bring about death, the means used to obtain the result are morally 
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irrelevant. And, in any case, removal of a ventilator seems to me to be an active not 
a passive means of bringing about death. 
This category of controlled NHBD raises interesting parallels to my discussion of 
diagnosing brainstem death and to the use of irreversibly unconscious people as 
donors which I shall propose in chapter four. 
In chapter four I will claim that we may, under certain circumstances, ethically kill 
and remove organs from people who are irreversibly unconscious. However one 
obvious way in which this might seem objectionable is that, in order for organs to be 
usable, death must be an event of fairly brief duration, not the protracted death 
brought about by the withdrawal of nutrition which is the most common way of 
ending the lives of PVS victims. In other words it is necessary to bring about death 
by very active means. 
However, if we do not believe that there is a significant moral distinction between 
`allowing to die' (especially not allowing to die by removing life support apparatus) 
and killing by more active means then this would seem to provide support for my 
claim. So from the fact that incompetent people whose lives are deemed to be of 
no value to them are already being killed (or allowed to die) by the (to me) 
seemingly quite active method of removal from a ventilator, which will ensure a 
rapid enough death that their organs are suitable for transplantation, it seems but a 
small transition to saying that those who are unconscious but not ventilator 
dependent ought to be caused to die in some painless rapid way and their organs 
excised. (Perhaps the unconscious patients idea includes more safeguards for the 
patient not fewer - Orr et al use as their example of the incompetent patient 
someone who is "ventilator-dependent and has minimal awareness of his or her 
environment"112 - my chapter four proposal would require that patients have no 
awareness of their environment. ) 
The parallel with chapter one grows from residual concerns about whether 
brainstem death is death or is merely `an infallible prognostic indicator' that death is 
imminent. For if it is the latter (and some who advocate transplantation hold that it 
is) then transplanters already kill dying people by active means when they retrieve 
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organs and the distinction between controlled NHBDs and brainstem dead donors 
becomes blurry. If these suspicions are warranted, the `dead donor rule' may have 
no subjects at all. 
Overall conclusion 
In order to obtain more organs from human cadavers for transplant it will be 
necessary to implement some or all of the above policies. While the benefits are 
obvious, there are also drawbacks. In the case of Harris' proposal it is fairly easy to 
point up an objection to the underlying philosophical principle; for other policies the 
objections tend to stem from concerns about possible misuse rather than from any 
specific philosophical objection. Evidence which suggests that doctors disagree on 
important matters such as declaring death to have occurred and are also not always 
fully open regarding their treatment of the newly dead gives weight to these 
concerns. 
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Chapter Three 
Other sources of organs: 
Xenotransplantation and the Argument 
from Marginal Cases 
If we are to save or improve the lives of all or even most of the people with end 
stage organ disease it is necessary to increase the number of organs available for 
transplant. I discussed in chapter two the problems which would arise if we moved 
away from our current `opt in' policy of retrieving organs from cadavers. Although 
solutions may exist to some of these difficulties it is unlikely that cadaveric donor 
numbers will ever be sufficient to meet the needs of all potential recipients. Thus it 
appears that we must look elsewhere. Xenotransplantation, although not currently 
part of routine clinical practice, is one of the greatest hopes for alleviating these 
problems of scarcity. 
We currently use large numbers of sentient nonhuman creatures in animal to animal 
preclinical trials of xenotransplants. In the abstract book for the Spring 2002 British 
Transplantation Society Annual Congress I see animal to other animal 
xenotransplantation experiments involving rats, cats, `nod mice', and Landrace pigs, 
among other species. New Scientist magazine carries frequent reports of such 
research. ' And, although animal-to-human whole organ xenotransplantation has 
been performed only on an ad hoc basis2, pig heart valves are a standard therapy 
for some forms of human heart disease and a report from this summer's (2002) 
Transplantation Society meeting in Miami states that `hundreds' of diabetic patients 
worldwide have been treated with porcine islet cells. 3 
Protocols have been created to permit, in principle, trials of animal to human 
transplants once technological obstacles have been overcome. Although there is, 
at present, no clinical xenografting activity in the UK, the Department of Health 
advisory group on the ethics of xenotransplantation which published its report in 
1996 appeared generally favourable towards the practice and the use of genetically 
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modified pigs as a source of organs for human transplantation was deemed 
ethically acceptable. In July 1998 the United Kingdom Xenotransplantation Interim 
Regulatory Authority (UKXIRA) was established within the Department of Health. 
This body will deal with applications to undertake clinical trials in 
xenotransplantation in humans. The Report of the Working Party to Review Organ 
Transplantation published by the Royal College of Surgeons of England in January 
1999 contains the following statement "The Working Party recognised that some of 
the problems associated with xenotransplantation are close to solution and that 
initial clinical trials might well take place in the not too distant future". 4 "Moral and 
societal problems involving ... the use of animals as donors" were given 
bottom 
billing in a list of obstacles awaiting resolution, after more scientific difficulties, 
namely "immunological problems such as acute vascular rejection, cellular rejection 
and chronic rejection; incompatible receptors in the recipient for foreign protein ... 
[and) ... 
infectious problems, both to the recipient and the population as a whole". 5 
It seems that the policy makers believe the introduction of xenotransplantation into 
clinical practice to be delayed merely by technical and financial difficulties and not 
by ethical problems. 
The structure of this chapter 
I discuss in this chapter whether species membership can count as a `morally 
relevant characteristic' permitting us to use all species of nonhuman animals as 
organ donors whilst forbidding us to use any human beings. I begin by establishing 
that animals have interests and that some of these interests confer moral 
obligations upon us. I then assess the claim that there is a morally relevant 
difference between humans and other animals which explains differential treatment 
in the matter of organ donation. Why do people think that humans may never be 
killed to meet our ends when animals may be so used? I discuss two possibilities. 
The first, which David DeGrazia calls the `sui generis' view, is, I think, what grounds 
most human uses of animals. This is the belief that being human `just is' morally 
relevant. I argue that this view is unjustly discriminatory against animals. Second I 
discuss whether being human confers some special property or properties which 
are morally relevant in this situation. Perhaps a comparison of the relative strength 
of creatures' interest in continued life might serve as a `morally relevant difference'. 
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Although such a comparison does typically fit common sense thinking that there is 
`more to be concerned about' when a human dies than when a non human dies it is 
vulnerable to the so called Argument from Marginal Cases (hereafter the AMC): 
some humans, in virtue of intellectual handicaps, have `less to lose' in death than 
some animals. 
However, I believe that any account which attempts to select donors simply by 
comparing `interest in continued life' faces two large problems. First, although it is 
possible to make such comparisons in a `rough and ready' way, I think it is not 
possible to pin them down very precisely which would be necessary if the 
comparison were to serve as a practical tool determining who may and who may not 
be utilised as an organ donor. The second problem is the conflict with common 
sense intuitions entailed by the AMC: many people (myself included) are reluctant to 
subscribe to the idea that as humans' interest in continuing to live grows weaker so 
too do our obligations to refrain from killing them. So the comparison of `life 
interests' will do only limited work in my argument. First I circumscribe it such that it 
uses a clear cut biological boundary, the boundary of consciousness, to avoid life- 
comparative problems turning into practical slippery slope problems. Second I 
attempt to unpick the intuition that `less is lost' when a creature with a weaker 
interest in continuing life dies than when one with a strong interest does. Although i 
subscribe to the idea that, indeed, less is lost from the point of view of the subject 
when an irreversibly unconscious person dies than when a normal person (or even 
certain species of animal) dies I do not wish to follow this to the conclusion that the 
moral prohibition against killing such people is weaker than the prohibitition against 
killing normal humans. I do not believe that such a human lacks moral status or 
(and this is slightly different) that we have no obligations regarding him. In other 
words, I come to the conclusion that there is, ultimately, something special about 
being human. 
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Why kill animals and not humans? 
I think that two commonsense intuitions underlie most human behaviour towards 
animals. 
(1 Animals have a degree of direct moral status - because their lives can 
go better or worse for them we may not treat them `exactly as we please' 
- we have obligations to them (not merely `with regard to' them). 
(2) It is not unethical to use animals as donors (and in other contexts) as 
although animals have moral status this is lower than that of humans. In 
other words, the reasons for protecting them against being killed or 
injured are fewer, or weaker. We might say that we have only a prima 
facie reason not to kill them, which may be overridden if an important 
human goal is served by so doing. We should `show respect' for the 
animals we use, taking care to minimise any pain and suffering caused 
and to minimise the number of animals used. 6 We also ought not to use 
the last remaining members of a species without replacing them, 
although this is more to do with concerns in environmental ethics than to 
do with the interests of the animals themselves. So long as these 
conditions are observed we may use animals for our ends. 
If creatures `have to' die or suffer to meet our ends it is felt that it is highly preferable 
if they be nonhuman animals rather than members of our species. These 
assumptions are not universally accepted. Some philosophers would deny 
assumption one and argue that we look to the needs of animals not because of 
concern for the animals themselves but rather out of sentimental attachment to 
them if they are our pets or because they are useful to us in the case of farm or 
laboratory animals. I discuss RG Frey's denial of moral standing to animals in a 
moment and touch upon that of Peter Carruthers in chapter four. Other people do 
not accept the second premise and would assert that animals may never be used 
as means to human ends. SRL Clark, for example, says "I myself then do not 
believe that chimpanzees, rats and the rest should be sacrificed even for an 
acknowledged greater good: such sacrifice infringes their right to refuse. In my 
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morality, all creatures with feelings and wishes should be thought of as ends-in- 
themselves, and not merely as means. "7 
I have a degree of sympathy with this viewpoint: many of the things which humans 
do to animals cannot, I think, be justified. However, I do feel strongly that the use of 
animals in clinical and research medicine, at least, so long as it is humane and done 
only for the most serious of reasons, is permissible. 
May we use animals at all? 
My stance on the use of animals could be argued to lend my thesis a resemblance 
to the claim made by John Harris in the previous chapter. Harris claims that the 
needs of dead and living humans ought to be weighed in a sort of calculus: I argued 
against him that such a comparison should not be made - that dead people who 
refuse to donate are `off limits'. Yet in this chapter I seem to be making a Harris-like 
move: the lives of human recipients and animals donors are weighed and animals 
sacrificed. Clark calls this kind of position `Kantianism for humans, utilitarianism for 
animals'. Limitations of space prevent me from making a full case for my belief. 
However, in my defence, I would note that I claim only that the use of animals in 
medicine and medical research is justified. I believe we ought to use animals to 
serve human goals only if the end result is of great value (or at least great hoped for 
value - not all experiments can be successful) and only if there are no other means 
of achieving the objective. The interests of animals in continuing to live ought to 
trump our desires for new cosmetics, for instance. 
The use of animals in this special context is, I believe, justified for three reasons. 
First, transplant surgery is carried out under general anaesthesia, and the `donors' 
destroyed without being permitted to regain consciousness, so the pain and 
suffering which often attends the use of animals in research can be entirely avoided. 
Presumably it is possible to house the animals in such a manner that they are 
unaware of the disappearance of their fellows to the operating theatre and so 
experience no anticipatory dread. If pain and fear are avoidable then the harm 
done to the animal is simply that of having its life ended prematurely and I shall 
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argue that animals are harmed less by death than are normal humans. This is, of 
course, not to say that they are not harmed at all: on the contrary, I think that all of 
the species of animals which could be used as donors to humans can plausibly be 
said to be done a harm in being killed (I discuss this more in a moment). However, 
the things that could be said to be objectionable about such killings are limited in 
this way. By contrast, I shall argue that our obligation not to kill even the most 
profoundly intellectually impoverished human beings does not stem only from 
considering the present condition of the potential donor. Some of our obligations to 
these people stem from sources which are inapplicable to animals and we also 
have obligations regarding them which do not apply to nonhumans (of this more at 
the end of this chapter and in chapter four). 
The second reason why they may be used is that the end result is one of enormous 
importance -- transplantation helps very ill people to live or to regain a semi normal 
life and the importance of saving a human life is (I believe) sufficient to justify 
ending an animal life. 
We may wish to add a third reason supporting the use of animals - that animal as 
well as human medicine benefits from such uses. Animals are as susceptible as 
humans to diseases such as diabetes (which can destroy the kidneys), other renal 
diseases such as polycystic kidneys, and hepatitis. However I am unsure of the 
strength of this third argument - our primary goal in using animals is to improve 
human life, not animal, and to appeal to this point is to appear to create a 
smokescreen masking our true intentions. 8 
These considerations work together to underpin my belief that animals may, morally, 
sometimes be killed to meet human goals. The harm done to animals is justified by 
the great good it produces. 
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Justifying assumption one 
The case for the moral considerability of animals is relatively easy to make. Most 
people believe that animals (well, mammals, birds, reptiles and so on at least, I am 
less sure about invertebrates) do generally have interests. To put it crudely for now, 
they believe that such creatures can feel pleasure and pain and that their lives can 
go better or worse for them. Because of this they have some moral status - we 
have obligations to them. This is borne out by law - since the Protection of Animals 
Act of 1911 animals (in the UK) have had legal protection from `unnecessary' harm 
(whatever this means) whether stemming from deliberate action or from a failure to 
act. 
In chapter two I introduced the ideas that consciousness is usually necessary and 
sufficient for the possession of at least a minimal set of interests and that interests 
are what confer moral standing. Care is needed here: it is not consciousness per 
se which confers moral status, consciousness is a prerequisite for having interests. 
Bonnie Steinbock says "Only beings with interests can have claims against moral 
agents. Interests are compounded out of beliefs, aims, goals, concerns. Biological 
life alone does not endow a being with interests. Permanently nonsentient, 
nonconscious beings cannot have interests. Without interests, they cannot have 
moral status". 9 
It would be wrong to pretend that this is uncontentious however. In chapter two I 
discussed some examples where present consciousness is not necessary, arguing 
that dead people who have previously been normal `interest holders' have `surviving 
interests'. With regard to the sufficient condition, some philosophers have argued 
that being a possessor of interests alone is not sufficient to grant moral status to a 
being: that self consciousness, rationality, or even the capacity to be a moral agent 
is necessary in order for a being to qualify for moral status. Other philosophers 
agree that interests are what counts but deny that animals have interests. My 
response to these more stringent conditions for moral standing takes two forms. 
First, I attempt to show in a moment that (a) animals have interests and (b) these 
interests confer a limited degree of moral standing. If having interests is sufficient to 
confer moral status then more demanding criteria for the possession of, that is, 
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admission to the class of beings which possess, such standing are ruled out. 
Second, it is also the case that any criterion which claims to be the sole criterion for 
conferring moral standing on beings and which sets the entry requirements high 
faces the problem that as well as excluding animals from the sphere of moral 
concern it will also exclude human babies and the profoundly mentally 
handicapped. I discuss and partially reject one such argument in chapter four. I do 
accept, however, that rationality, autonomy or the ability to be a moral agent may be 
capacities which confer different degrees of moral standing within the class of 
beings with a degree of moral standing: I discuss this convoluted problem later in 
this chapter. 
The problem of what is required in order for a being to be admitted to the class of 
the morally considerable is not a problem for the dead: assuming that they were 
`normal' human beings during life then they were paradigmatic examples of the 
sorts of beings which have moral status and I hope that the account of posthumous 
harming given in the previous chapter shows that some interests (and thus moral 
status) persist after death. It is, however, a problem for claims to moral status made 
on behalf of animals. 
Do nonhuman animals have interests? 
RG Frey denies that animals have interests and, thus, moral status (Frey actually 
says `rights', but, as mentioned at the beginning of chapter two I hope to avoid 
getting entangled in the rights debate). Frey makes a two pronged attack; following 
Tom Regan he says that interests may be thought of in two ways. We can talk of 
some things being `in our interests- those things which contribute to our wellbeing; 
and we can talk of things which we are `interested in' - our desires, and wants. 
Regan calls these `welfare interests' and `preference interests' respectively. 10 Frey 
thinks that if interests are thought of in terms of welfare interests then the claim that 
animals have interests yields counterintuitive results as nonsentient things can also 
be said to have interests in this way. Alternatively, if they are to be thought of as 
`interests in' things then animals are excluded from the class of interest-possessors 
as, in order to have interests, animals must have wants and beliefs which, Frey 
believes, they cannot be said to possess in the absence of language. 
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(1) Welfare interests 
Frey says (correctly I think) that animals clearly have interests of this sort - "in the 
sense of having a good or wellbeing which can be harmed or benefited"-" 
However, he thinks that acknowledging these sorts of interests provides little 
succour to those who wish to ascribe moral status to animals "for it yields the 
counterintuitive result that even manmade/manufactured objects have interests, 
and, therefore, on the interest requirement ... have or at least are candidates for 
having moral rights". 13 Frey thinks that "anything, including tractors, can have a 
good, a well-being ... if it is the sort of thing which can be good of its kind"13, 
because a tractor unable to perform certain tasks is not a good tractor. "Thus, to 
say that it is in a tractor's interests to be well-oiled means only that it is conducive to 
the tractor's being a good one if it is well-oiled. "14 
Frey has a point: it does seem perfectly reasonable to talk of things being better or 
worse for various sorts of non (ie never) sentient living beings, and, although this is 
even more derivative, never-sentient never-living things. We talk of `needs' of being 
met or unmet: my plant `needs' to be watered, my car `needs' an oil change. 
However, although I agree that it makes sense to talk of what is good or bad for 
nonsentient things, the `needs' of devices such as tractors and those of living 
nonsentient things are not the sort of needs which generate interests. 
The case of living nonsentient things and of manmade devices is not identical. 
Plants can have a `good' independent of human interests (think of flourishing 
weeds). Steinbock calls this sort of wellbeing `autonomous goodness'. I do not 
wish to dwell on the differences between plants and artefacts - it is not relevant to 
my case as, although plants can be healthy or fail to thrive, they are like artefacts in 
not caring. Plants are indifferent between treatments that help or harm them, 
although they have a welfare this does not create welfare interests. 
It is the experiential requirement that makes the difference, that confers interests. It 
is not in my interests to allow my car to run out of oil or my plant to die. Steven 
Sapontzis states "would we ordinarily say, as Frey does, that "it is in a tractor's 
interests to be well oiled"? I think not. While `need', `want', `lack', `harm', `benefit', 
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and `good' are all commonly applied to plants, artifacts, and so on, `interest' is not. 
`Interest' is commonly reserved for the people and animals who will benefit or be 
harmed by the needs of plants, artifacts and so on being unmet. "15 As Steinbock 
says "It matters to sentient beings how you treat them". 16 
The Feinberg/Steinbock account of interests does not entail that what happens to 
nonsentient things does not matter at all. It holds simply that it does not matter `to 
them'. As Steinbock states "Ail the interest view denies is that ... [a nonsentient 
thing] ... has a stake in its own preservation ... We can have obligations regarding 
mere things, but these obligations are not to them. We have no obligations to them 
because it does not matter to them how we treat them". 17 By contrast, the welfare 
interests of sentient things matter to them because they are capable of having 
preference interests about what happens to them: they can prefer one or another 
outcome and their lives can go better or worse according to what actually happens. 
To attribute this sort of interest to animals we need to deny the conclusion Frey 
draws from the second horn of his dilemma. 
(2) Interests as desires 
Bonnie Steinbock sets out the second horn of Frey's alleged dilemma succinctly: 
"To want something is to have certain beliefs - in particular, the belief that one does 
not now have what one wants. Animals cannot have beliefs, according to Frey, 
because to have a belief is to believe that a certain sentence is true. Only creatures 
with linguistic ability can regard sentences as true. Since animals lack linguistic 
proficiency, they cannot have beliefs. Without beliefs, they cannot have wants; 
without wants, they cannot have interests. Without interests, they cannot have 
rights. Equally, they lack moral status". 18 
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Are animals language users? 
How might this claim be countered? Readers will no doubt be familiar with the 
often-cited studies concerning the teaching of American Sign Language to great 
apes. A possible response might be to say that these animals are language users. 
These animals' grasp of language was sufficient to enable them spontaneously to 
make up new signs for novel objects, to instigate conversations, to use sign 
language when alone and to teach sign language to their offspring. Koko the gorilla 
had a mean IQ score of 80.3 using the standard human tests, averaged over seven 
tests. 19 These experiments also suggest that these animals have degree of self- 
consciousness: they demonstrate a crude awareness of other minds, inasmuch as 
they are capable of acts of deception which require insight into the position of the 
person being deceived, (feats not possible for humans with strong autistic traits). It 
is not appropriate to go into great detail here but for examples of great ape (and 
other nonhuman animal) sophistication see Byrne (1995), Byrne and Whiten (1988) 
and Patterson and Gordon (1993). 
However, this does not seem a terribly hopeful approach: in the most successful of 
the AMESLAN experiments the animals were able to acquire language to only 
approximately the ability level of a four year old child and so I think it would be 
wrong to claim that this qualifies the great apes as `language users' in our sense. 
Although these studies are impressive, an inescapable conclusion is that even the 
great apes, the creatures with the greatest ability for learning a human like 
language, can only dubiously be described as language users. The chimps failed to 
progress beyond the level of a 36 month old child and few of their utterances were 
spontaneous. And other animals (even mammals which have a great deal of 
interaction with us) fall outside the category of language users in any meaningful 
sense. Clearly, another sort of defence is necessary. 
Being a language user is not necessary for possessing 
preference interests 
A more powerful weapon against Frey is to deny that language is always necessary 
for beliefs and thus deny that it is always necessary for the possession of interests. 
Frey holds that when someone believes something what he or she believes is that a 
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certain sentence is true. "Now what is it that I believe? I believe that my collection 
lacks a Gutenberg Bible; that is, I believe that the sentence "My collection lacks a 
Gutenberg Bible" is true... If what is believed is that a certain sentence is true, then 
no creature which lacks language can have beliefs. "20 
Steven Sapontziz counters Frey thus: "The proper conclusion of Frey's analysis of 
belief statements is that in order to understand such statements, one must be able 
to understand sentences. This conclusion is neither controversial nor relevant to 
the issue of whether animals can believe; it is relevant only to whether animals can 
formulate or understand belief statements. "21 
It seems perfectly possible to make sense of the idea of having beliefs which are 
not beliefs about the truth or falsity of a sentence. Stephen Clark employs the 
notions of de re and de dicto beliefs to make this point. De re and de dicto beliefs 
are different ways of thinking about things: either in terms "of what is said" (de dicto) 
or in terms "of the thing" (de re). So, taking the example of the belief that `the cat is 
on the mat', Clark states that a belief de dicto would be an attitude towards the 
proposition that the cat is on the mat - believing it to be either true or false (a `belief 
statement'), whereas a belief de re would be about the cat itself. In expressing such 
a belief in verbal form we would be bound to admit that what we believe about the 
cat is that she is on the mat. But an unexpressed belief about the cat is simply an 
expectation, when the cat or an image of the cat is in mind, of finding her on the 
mat. "This need not involve any attitude towards a proposition or even a verbal 
formula, simply a readiness to find the cat there, a having-it-in-mind before we 
reach the place. "22 
De re beliefs seem to be the appropriate way to explain what drives animal desires 
and so their preference interests. This idea is also propounded by John Searle who 
states "I conclude that the fact that fine grained distinctions cannot be made for 
animal beliefs and desires does not show that animals do not have beliefs and 
desires". 23 George Graham suggests a way in which we might try to think of these 
beliefs. His claim is that "Belief networks occur along something like a continuous 
or floating scale". 24 For example he, Graham, may have a belief that a particular 
piece of music is beautiful. A trained musician may also have that belief but will be 
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able to point to many more subtleties and examples of cleverness in the piece to 
support his belief than are available to Graham. Both believe that the music is 
beautiful, yet Graham's belief is based on a far more impoverished network of other 
beliefs than is that of the musician. This idea of an impoverished set of beliefs can 
be applied to animal cases. A dog "may believe that the cat has run up the tree 
although he has no notion of the value of soil and water or of whether the tree has 
leaves or needles and burns. [The dog] conceives of the tree with his own stock of 
concepts. "25 
But what does this mean? Does the dog believe that the cat is up the tree, or that 
the `small brown fun-to-chase thing' is up the tree? Does the dog then consider a 
cat and a squirrel in the same way? What if the animal was not out of reach up a 
tree but on a wall, say? Would the dog still apply the same concept? This answer 
leaves it open to the critic to question just what the dog's stock of concepts might 
consist in. The answer is that we cannot know precisely but that we need not know. 
We do not need to be able to pin down precisely the content of an animal's mental 
state in order to assert that it has content. All that is necessary is that it refers to 
something: that it is `about' something. So we can, roughly, work out what it is that 
an animal is interested in, even if we cannot pin it down precisely. 
Daniel Dennett (1996) states that whenever an agent acts it acts on the basis of a 
particular understanding or misunderstanding of the circumstances and intentional 
(in Dennett's special sense of the term, meaning `aboutness') explanations and 
predictions rely on capturing that understanding. To predict the action of an 
intentional system - an animal in this case - or to know what it is interested in, you 
have to know what things the beliefs and desires of the agent are about, and you 
have to know, at least roughly, how those beliefs and desires are about those 
things, so you can say whether the crucial connections have been, or will be, drawn. 
So we can, according to Dennett, tolerate slack in our knowledge of how an agent 
thinks about things without denying that they can have thoughts which are about 
things. The dog believes that the cat is up the tree even if its concept of `cat' and 
`tree' cannot be determined. Ultimately, it is difficult to say that animals have full 
fledged beliefs. However, full fledged beliefs are not necessary for ascribing 
preference interests to animals. These interests require only what Steinbock calls 
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`belief-like states'. 
Animals, without the aid of language, are unable to `cut as fine' as we are in 
expressing beliefs. In contrast "There is no limit ... to what we (humans) can 
believe, and to what we can distinguish in belief". 26 Yet, despite our ability as 
language users to `cut as fine' as can be required in describing our beliefs and 
desires, we do not always do so. This seems to provide further support against 
Frey's idea that beliefs are always beliefs about the truth or falsity of a proposition. 
David DeGrazia says "I, for one, do not know the precise content of my own 
concept of rabbit. Indeed, I doubt it has a precise content'. 27 
In case the reader remains unconvinced by this woolly talk of `belief like states' with 
indescribable content, other evidence supports the ascription of beliefs, desires and 
thus interests, to nonhumans. 
Attributing `belief-like states' does explanatory work 
To my mind, the most compelling evidence supporting the claim that animals believe 
is that it fits better with our actual experience than does the alternative. Much 
animal behaviour would seem inexplicable if we did not employ the working 
assumption that they have beliefs (Dennett (1987) calls this `taking the intentional 
stance'): animals seek food when they are hungry and (with the possible exception 
of Labrador dogs) cease to eat when they are sated, they seek shelter in bad 
weather and to avoid pain and so on. The list is endless. This behaviour by itself is 
perhaps insufficient to say that animals really believe and desire; a windup toy could 
head towards food or a warm spot by the fire if suitably aimed, yet we would be 
loath to impute desires. But add the behaviour to our knowledge of evolutionary 
theory and of the similarities between human and animal physiology and it seems 
more difficult to deny the existence of desires. We know that mammals at least are 
physiologically much like us: they are, as it were, `wired up' in the right way to be 
sentient. And, as Sapontzis puts it, "there would be no evolutionary point to their 
being sentient if they could not recognize, desire, and pursue those things that give 
them pleasure"28 and similarly avoid those things that cause pain. 
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In `real life' we do not usually entertain serious doubts about many of the things our 
household pets can be said to believe (although this may, to some extent, be due to 
familiarity). For example, when, in the evening, the dog which has been happily 
sleeping all afternoon becomes restive, whining and placing its head in its owner's 
lap, we believe it wants its evening meal. Admittedly, our convictions about animal 
beliefs falter when we move into more complex territory (it would be difficult to claim 
that the dog believes it is interrupting its master's writing a letter to the Daily 
Telegraph with its demands for food), and we also become unsure of what to say 
when we descend the phylogenetic scale to the level of worms and flies. We are 
fairly confident in attributing simple beliefs to animals relevantly like us, however. 
This conviction does not derive solely from our ad hoc interactions with animals - 
further evidence for the theory is provided by scientific study both in laboratories 
and in natural settings (I will not list examples here as they are too numerous). 
And, as well as helping us predict behaviour, attributing interests and thus a degree 
of moral status to animals, as David DeGrazia notes, helps explain many of our 
ethical intuitions. "Kicking dogs, whipping horses, and otherwise hurting sentient 
animals is clearly prima facie wrong. To justify any such action would require a 
special explanation - say, the need to prevent the crazed dog from killing a child. 
But pulling weeds, tearing up the grass playing football, breaking stones for fun, and 
killing animals that are indisputably insentient (say, amoebas in a petri dish) 
generally does not seem even prima facie wrong, unless the actions affect the 
interests of sentient beings. "29 We do not think that the wrongness of kicking a dog 
stems only from the distress caused to its owner; by contrast it is hard to see how 
there could be anything more than this wrong with damaging a lawn by playing 
football on it. 
So attributing limited beliefs to animals does explanatory work: it helps to account 
for their behaviour and for our common sense moral attitudes towards them. It fits 
with known scientific facts about the way the world works. It seems to me that, as 
George Graham says, "when the ascription of beliefs to animals best explains 
behaviour, animals believe". 30 As an aside, of no particular argumentative weight, 
David DeGrazia notes that Frey has, in public lectures although seemingly not in 
print, now conceded that animals have interests. 31 
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Animals have at least some interests and thus a degree of 
moral status 
It is my belief that Frey's attempt to deny interests to animals fails. Humans and 
other animals differ from plants and tractors because they care about what happens 
to them. Their welfare is important to them, regardless of what it means for anyone 
else, because they are creatures capable of having preferences and desires in the 
sense discussed above. This is why they have welfare interests, not just a welfare. 
On the Feinberg/Steinbock account "the ability to have interests2 [things we take an 
interest in] is necessary for the ability to have interests, [things which are in our 
interests]. It is only if treatment can matter to a being that it can be said to have a 
sake"32 (my italics). Bernard Rollin echoes this sentiment: any animal, even man, is 
not explicitly conscious of all or probably even most of its needs. But what makes 
these needs interests is our ability to impute some "mental life", however 
rudimentary, to the animal, wherein, to put it crudely, it seems to care when certain 
needs are not fulfilled... Thus, to say that a living thing has interests is to suggest 
that it has some sort of conscious awareness, however rudimentary". 33 Humans 
and other animals have a `sake' in a way that nonsentient things do not - this is 
what makes the difference. 
For this reason, we confer upon animals a degree of moral status, by which I mean 
simply that there is `something to be concerned about' in our treatment of them, in a 
way that there isn't in our treatment of stones or of plants (which have a welfare but 
not welfare interests). We have moral obligations to animals which we cannot have 
to stones or plants (although we could to the owners of these things, perhaps). I 
believe then (following Steinbock) that the minimalist requirement of being 'the sort 
of thing that is or was (or, although it is not my concern here, will become) sentient' 
is usually necessary and always sufficient for the possession of at least a minimal 
set of interests, and that these interests confer a degree of moral status. If a being 
has a `sake', if it cares that its life can go better or worse for it, then this imposes 
some restrictions on what may be done to it for other's purposes. Or perhaps I 
should say `most' humans and animals. This idea is part of what drives my 
circumscribed AMC argument as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. 
Some humans - those who are irreversibly unconscious - do not have interests in 
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this way: they are unable any longer to care what happens to them. I will say more 
on this in a later section. 
Problems remain for this account of interests, of course. First, some philosophers 
would wish to attribute moral status to things which can never be conscious - to the 
sort of things that simply are not conscious. `Deep ecologists' would argue that 
plants, animals considered at the species rather than individual level, and even 
habitats have moral status (ie our moral concern for the object under consideration 
stems from the thing itself, not from worries about the effect that damaging it may 
have on sentient things which care about it). 34 I do not think this is the case -1 
think that our obligations concerning the environment are `with regard to' it, not `to' 
it. However, I shall leave the question open here - this is why I say `usually' 
necessary in the above. All I am concerned to show is, as Steinbock says, that 
animal species, `the environment' considered in some abstract sense, tractors and 
so on, cannot themselves care about what is done to them. 
A second problem is that sometimes creatures have preference interests in things 
which are not in their welfare interests, or are wrong about what they think will 
satisfy them. I note this only in passing, but do not think it an insurmountable 
problem for this account of interests. 
However, to attribute moral status to animals is not to say that they have as great a 
status as human beings. As Warren notes "There are sound reasons for 
recognizing stronger obligations towards some sentient beings, such as those that 
are moral agents [and] those that are members of our social communities". 35 This 
will be the subject of the latter half of this chapter. 
How to address assumption two 
Most people would agree that taking the life of, or injuring, a human being is a more 
heinous crime than doing these things to an nonhuman animal. What is it about 
animals that means that they always take second place to all human beings, even 
when they appear to possess the same sorts of interests that rule out the use of 
humans? This sort of talk introduces the notion of a `morally relevant difference' 
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whether one chooses to call it so or no. This is a slippery sort of concept to grasp 
so I will spend a little time setting out an explanation of it. 
The Principle of Formal Equality36 states that relevantly similar cases should be 
treated similarly: differential treatment requires a relevant difference. We require a 
relevant difference to treat unequally as people are not equal in every sense -- some 
are cleverer, taller, better at one thing or another, than are others. At the same time, 
James Rachels argues, "when people are equals - when there is no relevant 
difference between them - justice requires that they be treated similarly". 37 
What may be said about this idea? I must note that I do not entirely agree with 
Rachels for two reasons. I think sometimes it is perfectly permissible to treat people 
(or perhaps `creatures', to avoid begging any questions about species bias) 
differently without needing to demonstrate any `morally relevant difference' between 
them to support one's action. Further, I do not think that some differential 
treatments are a matter of justice at all. 
I think that the question of how one intends differently to treat the relevantly similar 
beings in question matters a great deal. For example, if one chooses to improve 
the situation of one person and not that of another is that wrong? Well it could be, if 
one were somehow responsible for improving the situation of both but neglected 
one's duties in the case of one but not the other (an example might be when one 
has a duty to provide a service such as health care or education). Even here it is 
not clear when one's differential treatment is unjust what if one person requires 
more intensive medical care, or more tuition, than another in order to achieve the 
same standard of health or education? Things are more straightforward when one 
is under no obligation to improve the lot of any particular person yet chooses to 
benefit one and not another. It seems hard to say what is wrong with this. Suppose 
X and Y both have a passion for chocolate cake. I have a chocolate cake and, not 
owing anything to either of them, I invite Y round to my house to eat it with me but 
not X. Why should this be wrong? And particularly, why should this be a matter of 
justice? Some choices simply do not require that we show a relevant difference. 
That said, I think it is also relatively clear that there are some circumstances when 
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we ought to show a relevant difference between creatures if we intend to treat 
unequally. What sort of things may be relevant? It seems to me that this is 
dependent on the question asked and, perhaps more importantly on the context. 
We now believe, although for a long time most people did not, that skin colour or 
gender are not reliable markers of a relevant difference when it comes to choosing 
between people for most everyday purposes - when choosing between candidates 
at job interviews, deciding who should be admitted to public places and so on. 
However, racial differences remain relevant when deciding whether someone needs 
to be screened for sickle cell anaemia and gender differences when deciding who 
should be offered gynaecological care. And just as there are differences between 
members of our species there are clearly a great many differences between 
humans and animals, most too trivial to be worth noting. It is clear that a great 
many of our `discriminations' (it seems odd even to call it that) between people and 
nonhuman animals are not wrong at all - why would it be wrong to deprive a cow of 
the chance to go to university, to give a fatuous example? However, in other cases, 
I think we do need to look a little more closely at the beings among which we 
differentiate, as it is far less obvious that the differences in treatment are justifiable. 
Both within our species and between our species and others there are certain core 
interests - `relevantly similar interests' - which are possessed by all (or almost all) 
members of the class (although the class of `relevantly similar interests for humans' 
is obviously not fully coextensive with the class of `relevantly similar interests 
between humans and animals'). It is this sort of interest which concerns me. 
Establishing a presumption in favour of equal consideration 
I subscribe to a loose principle of `equal consideration of relevantly similar interests' 
(hereafter usually `equal consideration') with respect to animals. That is, I believe 
that animals `matter' sufficiently that those of their interests which are relevantly 
similar to the interests of humans ought to be given equal moral weight with the 
human interests. The rough idea that `morally relevant similarities ought to be 
treated equally' is found in most (perhaps all, I am not sure) of the major theories of 
ethics. However, although the general ideal is widely subscribed to, there is 
widespread disagreement about what these similarities may be. Tom Regan thinks 
that being a `subject of a life' in his sense is a morally relevant similarity. He states 
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"like us, animals have certain basic moral rights including in particular the 
fundamental right to be treated with the respect that, as possessors of intrinsic 
value, they are due as a matter of strict justice". 38 John Rawls asserts that "Each 
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society 
as a whole cannot override"39 (although in Rawls' theory only those subject to the 
terms of the social contract are entitled to equal consideration - animals are 
excluded and human `marginal cases' not discussed in any detail). And Peter 
Singer says "The capacity for suffering - or more strictly, for suffering and/or 
enjoyment or happiness - is not just another characteristic like the capacity for 
language, or for higher mathematics... If a being suffers, there can be no moral 
justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the 
nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted 
equally with the like suffering - in so far as rough comparisons can be made - of 
any other being". 40 In its appeal to interests, regardless of who possesses them, 
my theory is more similar to that of Singer than the other authors. However I do not 
accept all the conclusions Singer draws from this account -I explain more at the 
end of this chapter. 
To refuse to give equal weight to the relevantly similar interests of human beings is 
now considered to be invidious. But what happens if this sort of principle is 
extended beyond the boundary of our species? I agree with Singer that "having 
accepted the principle of equality as a sound moral basis for relations with others of 
our own species, we are also committed to accepting it as a sound moral basis for 
relations with those outside our own species - the nonhuman animals". 41 
Such a principle by no means requires us to believe that humans and animals have 
`equal moral status', nor does it entail a moral requirement to `treat humans and 
animals equally' (whatever that may mean) or to deny the absence of any 
differences between animals and humans. However if applied to all our relations 
with nonhumans it would still require substantial revisions in our behaviour. It rules 
out what DeGrazia calls a 'general discounting' of animal interests of the sort that is 
evident in, say, hunting or consuming animal flesh -a devaluing of their interests 
relative to ours simply because they are animals. I do not discuss the application of 
the principle of equal consideration of interests to animals in cases other than organ 
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donation - such a discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. Word limit 
concerns also prevent me from arguing fully for the principle: however it is possible 
to establish what DeGrazia calls `a presumption in favour of equal consideration of 
relevantly similar interests' over unequal consideration. This presumption stems 
from two main sources. 
It grows first from the fact that animals have interests - their lives can go better or 
worse for them. If some of the interests possessed by animals are the same sort of 
interests possessed by humans then this at least raises the question of whether 
they could be relevantly similar - it is not absurd to talk in this way. 
And second, if it is even possible that the interests could be relevantly similar then 
surely simply assuming that they are not is pernicious: the example of racism and 
perhaps sexism (although I am less sure about this) should make us wary of 
accepting contemporary moral standards unreflectively. The fact that black people 
were once treated as possessing lesser moral status than whites does not by any 
means prove that our current treatment of animals is unethical; however it does 
provide a reason why we should insist that these practices should be justified. 
According to my Cassell Concise Dictionary a species is `a group of organisms 
(taxonomically subordinate to a genus) generally resembling each other and 
capable of reproduction. 42 But as Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks ask "Why 
should our primary classification (whatever that means) be our species rather than 
biological class (mammals), biological order (primates), sub-species distinctions 
(race) or cross-species distinctions (gender)? "43 Each distinction might be primary 
for a different reason: as mentioned above, race is relevant if our aim is to identify 
humans at risk of sickle cell anaemia. And even if we did find one sort of 
classification to be biologically primary, how does that make it morally relevant? 
"Moral properties and biological properties are categories from different domains. 
We cannot merely assume a particular biological property is morally relevant; we 
must show it is relevant. And even if it were shown; its relevance would be 
established by referring to moral principles, not brute biological facts. " 44 
I have, I hope, provided good reasons in support of assumption one: reasons why 
we think that higher mammals, at least, have some moral status. However, we use 
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them in preclinical trials of xenotransplantation techniques and as donors of heart 
valves and pancreatic islet cells to humans. In the future the transplant community 
intends to use them as solid organ donors to humans. These practices rest upon 
assumption two: that there is a `morally relevant difference' which justifies our 
differential use of humans and other animals in this case. What sort of thing could 
mark the difference so that we may not be killed for our organs while non humans 
may? 
I must point out here that I shall not be considering one possibility which some 
would claim marks the difference - the possession of an immortal soul. While I do 
not wish to categorically deny the existence of such things as souls I feel they ought 
not to be called upon to do explanatory work here as their existence or otherwise is 
unverifiable. 
The case against equal consideration 
A first attempt to ground assumption two: the sui generis 
view 
I shall begin by considering what I believe to be a very implausible attempt to justify 
unequal treatment: one which denies that relevant interests ought to be considered 
equally. Many (perhaps most) people think that the answer to the question `why 
may we kill animals for their organs while human beings are off limits? ' is so obvious 
it need not even be asked - believing perhaps that the practice is self evidently 
permissible. Humans are humans, animals are animals, and that is all there is to it: 
we use (eat, chase for sport, experiment on and so on) only the latter (or, at least, 
only in very rare cases the former: such instances being greeted with public outrage 
if they become common knowledge). Regardless of the similarities between our 
species and others there is something `special' about people; something that sets 
us apart from all other animals. We may claim to find certain animals `special' too, 
but these claims tend to be due to the partial affection of animal lovers rather than 
based on an impartial consideration of properties of the animals themselves. 
Although we may show great affection for our pets we also commonly breed 
sentient animals for food, destroy them if they move into our homes uninvited and 
use them in experiments testing not only medicines but also products of lesser 
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importance, such as cosmetics. In other words, most people who advocate the use 
of animals as organs donors who would yet be horrified at the thought of using 
humans tend to think that our membership of the species homo sapiens is reason 
enough to protect us all from such usage while permitting at least some nonhumans 
to be used. That is, they think that species alone is reason enough and need not be 
backed up by supporting argument. 
It might be argued that to attack such a view is to attack a straw man, that no-one 
really believes that is it the raw fact of species membership which is relevant, but 
that species is a marker for a difference that is relevant. I disagree, I think that 
layperson thinking about the matter (I include transplant surgeons in this category 
for my purposes here) does not usually go deeper than noting the species 
difference. David Degrazia (who coined the term `the sui generis view') notes that 
this position is "rarely acknowledged by philosophers" but captures "a common 
conviction about the moral status of humans". 45 
This sort of thought is, in any case, not confined to lay people - Anne Maclean is an 
example of a philosopher who specifically rejects the idea that it is any particular 
capacity of humans which makes them morally `special'. Talking of the `grossly 
mentally handicapped "Baby Jane Doe"' she states "there is everything to be 
concerned with from the moral point of view - there is the baby, who is as much an 
object of moral concern as any other baby". 46 Similarly, when unconscious people 
are under consideration, Maclean asserts "once again there is everything to be 
concerned with from a moral point of view, there are the people themselves''. 47 
Jenny Teichmann also advocates this position: "`everyone' has to mean every 
human being, not every `person' as defined by philosophers. The distinction 
between human beings and other things is natural, not arbitrary and not difficult to 
draw either in principle or in practice. But the differences between levels of 
intelligence, between living coherent or incoherent memories, between being sane 
and insane and so on are matters of degree, not of kind". 48 
Robert Nozick, when talking about grossly retarded human beings being compared 
to animals makes a different sort of defence: "these people are, after all, human 
beings, of the same species as we are, however retarded or handicapped. Even 
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supposing a particularly retarded individual turns out to be no more rational or 
autonomous and to have no richer an internal psychology than a normal member of 
another mammalian species, he nonetheless is a human being, albeit defective, and 
must be treated as one. " 49 ! discuss Peter Carruthers' version of this sort of 
defence, that 'mentally defective' humans (Carruthers' term) ought to be protected 
because they are members of a class who, generally, we protect, in chapter four. 
I think that people who appeal to sui generis type arguments to differentiate 
between humans and animals, when the subject is who should be killed for their 
organs, are wrong. Species is not a clear cut boundary and even if it were it is not 
clear how we ought to draw moral conclusions from this biological fact. (I also think 
that, contra Teichmann, the boundary of consciousness clearly is a boundary, or at 
least as much one as the boundary of the species: it is not arbitrary. But I am 
moving too fast. ) 
A series of arguments against the sui generis view 
1: The argument from taxonomy 
The system of taxonomy (the classification of individuals into groups and subgroups 
on the basis of relevant similarities) was devised by a Swedish botanist called Carl 
von Liane (Carolus Linnaeus) and published in 1758. According to Linnean 
taxonomy, "The smallest taxon is usually the species (a group of potentially 
interbreeding individuals). Closely similar species are first grouped into a `genus'... 
Genera are next grouped into larger units, such as a `family' and families 
themselves are grouped into an `order' and so on. " 50 Linne classified humans as a 
unique species (Homo sapiens), genus (Homo) and even family (Hominidae) from 
the rest of creation. Under the Linnean system "Our nearest relative, the 
chimpanzee, is not Homo but Pan (there are two species, Pan troglodytes and Pan 
paniscus) while the gorilla is a separate genus, Gorilla gorilla, and the apes as a 
whole belong to the family Pongidae". 51 
A `cladistic' interpretation of taxonomy (ie one designed to reflect evolutionary 
history rather than animal's present appearance) "shows that humans are not a 
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separate lineage from the modern apes: we are apes, and specifically we are close 
relatives of the gorilla and especially the chimpanzee... The everyday sense of the 
word `ape', which excludes humans, and the term `pongid' must be abandoned 
when we are talking about evolution. Nonhuman apes are ... a grouping formed by 
subtracting humans from the valid Glade of apes-including-humans". We are more 
closely related to chimpanzees than these animals are to gorillas. To put it rather 
melodramatically, "if we were chimpanzees, our closest relatives would not be those 
big black animals in nearby forests that look rather like ourselves, let alone those 
reddish Asian animals [orang-utans] that hang from the trees, but the naked and 
bipedal humans". 52,53 
It is clear (to everyone apart, perhaps, from Creationists) that human and 
nonhuman animals spring from the same genetic stock. Further, whilst we share a 
distant common ancestor with all mammals, we are particularly closely related to 
the African great apes: humans and the two species of chimpanzee technically 
belong in the same genus (imagine seeing the labels `Homo troglodytes' and `Homo 
paniscus' on cages in zoos! ). Rosemary Rodd notes that "It is commonly accepted 
that the chimpanzee-gorilla-human split occurred about 8-10 million years ago. 
Human, gorilla, and chimpanzee lines have been separate for approximately the 
same length of time as those of brown, black, and sun bears (Ursus arctos, Ursus 
americanus, Helarctos malayanus); and the African ape-human line diverged from 
that of the orang-utan at about the time of the split between the ursid line and the 
genus Tremarctos (spectacled bear)"(54). 
Jared Diamond notes that "The genetic distance (1.6%) separating us from pygmy 
or common chimps [Pan troglodytes and Pan paniscus] is barely double that 
separating pygmy from common chimps (0.7%). It is less than that between two 
species of gibbon (2.2%) or between such closely related North American bird 
species as red-eyed vireos and white-eyed vireos (2.9%) or between such closely- 
related and hard-to-distinguish European bird species willow warblers and 
chiffchaffs (2.6%). The remaining 98.4% of our genes are just normal chimp genes. 
For example, our principle haemoglobin, the oxygen-carrying protein that gives 
blood its red colour, is identical in all 287 units with chimp haemoglobin. " 55 So 
genetically we are very close to some nonhuman animals: does this give reason to 
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think that species is not relevant? 
We should perhaps refrain from drawing too many conclusions about the 
`humanness' of chimpanzees (or vice versa) from this research as other work has 
shown that nearly 75 per cent of human genes have some counterpart in 
nematodes - millimetre-long worms. And, as a New Scientist article notes, some 
scientists believe that genetics will be unable to tell us what, if anything, marks the 
boundary between humans and other animals. Although chimpanzee and human 
DNA is 98.5 per cent similar (according to this article) "the way it is arranged on the 
chromosomes is somewhat different. Chimps have 24 pairs of chromosomes, 
humans 23. Eighteen of the pairs are pretty much identical, but the rest have been 
reorganised, with large chunks of DNA moved around. For example, compared to 
the chimp, human chromosomes 4,9 and 12 contain huge inversions. In the case 
of chromosome 12, this has the effect of shifting almost a quarter of its DNA from 
one end of the chromosome to another. Such rearrangements could alter the 
activity of critical genes by moving them closer or further away from the pieces of 
DNA that switch them on and off. " 56 
2: Ring species 
If one is not convinced by the above, another argument remains. Richard Dawkins 
suggests that humans and (other) chimps are an example of a `ring species'. 
Dawkins states "it is we that choose to divide animals up into discontinuous species. 
On the evolutionary view of life there must have been intermediates, even though, 
conveniently for our naming rituals, they are usually extinct. " 57 The best known 
example of ring species are the herring gull and lesser black-backed gull, clearly 
distinct species in Britain yet linked by a continuous series of interbreeding 
individuals all the way around the world. Dawkins points out that this example is 
easily identifiable as the two species are separated only by distance. Most ring 
species are separated by time, in that usually the intermediates are historical rather 
than currently living animals. However "All pairs of related species are potentially 
ring species. The intermediates must have lived once. It is just that in most cases 
they are now dead. " 58 
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There are similarities between the questions surrounding the grey area at the 
species boundary and the grey area at the beginning of life: "It is no use telling 
these people [pro-lifers] that, depending on the human characteristics that interest 
you, a foetus can be `half human' or `a hundredth human'. `Human', to the 
discontinuous mind, is an absolute concept. There can be no half measures. And 
from this flows much evil. " 59 The ape-human intermediates no longer exist. Yet 
finding even one living intermediate would be sufficient to destroy our current 
boundary system. "We need only discover a single survivor, say a relict 
Australopithecus in the Budongo Forest, and our precious system of norms and 
ethics would come crashing about our ears. Racism would blur with speciesism in 
obdurate and vicious confusion. " 60 
3: A reductio ad absurdum argument 
The small genetic difference between the other great apes and ourselves also 
appears to commit one (in a reductio ad absurdum kind of way) to making some 
rather odd concomitant distinctions between species which one may generally think 
of as being so similar as to be almost indistinguishable. If one wishes to base one's 
distinction between humans and all other animals on this small genetic difference 
and nothing else one is logically committed to treating differently chimpanzees and 
gorillas and to treating both of these species differently from orang-utangs. Some 
people who have made a study of such creatures have suggested that the species 
do differ in observable ways, so to take the example to its absurd extreme we must 
also note that we are committed to treating differently the different species of gibbon 
(between whom there is greater genetic distance than between humans and 
chimps), and the red-eyed and white-eyed vireos. Few who wish to protect all and 
only humans from use would wish to commit to this, I think, which suggests that 
something other than pure genetics is behind the favouritism. 
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4: Superior nonhuman beings 
If membership of our species per se is what confers `full moral status' on all and 
only humans then we ought fervently to hope that if our species encounters alien 
creatures of the sort beloved by science fiction television writers - nonhumans who 
are much more advanced than we are - the aliens do not assign moral standing 
according to this policy. 
5: The dubious moral status of some genetic humans 
In fact, not everyone does ascribe full moral status to all genetically human 
creatures: think of those on the `right to choose' side of the abortion debate. And, 
even more clearly, consider hydatidiform motes - these are genetically human, yet 
noone would consider ascribing full moral status to them. 61 
Appealing to species per se or capacities of species? 
The species boundary is not as clear cut as Teichmann claims it is: it cannot be so. 
So species per se seems a very weak ground for making distinctions in moral 
standing between creatures. Humans and their closest relatives are connected by a 
continuum rather than being adjacent but separate and to claim that the boundary of 
our species is immutable would effectively be to deny the theory of evolution. And 
why ought mere species membership inform our beliefs about moral status? In the 
absence of supporting argument it is dangerous simply to assume that unequal 
treatment based on species membership is correct: human history warns against 
the wisdom of accepting current moral norms unreflectively, especially when the 
evidence of animal interests provides a presumption in favour of equal treatment. 
Denying that species membership is a good candidate for the job does not mean 
that we cannot find any morally relevant reasons for treating humans and animals 
differently for our organ donation purposes: perhaps species membership confers 
something special which make the human interest in not being used as an organ 
donor relatively stronger. LaFollette and Shanks call this position `indirect 
speciesism' - "the view that there are morally relevant differences which accompany 
species differences". 62 
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This appears a much more promising avenue of enquiry: no matter how closely 
related we are to chimpanzees it is clear that homo sapiens as a species have 
made what Jared Diamond calls `a Great Leap Forward', developing art and 
technology and, crucially, language, around 40,000 years ago. "Until the Great 
Leap Forward, human culture had developed at a snail's pace for millions of years. 
That pace was dictated by the slow rate of genetic change. After the Leap, cultural 
development no longer depended on genetic change [but instead allowed humans 
to communicate easily and thus rapidly to work out solutions to problems in ways 
that would not have been possible without spoken language]. Despite negligible 
changes in our anatomy, there has been far more cultural evolution in the past 
40,000 years than in the millions of years before. " 63 
It is uncontroversially true that the average human is clearly a more sophisticated 
animal than the average chimp, pig or dog. His mental and emotional life is richer 
than what these animals could aspire to. 64 Diamond's points suggests a way of 
setting a moral boundary between homo sapiens and all other animal species which 
does not rely on raw membership of our species. Perhaps the possession of 
language and the increased mental abilities it confers makes a difference? I 
mentioned above why this type of consideration is not suitable as a criterion for 
admitting beings into the class of '`morally considerable creatures' -- it may still serve 
as a useful means of grading degrees of moral status within the class of beings with 
such status. Perhaps humans are harmed more than animals are by being used as 
organ donors and this is why they ought not to be used. 
A second attempt to ground assumption two: differences 
between the human and nonhuman interest in continuing to 
live 
The kinds of `harming' or of `thwarting of interests' discussed in the animal welfare 
literature tends to take two forms: causing suffering and ending lives. While both of 
these are the sorts of interests which humans and animals share, only the latter is 
relevant to the special circumstance of using animals in transplantation. Pain and 
suffering, although usually a major consideration in comparisons of humans and 
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animals, is not relevant to our case here as organ donation may be performed 
under general anaesthesia and the donor then destroyed without being permitted to 
regain consciousness. I suppose there may be residual concerns about the 
conditions in which an animal bred for transplant is kept, and especially in any 
suffering which may be entailed by genetic modification, but I shall assume that 
these problems are remediable. The harm with which we must be concerned here 
is simply the possible harm done by killing a creature. 65 
Death as a harm 
Is death a harm to the one who dies? This is a contentious subject: it seems slightly 
odd to talk of a harm of which one is unaware, and of harms which have no subject. 
These ideas seem paradoxical: while we live we are not harmed by our own death, 
but as soon we die, we cease to be aware of anything, and, worse, there is no `us' 
remaining to be harmed. In chapter two I discussed these difficulties in relation to 
the question of whether the dead can be harmed posthumously. I hope that the 
account of antemortem harming and surviving interests given in chapter two 
sufficed to support the intuition that posthumous events can be harms: the same 
arguments give substance to the claim that death is a harm. Even if I was 
unconvincing, the intuition that death is a harm to the dead remains a powerful one: 
most people, philosophers and laymen alike subscribe to it, including those 
philosophers who claim that the dead cannot be harmed by events occurring after 
their death. 66 
I adhere in the following to the view that death is a harm because of what it deprives 
people of: I accept that this is far from the only possible explanation but it is one 
common among the philosophers I discuss. The susceptibility to be harmed by 
death, on this view, stems from the possession of interests: something with no 
needs or desires, or things which are better or worse for it, cannot be harmed if its 
life is ended. In my discussion of Frey above I made a case for the attribution of 
crude preference interests to at least some animals. These preferences confer 
welfare interests - the animal cares about what happens to it and for this reason is, 
arguably, harmed if its preferences are thwarted. But do animals have an interest in 
continued life in the way that humans do? If they do, the principle of equal 
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consideration must come into play. To make such a claim for animals is 
contentious. Some philosophers argue that, although animals may be deprived 
future happiness by death, they cannot have an interest in continued life as they 
cannot form such a complicated thought as a desire for life. 
Animals are harmed by death 
Are animals harmed by death? Ruth Cigman thinks that they are not as in order for 
death to be a harm it must thwart the individual's `categorical desires'. Such a 
desire "does not merely presuppose being alive (like the desire to eat when one is 
hungry), but rather answers the question of whether one wants to remain alive". 67 
(nb Cigman actually says that animal death is not a `misfortune' but as Regan 
notes, these terms seem to be co-extensive when applied to humans and animals - 
what would it mean for someone to be harmed without this being a misfortune and 
vice versa? ). How should we respond to this? I hope that my earlier discussion of 
Frey suggested that animals are capable of having at least belief-like states and 
desires in the absence of language. Can they desire continued life? 
Many animals exhibit behaviour which could be indicative of a preference for their 
lives to continue (although in an attenuated or at least `not fully describable' sense, 
due to their lack of language) - they are able to recognise and avoid life-threatening 
situations. My dog, when imagining herself `threatened' by a gunshot in the 
distance, takes extreme evasive action. Kittens are unwilling to walk on a 
transparent surface over a perceived drop and, if forcibly placed on the `deep' side 
of the testing apparatus, reportedly `freeze in terror': the same response is seen in 
human babies. 68 However, the fact that a dog is afraid of a gunshot does not prove 
that it fears the gun will kill it. And as we descend the phylogenetic scale we see 
animals exhibiting aversive responses to stimuli (caterpillars wriggling on pins, for 
example) even to the point at which we are fairly sure that their nervous systems 
cannot support consciousness - that they are exhibiting mere `trophisms' rather 
than any felt desire to escape their circumstances. So we find it hard to conceive, in 
human terms, the extent to which an animal desires that its life continue, and we 
also find it difficult to determine where, on the phylogenetic scale, to say that this 
ability ends. Only the first problem is of direct concern to us in this thesis as only 
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animals physiologically similar to us are at risk of being killed as donors to humans. 
Cigman does not think that the responses to danger described above are sufficient 
to describe an animal as being afraid of death. In order for death to be a harm, she 
contends, one needs to possess "the related concepts of long-term future 
possibilities, of life itself as an object of value, of consciousness, agency and their 
annihilation, and of tragedy and similar misfortunes". 69 There are, as Regan notes, 
problems with Cigman's theory. What would animals have to do to prove they 
possess long term goals? Countless experiments show animals forgoing present 
pleasures for larger future goals and such like. However the impossibility of 
ascribing clear cut beliefs to animals makes it difficult to say exactly what they think 
in these situations. I agree with Professor Cigman, animals do not possess the 
concepts she mentions to any great extent, they cannot desire that their lives 
continue in the way that normal humans can. What would follow from this? Not 
very much, I think. 
Must we desire life in order to have an interest in life? 
The first thing to note is that not all humans have the categorical desire for 
continued life. Lawrence Johnson gives as an example the case of a young healthy 
man with good prospects who wishes to kill himself as he has been dumped by his 
girlfriend. This seems to be a clear case of having an interest in life which is at 
odds with one's formed desire (for death). Johnson says "it would seem to me that 
it would be in the young man's interests to frustrate his desire to terminate his 
life". 70 And consider human babies and severely intellectually subnormal people. 
Here are people who may have no categorical desires at all, yet who are generally 
thought to be harmed by death. Although an attempt could be made to bring 
babies, at least, into the fold under a potentiality argument, it is difficult to see what 
could protect adult humans incapable of categorical desires. I shall say more about 
this kind of thought in a moment. 
We need not appeal to a specific preference for continued life in order to say why 
death is a bad thing. As I alluded to in the previous section, I operate in this thesis 
according to the belief that death is a bad thing primarily because of the 
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opportunities it cuts off. While this is not the only possible reason for saying that 
death is an evil, it seems to me a plausible one. As Michael Lockwood says "we 
need not, usually, even appeal to a person's preference for going on living per se, 
by way of explaining why it would be wrong to end his life -- though that preference 
alone would suffice for judging it wrong to do so. In so far as it is rational for people 
to fear and avoid death, this is ... largely because ... it does, in general, represent 
the ultimate frustration of the majority of one's desires. " 71 In fact, attributing the 
wrongness of killing only to the violation of a preference for life seems odd. In 
cases where killing is done instantly and painlessly as the person sleeps it becomes 
vulnerable to the `no subject' and `experience' problems discussed in chapter two. 
The desire is not violated during life, the person is unaware of being killed, and, 
once dead, the subject of the preference is gone. I assume the notion of the 
antemortem person is not available here -a preference for continued life could not 
be a surviving interest. 
It seems to me that although having a preference for continued life is a sufficient 
condition for describing something as having an interest in living it is not a 
necessary condition. And if the interest in continued life comes simply from having 
desires which ought not (other things being equal) be frustrated by death, then 
animals as well as humans have such an interest. 
Regan says: 
"... it does not follow that individuals who lack any grasp of long- 
term future possibilities have no long-term future possibilities. On 
the contrary, even if we assume that animals fail to have a 
sufficiently rich grasp of long-term future possibilities, in Cigman's 
sense, animals do have a psychophysical identity over time. 
Barring unforeseen developments, Fido will be the same dog 
tomorrow, and tomorrow, and so on into the indefinite future as he 
is today. The untimely death of such an animal, therefore, does 
cut that individual's life short, not only in the sense that a living 
organism ceases to be biologically alive, but, more pertinently, in 
the sense that a particular psychological being ceases to be. And 
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it is this latter fact, not whether animals have a sense of their long- 
term future possibilities, that is decisive in giving an account of the 
harm or misfortune death can be for them. Death, for them is a 
misfortune, a harm, when death for them is a deprivation, a loss, 
and it is the latter when their death is contrary to their welfare- 
interests, even assuming that they themselves have no 
preference-interest in remaining alive or in avoiding death. " 72 
To conclude this section, it seems entirely reasonable to think of death as being a 
harm to an animal, even if the animal has no formed desire to go on living as such. 
The animal has a (welfare) interest in continuing to live in virtue of it being possible 
for its life to go better or worse for it, even if it cannot form the desire to continue to 
live. 
Animals are harmed by death but humans are harmed more 
This is not the end of the matter however. Most people also think that the difference 
between what humans and animals lose in dying is morally relevant. That is, we do 
generally think it is `worse' when a human being dies than when an animal dies: 
worse, that is `from the point of view of the dead creature'. Death is a greater 
deprivation for the human than the animal because a human `loses more': there are 
more reasons for us to point to in describing the death of a human as a bad thing. 
As David DeGrazia puts it, "Assuming that some animals are harmed by death, 
death seems to harm some morally considerable beings more than others". 73 
I concede that normal humans are, usually, harmed more by death than are 
animals. The preference for continued life is relevant here: except in cases of 
painless death of which the subject is unaware, the fact that humans fear death and 
can regret its cutting short our projects does make it a worse thing for us than for 
animals. And the plans and projects of humans are usually far more complicated 
than those of animals - `more is lost' in a typical human death than in an animal 
death. 
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The implications of this for organ donation 
If the death of a nonhuman `matters less' for it than the death of a human for the 
human, then perhaps it should matter less to everyone else too. In other words, 
perhaps it matters less when nonhumans are killed. Let us attempt to unpick this. 
John Harris states "Talk about the lives of individuals having moral value [moral 
status, in my sense] refers to the moral reasons we have for respecting claims to 
continued existence made by or on behalf of such creatures. To evaluate these 
claims and compare them to other possibly competing claims, seems to presuppose 
some view about just what it is that makes life important, that makes it wrong to end 
a life prematurely, and of what it is that makes some lives, or the lives of some 
individuals, more important than others. " 74 What might this thing be? 
I argued that animals are harmed by death and that they have an interest in 
continuing to live even if they cannot take an interest in so doing. This interest in 
not dying is sufficient to confer a limited amount of moral status - we do not think 
we should kill nonhumans `without good reason' because continued life matters for 
them. However, the `without good reason' clause is interesting - we generally think 
that humans must not be killed simply when it suits other people's ends. By 
contrast we think that animals may be killed if there is `good reason' and that saving 
the life of human organ recipients counts as a good reason. So there is something 
special about human beings which means that although their interest in living may 
never (or almost never) be overridden, the interest animals have in living may be 
overridden much more easily. What underlies this? Apparently, some sort of variant 
of the idea that humans are more `complex'. 
The ideas that a human's life `matters more' to it than a nonhuman's life for the 
nonhuman and that taking human life is thus a morally weightier matter appears 
both in common sense thought and, in varying forms, in the work of a great many 
diverse philosophers for example Peter Carruthers, Joel Feinberg, RG Frey, 
Lawrence E Johnson, Michael Lockwood, James Rachels, Tom Regan, Peter 
Singer and Bonnie Steinbock. These writers disagree with each other on the 
question of whether nonhumans can be said to possess an interest in not dying. 
They agree however that, even if death does harm animals, less is lost in animal 
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death than in human death and a lesser moral status thus conferred. We have, 
therefore, only a relatively weak, overrideable, reason not to kill animals. So the 
strength of one's `interest in going on living' is, according to these philosophers, a 
morally relevant difference which justifies differences in whom we may kill. We 
need not give equal consideration to animal and human interests in continuing to 
live as they are not relevantly similar - the human interest is stronger. 
Here are a few examples among the many available: I have chosen examples from 
three different philosophical positions to emphasise how widespread this belief is. 
Tom Regan, in presenting his lifeboat dilemma in which four humans and a dog all 
occupy a lifeboat which can sustain only four of them, says "the harm that death is, 
is a function of the opportunities for satisfaction it forecloses... To throw any one of 
the humans overboard, to face certain death, would be to make that individual 
worse-off (ie, would cause that individual a greater harm) than the harm that would 
be done to the dog if the animal was thrown overboard. " 75 Peter Carruthers states 
"when we enter sympathetically into the death of another, trying to see what their 
death may have meant from their point of view, we do seem naturally to focus on 
those plans and projects that have now been cut short. For this would explain the 
fact ... that many people 
feel less sympathy - from the perspective of the one who 
dies - for the death of a baby or an old person who has let go their hold on life. For 
in such cases, no forward-looking motives for survival may exist. " 76 And James 
Rachels says "When a mentally sophisticated being dies, there are more reasons 
why the death is a bad thing". 77 
What sort of things might make the difference? Many different properties are 
proposed, but rationality, self consciousness and the ability to be a rational 
contractor are perhaps the three most widely propounded ones. These properties 
all tend to fall, one way or another, under the nebulous concept of `personhood'. 
What makes the difference? 
The concept of personhood and its application is problematic: different philosophers 
have differing ideas as to what constitutes the state. Jenny Teichmann says "To 
determine in a particular case whether or not some individual is a `person in a 
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philosophical sense' necessarily requires the making of ad hoc decisions about 
boundaries". 78 Mary Anne Warren notes that some philosophers take `person' as 
an honorific term meaning simply `being with full moral status', and in particular, with 
an interest in life which may not be overridden for the greater good, without making 
any claims about the characteristics of the creature. Others require that a creature 
possess certain empirically testable characteristics. It is not clear how the link 
between the metaphysical and the normative definitions of personhood ought to be 
forged. Some (such as the early Warren) claim that it is `self evident' that a `person 
in the empirically testable sense' has full moral status. Others (such as H Tristram 
Englehardt79) attempt to form an argument linking the two concepts. In addition, 
among those philosophers who do require that a creature demonstrate certain 
characteristics in order to be a person, criteria for personhood vary from self 
consciousness and rationality to more demanding requirements such as the ability 
to be a moral agent. 
I accept Teichmann's point: the application of the concept of `personhood' is very 
problematic (in fact I shall argue in the `difficulties in comparing lives' section below 
that it is probably unusable). However the idea which underlies the term does 
appear to possess considerable plausibility: when we consider the lives of typical 
members of our species and compare them to the lives of typical nonhurnans we do 
tend to reach the conclusion that human life is `richer' than that of animals. And, in 
the absence of any good reason to think that membership of our species has any 
ability to confer moral standing, and given that I choose not to discuss any possible 
moral status conferred by the possession of a soul and such like, it seems that this 
richness is what gives `persons' a greater interest in life continuing and which thus 
makes their death `worse' (for them) than the death of a nonperson. 
Earlier i used the fact that animals have both welfare and (attenuated) preference 
interests to demonstrate they are morally considerable. However, human beings 
typically have a capacity greater than do nonhuman animals to plan for the future, to 
be self aware and autonomous and to have meaningful interactions with others. 
These types of interests confer a higher moral status as they mean that more is lost 
when a human being dies than when an animal does. If the `badness' of death is 
due to what it deprives us of (as I assume), the human whose life is cut short 
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undergoes a greater deprivation as they had a `higher stake' invested in their lives 
than animals. And humans are capable of forming a desire to go on living, with all 
the complex thoughts about time, nonexistence and so on that this entails. Animals 
cannot have such desires. 
Humans have a higher moral status than animals, but I am 
not sure why 
In short, it is not at all clear exactly which of these proposed ways of conferring 
higher moral status on humans than animals works. However, between them, they 
are widely accepted. Fortunately it is not necessary for me to discuss in detail 
exactly which of these proposals is the most plausible candidate for conferring full 
moral status on humans, for reasons I set out in the remainder of this chapter. In 
what follows I lump together these ideas under the crude heading of `having a richer 
life'. Death is more of an evil to creatures with a richer life. This does not do justice 
to the complexity of the arguments but suffices for our purposes. 
I begin by noting a corollary of the idea that some lives are richer than others (in 
one of the above ways) and that this confers higher moral status. It is not obvious 
how such a position protects those human beings who do not have the normal 
range of human interests. This is not to say automatically that babies, profoundly 
mentally handicapped people and so on are to be utilised if we use animals - the 
belief that normal humans have a stronger interest in not dying than do animals may 
still be compatible with protecting atypical humans. It does mean that supporting 
reasons must be given. But first, the problem. 
The `Argument from Marginal Cases' 
This sort of argument has been around in the animal ethics literature for almost 
thirty years. The Argument from Marginal Cases (henceforth, the AMC) centres 
around a single unpleasant fact - some human beings have intellectual lives which 
are less complex than those of the average cat or dog. As a consequence their 
interests may be only of the most basic welfare variety. For whatever 'level of 
animal mental complexity that can be imagined for those creatures used in 
transplant-related surgery, whether the reader believes that they are persons or 
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merely beings with basic interests, it is possible to imagine a damaged human 
whose mental life is less complex. Thus it is hard to say why such humans ought to 
be given preferential moral status if animals are not. 
Here is my statement of the AMC as applied to the specific case of 
xenotransplantation: 
(1) It seems undeniable that many species other than our own are 
conscious. Because of this they have (at least a minimal set of) 
interests: they try to avoid pain and to seek to meet basic needs such as 
hunger and shelter. They may be said to have a stake in their lives and 
an interest in them continuing. These interests confer (at least a limited) 
moral standing. 
(2) lt also seems undeniable that some profoundly cognitively damaged 
people lack the usual range of human interests. That is, they have only 
the sorts of interests possessed by nonhuman animals and are likely to 
have a less `rich' life than many animals. The worst cases - those who 
have permanently lost consciousness - have no mental lives at all and 
are wholly unable either to desire continued life or to have even the 
limited interest in continued life I ascribed to animals. It seems difficult 
to say how such people are harmed by death. 
(3) Thus, on a comparison of present interests some humans are found to 
be equivalent to, or worse off than, some nonhumans. The worst cases 
lack even the sorts of interests that confer the limited moral status we 
usually attribute to animals. For this reason they appear, at least, to be 
as vulnerable as animals to being killed or injured for human purposes if 
a sufficiently good reason is found. 
(4) Yet, our conduct towards these very intellectually subnormal humans 
and the comparable animals does not reflect this. To take our specific 
case of xenotransplantation, intelligent animals such as pigs and dogs 
are currently being killed in animal to animal models of transspecies 
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transplantation. Human beings are not currently used as involuntary or 
nonvoluntary organ donors (unless certain dubious `urban myths' are to 
be believed80), and it is not at present common even to countenance the 
idea of such treatment. 
(5) So what grounds this differential treatment? As we saw above, species 
per se cannot provide a moral justification for such a belief. And a 
comparison of interests does not seem to provide a morally relevant 
difference protecting all humans while allowing all nonhumans to be 
used. It seems entirely reasonable to ascribe the interest most relevant 
in the case of donation - an interest in continued life - to animals, and 
some human `marginal cases' appear to be deprived of less in death 
than are animals. 
(6) If we cannot find anything to serve as the criterion which justifies our 
unequal treatment of humans and animals when the question is whom 
we can kill for their organs then we must concede that our present 
differing behaviour towards nonhumans and profoundly cognitively 
impaired humans is unwarranted. Most proponents of the AMC 
conclude by stating that this leaves us with two choices: first we could 
increase the moral status of animals to that which is currently granted to 
these damaged human beings (ie that they not be killed or caused pain 
to meet other people's ends) or second, we could concede that we may 
treat human marginal cases as we now treat animals. For if some 
humans are harmed by death only to the extent that animals are then it 
is not `more wrong' to end their lives than it is to end the lives of the 
animals currently used, according to the principle of equal consideration 
of relevantly similar interests discussed above. 
Unpleasant choices 
This seems like an invidious choice. I do, as a matter of fact, think that something 
resembling the second choice is the correct one, but my reasons for believing this 
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do not stem solely from the AMC. I shall explain this further in a moment and in 
chapter four. 
The plausibility of, and problem with, the idea that having a 
`richer life' gives a relatively stronger interest in remaining 
alive 
The AMC is a problem for any account of moral status which gives humans higher 
status based on some capacity which they possess rather than on the brute fact of 
their species. However, the AMC itself faces two problems. 
The first problem actually applies to the idea that different interests in continued life 
may be compared as well as to the AMC (which grows naturally from the idea that 
this comparison can be made). It is that it seems inordinately difficult to compare 
the strength of the interest in continued life among beings all of whom are 
conscious. The kinds of animals physically suitable to provide organs for humans 
are also the kinds who have the greatest claims to personhood, or, at least, the 
kinds who exhibit a degree of rationality or self-consciousness. They of all animals 
are deprived of most in death and so they of all animals have the strongest interest 
in not having their lives ended prematurely. However, because animal minds are so 
different from those of humans it is difficult (I think impossible) to compare them. 
The second problem is with the scope of the AMC. I believe it needs to be 
restricted. While it has a great deal of intuitive plausibility when we think in 
prudential terms about `what is lost' from the subject's perspective, and while it 
serves to inform our beliefs about the relative wrongness of killing humans and 
animals, i think we ought to be wary of allowing it to lead us to any conclusions 
about the permissibility of killing human beings. 
The case for a circumscribed AMC 
The intuition that some lives are `richer' and thus that there is `more to be concerned 
about' in ending them than there is for less complex lives is a powerful one. When 
thought about in broad terms it seems plausible, most people can agree that a 
normal human generally does have a richer and more complex life than does a dog 
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or a cat (whatever we mean by `richer' or `more complex) - they have 'greater 
opportunities for satisfaction', or are 'persons' when animals are not (or at least, 
have more of the capacities which are typically ascribed to `persons' by 
philosophers). 81 However, it seems very difficult, when it comes down to it, actually 
to make formal inter species comparisons of lives. This does not apply only when 
we try to make comparisons across the species boundary of course - just as we are 
unable to know what it is like to be an animal in this sense we also perhaps cannot 
know truly what it is like to be another human. The point is that it is unclear just how 
such comparisons between lives can be made with sufficient accuracy as to decide 
precisely what is lost in different deaths. 
There is an extraordinarily large amount of discussion regarding the extent to which 
human and animal lives can be compared: I attempt to wade through the muddle in 
the appendix to this thesis. However, because I suspect that the discussion is 
intractable, it does no work in my argument. I offer instead a circumscribed human 
and animal comparison which I hope will be able to do some practical work in 
helping us to determine who might be a suitable candidate for organ donation. I 
wish to assert something which I hope will excite no controversy: irreversibly 
unconscious human beings have no interest in remaining alive - it no longer makes 
sense to talk of their lives going better or worse for them. To phrase it according to 
other theories: their life contains no opportunities for satisfaction, they are unable to 
value their own life. Regardless of what the reader chooses to believe from my 
discussion in the appendix to this thesis of the extent to which animals are rational, 
language-using moral agents, the fact of the matter is that, at the very least, they 
have a limited interest in continued life. By contrast, whatever criteria are used, a 
permanently unconscious human has no (present) interest in continuing to live. 82 If 
we are to assign moral status purely on the basis of present interests it would seem 
that irreversibly unconscious people have a lesser claim than do animals. An 
obvious objection is that it is not possible clearly to delimit such a class of human 
beings -I address this in chapter four. For now, I shall assume that it is possible to 
determine a class of human beings who have no present interests. (They may have 
surviving interests which are relevant -I discuss this in chapter four. In this present 
section I restrict my discussion of the irreversibly unconscious to those who, like 
many dead people, have expressed no strong feelings regarding their treatment. ) 
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Obligations to and concerning humans are not conferred 
only by a consideration of interests 
May we draw any direct conclusions from this regarding how we may treat such 
people? I do not believe that we may. Even given the extreme example of human 
lacking any interests I do not think it follows that such a comparison could act as a 
basis for a policy for selecting humans who could be killed for their organs. But this 
is what the comparison of interests in continued life is often assumed to prove. 
Singer imagines "living a life with no conscious experiences at all. Such a life is a 
complete blank; I would not in the least regret the shortening of this subjectively 
barren form of existence. This test suggests, therefore, that the life of a being that 
has no conscious experiences is of no intrinsic value. " 83 I agree with Singer until 
the last sentence - surely it is correct that such a being has no capacity for caring 
about anything done to it and indeed its life may have no value to it. However I 
contend that this does not mean that we are not free to treat it in any way we 
please. 
I talked above of `creatures' with richer and poorer lives being harmed to differing 
extents by death and so having differing degrees of moral status. This idea is 
usually relatively unproblematic as the creatures with the highest status tend to be 
those who are genetically human. But the AMC makes problems for this account: 
when we compare the lives of the `worst case' intellectually damaged humans - 
those who are irreversibly unconscious - and animals we are drawn ineluctably to 
the conclusion that `less is lost from the subject's point of view' when the human 
dies than when the animal does. These humans - if this account is followed - 
appear to have a lower moral status than animals: they would appear, in fact, to 
have no status at all. So if a creature has no interest in its life continuing - if its life 
can no longer go better or worse for it - then other people need have no interest in 
the continued life either. They may, in the situation which occupies us here, kill the 
creature for its organs because the reasons from refraining have been lost. Ought 
we to accept this? Singer's comment makes it clear that he does, and the `interests' 
account of moral status I described earlier may also appear to support this 
conclusion. 
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I think that the `interests view' can accommodate the idea that the cases of mentally 
impoverished humans and of non humans are different. The differing strength of 
the interest in continued life is, I think, what grounds the assumption about the 
differing seriousness of killing normal humans and animals. However] am anxious 
to show that rightness or wrongness of killing humans should not be decided only 
on these grounds. I agree that normal humans do have a greater interest than do 
animals in staying alive (and even that some nonhumans have a greater interest 
than the most damaged humans). However, I do not think it follows that we have 
few or no obligations to and regarding these worst off human beings. I wish to 
subscribe to the `little to be concerned about in death from the point of view of the 
profoundly handicapped human subject' part of the AMC without being tied to the 
idea that there is `little to be concerned about per se'. A weaker interest in life is 
relevant to what we might wish to say about the sadness of a death, or the harm to 
the victim, but we must be careful when drawing conclusions from this to apply to 
the question of the relative wrongness of killing as, in humans but not animals, other 
sources of moral obligation come into play. 
James Rachels, Peter Singer and John Harris have done the most work in 
attempting to compare interests in a way which is impartial between species and to 
create tools by which we might objectively compare different lives. In this section I 
briefly set out the version created by Rachels in "The End of Life" in order to point 
out some objections to the enterprise of assessing a subject's interest in continued 
life to determine our moral obligations. Readers should not infer from this that the 
theories of these three philosophers are identical. They are, however, sufficiently 
similar in relevant respects to be lumped together for my purposes here. Readers 
should also not infer that only utilitarian philosophers wish to deny moral standing to 
irreversibly unconscious humans: the early Regan seemed to hold a similar view. 
(In fact Regan even queried whether irreversibly unconscious people are human. 84) 
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Rachels: `the rule against killing' and `thebadness of death' 
fit together 
Because these philosophers, Rachels, Singer and Harris, are keen to protect the 
subjects of valuable lives rather than the merely (biologically) alive, some people, 
such as the persistently unconscious, fall outside the scope of protection offered by 
this sort of `rule against killing' entirely. To quote Rachels "In killing such persons, or 
allowing them to die by neglect, the justification isn't that their lives are being traded 
off against some `higher value' or that an exception is being made from some dire 
necessity. It is simply that the point of the rule, in such cases, is lost. " 85 
According to Rachels "Death is a misfortune, not because it puts an end to one's 
being alive (in the biological sense) but because it ends one's life (in the 
biographical sense). " Thus "to show how the termination of one's life can be a bad 
thing ... we need to examine some aspects of what it means to have a life. " 86 
Rachels thinks that we use the word `life' in two ways. "On the one hand when we 
speak of `life' we may be referring to living things, to things that are alive... On the 
other hand when we speak of `life' we may have in mind a very different sort of 
concept, one that belongs more to biography than to biology. Human beings are not 
only alive, they have lives as well. " 87 I use the idea of a biographical life here as a 
stand in for the more general notion of a `richer life' discussed above: the idea 
seems to correspond quite closely to the idea of some kind of personhood (not least 
because both are stipulative terms and somewhat nebulous). He states "From the 
point of view of the living individual there is nothing important about being alive 
except that it enables one to have a life. In the absence of a conscious life, it is of 
no consequence to the subject himself whether he lives or dies. " 88 This is 
uncontroversial, I think. Rachels continues "Therefore, in so far as we are 
concerned to protect the interests of the individuals whose welfare is most directly 
at stake we should be primarily concerned with lives and only secondarily with 
life". 89 This seems to me to be far less acceptable. 
For Rachels, the relative `richness' of a life confers relative moral status: in 
comparing the death of a `mental defective' to that of a normal woman he states 
"less can be said about why her death was a bad thing; there are fewer reasons for 
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regretting it just as there are fewer reasons for regretting the death of a dog than the 
death of a (normal) human being". 9° Singer echoes this idea. When, in `Practical 
Ethics' he compares the `value of life of a horse (to the horse)' to `the value of life of 
a human (to the human)' this is not the end of the matter - he wishes also to draw 
conclusions about how they may be treated. "We are not, of course, going to 
attempt to assign numerical values to the lives of different beings, or even to 
produce an ordered list. The best that we could hope for is some idea of the 
principles which, when supplemented with the appropriate detailed information 
about the lives of different beings, might serve as the basis for such a list. But the 
most fundamental issue is whether we can accept the idea of ordering the value of 
different lives at all. " 91 (my italics) 
The fit with our common sense intuitions 
This sort of argument fits, to an extent with `layperson' moral thought - we do often 
think it `worse' when a young person dies than when an old one does, or when an 
intellectually normal person dies that a profoundly mentally handicapped person. 
We feel it is worse for them, and we may also feel it is `worse' for the survivors too, 
for the sorts of reasons Rachels mentions. However, this is the extent of my 
agreement: we need not, as Rachels does, think that this means it is less evil to kill 
a subnormal person than a normal one. Rachels says "the explanation of the point 
of the rule against killing, and the explanation of why it is bad to die, should fit 
together". 92 I agree with Rachels that we may, putting ourselves in the shoes of the 
subject, think that the death of a handicapped person with few interests is less bad 
than that of a normal person. However I would object that it does not follow that we 
would take the killing of a handicapped person with few interests any less seriously 
than that of a normal person. It seems to me that in the above quoted passages 
Rachels is making an illegitimate move from intuitions about how `tragic' a death is 
to considerations about the wrongness of ending that life. Thinking that little is lost 
from the perspective of the subject when a profoundly mentally handicapped person 
dies need not lead us to think that there is `nothing to be concerned about' when we 
take the perspective of a prospective killer. On the contrary, we do not tend to think 
that there is `nothing to be concerned about' in the killing of even the most grossly 
handicapped miserable human being, we do not usually think it any less evil to kill 
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such a person than it is to kill the happiest of men. As Anne Maclean says "the 
`natural good or evil' of a death bears no relation to the moral evil of bringing about 
that death". 93 
Species prejudice again? 
It should be noted that the common sense disagreement with Rachels and Singer 
occurs only when the killing of humans is the issue. I think that many people would 
agree with Rachels that `the explanation of the point of the rule against killing and 
the explanation of why it is bad to die' do fit together when the rule is applied inter- 
and not intra-species. That is, most people would agree that it worse to kill a 
human than a dog, and, now the appeal of the sui generis view has been tarnished, 
they could offer as justification the fact that the dog possesses a weaker interest in 
life. It is this idea which, in the absence of any good reason for thinking 
membership of our species to be a morally relevant difference, now informs the 
second assumption at the start of this chapter. 
In humans, should `the rule against killing' and the `badness 
of death' fit together? 
Some people may also agree with Rachels that it is better to kill or fail to save a 
severely mentally handicapped human rather than a normal one in emergency 
situations where not all can be saved. That is to say, many people could at least 
see the sense in such a suggestion (this is not to say that they would agree to it! ). 
However, while I think Rachels' proposal is something to which most people would 
agree when comparing humans and animals, and even something some people 
may agree to in disaster situations when some humans must die in order that others 
might be saved, it is not, I think, something to which most people would agree to 
when the killing of handicapped human beings under non emergency circumstances 
is the issue. When killing even the most profoundly mentally handicapped humans 
in `everyday' situations enters the agenda, we tend to think that something other 
than a comparison of quality of life becomes relevant. I wish to argue, against 
Rachels, that there are reasons why we ought to refrain from killing humans which 
do not stem from a considerations of their present `interests package' - reasons 
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which do not apply to animals. George Graham comments that Singer's and 
Rachels' theory "tells us to factor out externalities in determining the value of life ... 
[ie a] creature's relation to me (or to us) cannot be what makes its life superior or 
weighty, morally". 94 I do not believe that external restrictions should be wholly 
ignored in this matter and I discuss these in chapter four. 
To put it another way, I think that the plausible idea that `less is lost' in some deaths 
than others which informs our decision that usually it is morally more appropriate to 
kill animals for their organs than humans can do only limited work when applied to 
humans. Insofar as we believe that it is `less bad for the subjecf when an animal 
dies than a human so too do we often think it `less bad for the subjecf when some 
extremely intellectually impoverished humans die than when some relatively 
sophisticated animals do. Even Maclean, a staunch advocate of the idea that simply 
being a human being is special (see page 116), acknowledges that there may be 
`something in' the idea that some badly-damaged people cannot value their lives 
and that this may affect how we treat them. However, she argues (correctly, I think), 
that we may decide to end the life of someone who is terribly handicapped or 
comatose, not because `there is no longer anything to be concerned with from a 
moral point of view' but because that is what respect for the person dictates at that 
point. "Such considerations [having to do with the quality of a person's life] do not 
determine whether or not a person is entitled to respect; they do determine, at least 
in part, what counts as respect in a given case. " 95 Thus, if we decided that 
euthanasia was `the best and kindest course' for someone permanently comatose 
"we would not be denying him respect in killing him, let alone denying that he still 
merited respect: we would be showing him respect - we would be doing what we 
thought respect for him required in the circumstances". 96 
The fact that the irreversibly unconscious human cannot care what happens to them 
is a reason supporting his or her use as a donor, but it cannot be the whole story. 
Moral standing may be conferred on humans without present interests in ways 
which are not available to animals (I am thinking specifically of the idea of harms 
which survive the loss of their subject, as discussed in chapter two). Additionally, 
factors external to the creature under consideration may confer obligations upon us 
not to treat humans in certain ways. We may worry that creating a policy of killing 
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the most damaged humans for their organs would be to step onto a slippery slope 
to using people whose deficits are much less, we may fear that such a use would 
cause a dangerous loss of sympathy for the most damaged humans or we may 
worry that social instability would ensue. These factors need not apply in the case 
of animal donors. I explore these ideas, and the obligations they impose upon us, 
in chapter four. 
Conclusion: the argument from (the most) marginal cases 
It it time to draw some conclusions. First, the nonhuman animals under 
consideration as organ donors clearly are conscious, and thus have interests and a 
degree of moral status. This is relatively uncontroversial; though some of them at 
least may not be able to reflect on their desire that life continue, they are capable of 
feeling hungry, afraid, or happy and possess interests in the limited, unreflective and 
probably `not fully describable in words' sense discussed above. We do, currently, 
use (kill) these animals in transplantation experiments and a limited amount of 
clinical practice and it is intended that their use will increase in the future. We do 
not use humans. Intuitions concerning the greater importance of normal human 
lives (both to those who live them and, by extension, to others) seem to support this 
distinction. Underlying reasons are harder to find however. I hope that I have 
shown that species membership as such cannot provide grounds for protecting all 
human beings at the cost of all nonhumans. And, notwithstanding the fact that most 
humans can, roughly speaking and for the sake of argument, be said to have a 
stronger interest in life than most animals the AMC still holds: some humans have a 
weaker interest in life than animals. However, I think that the idea that lives may be 
compared and conclusions drawn from this regarding relative moral status must be 
restricted in two ways. First, it is not possible to make an accurate comparison 
between species when all the beings under discussion are conscious - such 
comparisons are impossible to make with any precision. Second the conclusions 
we draw from the fact that some humans have a relatively weak interest in 
continued life must be restricted - they must not lead to the conclusion that `little is 
lost' from the point of view of society as a whole when human `marginal cases' die. 
In particular we must not conclude that the wrongness of killing them diminishes in 
step with their impoverished interests. This is why we have obligations to and with 
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regard to even the most damaged human beings which do not apply to animals. 
Yet despite what has been said in the latter sections of this chapter, I believe that 
some human beings, as well as animals, may in fact be utilised as organ donors. I 
have so far merely hinted at the reasons we have for conferring moral status on, 
and otherwise showing respect to, the most intellectually impoverished humans. In 
chapter four I will discuss them in more detail. I will also suggest that these 
considerations sometimes make it ethically permissible to use `permanently 
comatose' people as organ donors - not because they lack value, and so we may 
do as we will with them, but because, just as different ways of treating people 
become appropriate as they pass from being alive to being dead, so it is appropriate 
to treat such unconscious people differently from normal human beings. 
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Appendix to chapter three 
To what extent do animals meet the definition of 
`personhood'? 
Mary Anne Warren distinguishes between a `minimalist' and `maximalist' definition of 
personhood. The first of these (the sort of view proposed by Singer) requires only 
that a person be "a rational and self consciousness being". 97 Some of the animals 
proposed for use as donors to humans may, I think, reasonably be said to have 
some claim to be this sort of person. 
The minimalist requirement 
Singer thinks that a creature's ability to value its life in this way stems from its being 
self conscious. "A self-conscious being is aware of itself as a distinct entity, with a 
past and a future... A being aware of itself in this way will be capable of having 
desires about its own future... To take the lives of any of these people, without their 
consent, is to thwart their desires for the future. " 98 In my discussion of this kind of 
proposal in the `Animals are harmed by death' and `Must we desire life... ' sections I 
made the simplifying assumption that animals are not able to form this sort of 
desire, so as to make the strongest case against my position. 
However there is a great deal of empirical evidence to support the claim that 
animals are rational and self conscious to a degree. For just one example see New 
Scientist magazine99 which carries a report of an experiment which supports the 
idea that dogs have a degree of mathematical ability. The dogs were tested on 
equipment designed to discover the age at which human babies begin to 
understand numbers. And there are numerous reports of experiments in which 
animals (usually the great apes) demonstrate a rudimentary ability to, as it were, 
step outside themselves and perceive themselves as others do by, for example, 
using mirrors to examine parts of themselves that would otherwise be inaccessible, 
or by positioning themselves in such a way that their nefarious activities are not 
visible to superior apes in their social group. 10° 
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The problem is that all experimental data of this sort falls victim to the objection 
noted in my discussion of Frey: we cannot pin down precisely what the animals are 
thinking. It is not possible clearly to define which creatures (other than ourselves) 
can be said to possess self consciousness, to consciously `value their lives', or to 
desire that they continue, even if we were able clearly to define what `self 
consciousness' consists in. The simplifying assumption must stand, l think. 
More demanding requirements 
Moral agency is often cited as being indicative of higher moral status (eg by 
Warren). But the extent to which animals are moral agents is, if anything, even less 
agreed upon than their claims to rationality. An oft-cited point against the idea that 
they are moral agents is the fact that many animals cannot be prevented from 
predating upon others, even when they are not hungry. However, as SF Sapontzis 
is keen to point out, many animals such as guide dogs display virtue or, at least, 
perform virtuous acts. And, though it could be argued that such behaviour is trained 
into them, as Sapontzis says, why would this make it less virtuous? "It cannot be 
correct to say that once we have succeeded in making courage and compassion 
"second nature" in our children, we have robbed their courageous and 
compassionate actions of their moral [in the sense that the agent recognises the act 
as moral and acts because it is the right thing to do] sense". 101 Wild animals may 
display evidence of virtue: stories of porpoises helping swimmers in difficulties and 
suchlike are common (although hard evidence is hard to come by) Scientific 
evidence also supports the idea: cf for example the experiments of Stanley Wechlin 
who demonstrated that a hungry rhesus monkey would not press a bar to obtain 
food if it meant that another monkey received a shock. 102 
It has been suggested that the substrates of morality, empathy, and a rudimentary 
sense of fairness, have an evolutionary origin in that they are essential for social 
play without which animals would be at a disadvantage. Studies have shown that 
social animals which work cooperatively fare far better than do those of the same 
species who fail to `bond' in this way. 103 As such, virtue may not be confined to our 
species. We should not try to make too much of this, clearly animals are not moral 
agents in the sense that normal adult human beings are. However, this returns us 
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to the AMC: although probably no animals meet this criterion for strong personhood, 
neither do all human beings. And, interestingly, humans who fail to meet the `moral 
agency' criterion for personhood need not be intellectually deficient. Strongly 
autistic people may be unable to adopt the perspective required to be a moral 
agent, despite being highly intelligent in many respects, and criminals may choose 
not to act morally (they obviously have the capacity to be moral agents but choose, 
sometimes, not to be). 
Animal lives are rich in ways that human lives are not, and 
we have no way to make a comparison 
It is generally felt that the lives of humans and the opportunities open to us are 
richer than are the lives of other animals. However, I am not sure that it is possible 
to make sense of this idea if we examine it more closely. 
Animals have claims to mental life `richness' which are inapplicable to humans. 
Their extended sensory world could perhaps be said to confer interests upon them 
which we humans cannot possess, interests which we ought perhaps to weigh 
against those of humans in any calculus. Consider the olfactory sense of a dog or a 
horse, creatures whose very faces are shaped around the nose; or the `sonar' 
employed by bats and marine mammals. Perhaps we could respond that some 
sorts of interests contribute more to an interest in continuing life than do others. 
Certainly humans have a far greater capacity to appreciate music, art and literature, 
and it could be argued that these sorts of experiences give life a greater `richness' 
than do the pleasure of beasts (or the base pleasures of humans). However, as 
DeGrazia notes "Without a compelling argument to support this type of quantitative 
scale, it looks suspiciously like a product of species bias". 104 
There are large problems then, in comparing lives across species. Most 
philosophers do not address how the comparison might be made at all. Peter 
Singer makes a brave attempt but is ultimately unable to make his account work I 
think. 
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Singer's `hypothetical choice situation' 
How might intraspecies comparisons of lives might be made? Peter Singer 
considers the matter carefully: proposing a situation of hypothetical choice in an 
attempt to compare lives fairly. Although, I think, ultimately flawed, his project is 
admirable in its honest assessment of the difficulties. Singer imagines that he has 
`the peculiar property of being able to turn into an animal' and that: 
"... when I am a horse, I really am a horse, with all and only the 
mental experiences of a horse, and when I am a human being I 
have all and only the mental experiences of a human being. Now 
let us make the additional supposition that I can enter a third state 
in which I remember exactly what it was like to be a horse and 
exactly what it was like to be a human being... In this third state, 
then, I could compare horse-existence with human-existence... 
would then be deciding, in effect, between the value of the life of a 
horse (to the horse), and the value of the life of a human (to the 
human). " 105 
Singer acknowledges that the coherence of this idea might be questioned, but he 
thinks that he can "make some sense of the idea of choosing from this position; and 
I am fairly confident that from this position some forms of life would be seen as 
preferable to others". 106 
Brave as the attempt may be, I think it is fundamentally unworkable: the difficulties 
facing any attempt to pin down `what it is like' to be an animal remain. As noted 
above, some animals have sensory capabilities which are very alien to us. This 
means, as George Graham notes, that "Human beings do not have and never can 
acquire the sort of conceptual equipment, the perceptual endowment, to imagine 
what it is like to be an animal. We are just too different from them. " 107,108 
A second problem with Singer's proposal is that some animals, at least, are not self 
conscious: Graham makes reference to the famous vervet monkey studies of 
Cheney and Seyfarth. He quotes the ethologists as saying "There are ... many 
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ways in which a vervet's view of her world is very different from our own... Her 
mental states are not accessible to her: she does not know that she knows. " 109 
Note that Graham is not denying that monkeys and other animals have beliefs, 
desires and emotions, he denies only that we can know what they feel like from the 
inside. Because of this, it is not possible to make Singer's comparison. 
For these reasons I do not think that the debate on the use of animals in medicine is 
helped by attempting to define the criteria which confer higher moral status on 
humans and then debating the extent to which animals and defective humans meet 
or fail to meet the definition. 
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Chapter Four 
Using human beings as donors: four 
arguments for the use of wholly and 
permanently unconscious human beings 
In this chapter I propose that some human beings ought to be killed for their organs, 
under certain specialised conditions. However, this is not the straightforward matter 
of logical entailment that I imagined it would be when I began work on this chapter 
several years ago. As discussed in chapter three there are enormous practical 
difficulties in comparing lives across species, or between normal or damaged 
humans, when all under consideration are conscious interest-bearers. If we are 
seriously attempting to delimit the class of `mentally defective' human beings to 
determine those that may be suitable as organ donors, these difficulties become 
practical problems standing in the way of the practice. How do we prove that a 
certain human has a weaker interest in continued life than a given animal? Even if 
we could prove this, does this really entail that these humans have lower moral 
status than the animals? And how do we avoid slippery slope arguments to the 
effect that if a given profoundly mentally handicapped human is a suitable candidate 
for organ donation then we may also consider others whose deficits are slightly less 
severe? Because of these, I think, intractable difficulties I impose two restrictions 
on the interests-based inter-species comparison tool. 
First I shall argue that humans may only begin to be considered as donors if they 
are wholly and irreversibly unconscious. This is clearly a much more stringent 
requirement than currently applies to the use of animals. The boundary of 
consciousness is important as it (a) clearly points out to us those human beings 
who no longer have either preference or welfare interests in the sense discussed in 
chapter three - they no longer have the capacity to care what happens to them; (b) 
it helps us to avoid concerns about how to go about comparing lives between 
beings all of which are conscious, and (c) to avoid slippery slope worries that if we 
think it permissible to use people with a given degree of intellectual deficit we would 
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have no way to refuse the use of slightly less handicapped humans. 
I argue secondly that we must not use our thoughts regarding people's interest in 
continued life as the sole basis for making policy about the rightness or wrongness 
of killing them. Although certainly I think many people would think it less of a 
tragedy when an irreversibly unconscious person dies a natural death than when a 
normal healthy person does, this does not obviously lead to the conclusion that our 
moral obligation to refrain from killing them is correspondingly weaker. When we 
are considering how to behave towards human beings, even those with the most 
meagre mental life imaginable, we are bound by obligations which stem from 
sources other than present properties of the person. The Feinberg/Steinbock 
`interests' account of moral status fits with such an intuition, I think. In this chapter I 
wish to suggest that `ante unconsciousness harmings', like the `antemortem 
harmings' discussed in chapter two, impose moral restrictions on how we may treat 
even the most damaged humans. Such restrictions do not apply to animals. 
However I also accept that the `interests' view is perhaps not the `whole story' when 
we consider the moral restrictions which apply to the treatment of profoundly 
mentally damaged humans. Concerns about the effect certain ways of treating 
such people would have on society as a whole or upon the family of the damaged 
person also impose limits upon what behaviour is morally appropriate. In other 
words, we have moral obligations both to and regarding such humans which restrict 
our behaviour towards them. 
That said, these kinds of considerations can also provide independent reasons for 
using some human beings. This is the subject of the present chapter. 
This chapter grows from a discussion of the contractua'ist argument of Peter 
Carruthers who, in his 1992 book `The Animals Issue' makes a different sort of 
appeal to the moral relevance of species from those considered in chapter three - 
that all and only humans are able to be members of a moral community which 
confers special protections upon its members. I hope to bring out the strength of 
my arguments from a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of this 
account. Carruthers' aim, in his words, is to "defend a theoretical framework that 
accords full moral standing to all human beings while nonarbitrarily withholding such 
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standing from all animals". ' Three arguments are presented in support of this claim: 
the `slippery slope argument', the `argument from sympathy' and the `argument from 
social stability'. Clearly, Carruthers denies my first assumption of the previous 
chapter: it is his belief that animals have no `direct' moral status. (nb Carruthers 
sometimes talks of animals as having `indirect' moral status and sometimes as 
having `no moral status'. By this he means that we have moral obligations with 
regard to animals but none directly to them. I follow Carruthers in using these terms 
interchangeably. ) I am not particularly concerned with refuting this part of his 
argument, for reasons I set out in a moment. Rather, I wish to draw two conclusions 
from my consideration of Carruthers. 
Carruthers does not succeed in conferring moral status on 
all humans 
I hope to show that his arguments fail to serve his intended purpose of giving moral 
standing to all human beings. Some human beings, the permanently and 
irreversibly unconscious, fall outside the scope of protection his arguments afford. I 
do not mean by this that such people cannot have direct moral status -I mean only 
that Carruthers' attempt to confer it upon them fails. 
Four reasons why Carruthers' arguments can be made to 
support the killing of some humans for organs 
I wish to suggest that we have reasons to think that the worst off human `marginal 
cases' - the permanently and irreversibly unconscious - may, under certain 
circumstances, be used as organ donors. I present four reasons: there may be 
more. 
First, the boundary of consciousness is a clear cut boundary (or at least, as clear as 
is the boundary of species) so we need not worry about the use of such people 
leading inexorably to the use of less damaged people. 
Second, the boundary of consciousness marks the point from which we confidently 
say that the subject can no longer care what happens to him. So, on a rough AMC 
- like analysis, we could say that if normal animals are sentient and have at least a 
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weak interest in continued life then we have a tentative reason for thinking that 
these humans ought to be used as donors if animals are. 
However I am unhappy to conclude, with Singer and Rachels, that we have no 
moral obligations to those humans who lack interests. So the third reason for 
considering such people as organ donors is that we ought to show respect for those 
desires a now unconscious person had prior to entering his unconscious state. If a 
person wished, prior to becoming unconscious, that his life be ended and his organs 
donated should he ever enter such a state, then this gives us a reason to take the 
organs. Such actions, if they are in accord with the patients' wishes, count as 
showing respect for him. 
My fourth reason grows from a consideration of Carruthers' argument from social 
stability, which aims to protect all humans from being used as means to our ends for 
reasons not directly to do with the people under consideration. The fact that the 
permanently unconscious person no longer cares what happens to him does not 
mean that there is nothing for anyone else to be concerned about. While this offers, 
I think, the best (although indirect) grounds for arguing that we ought not to utilise 
humans whose interest in continued life is weaker than that of most animals (or 
nonexistent), it too can provide an independent argument for using some humans, if 
it can be shown that such donation will not cause instability. 
Carruthers' theory 
Carruthers makes two related claims regarding moral relevance. First, under 
contractualism "intelligence - or at least a certain kind and level of intelligence - 
is 
not morally irrelevant". 2 Quite the opposite in fact - it is a sufficient condition for a 
creature to have moral standing that it be a rational agent: its rationality being, in 
large part, a function of its intelligence. Second, he claims that "species 
membership, together with the similarities of appearance and patterns of behaviour 
with which it is associated, is not morally irrelevant under contractualism". 3 
Carruthers' position is developed along the lines of John Rawls' theory of social 
justice: he views morality as a construct created by rational contractors choosing 
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rules by which we might live. In Carruthers' own words: "Morality is here pictured as 
a system of rules to govern the interaction of rational agents within society. It 
therefore seems inevitable, on the face of it, that only rational agents will be 
assigned direct rights on this approach. Since it is rational agents who are to 
choose the system of rules, and choose self-interestedly it is only rational agents 
who will have their position protected under the rules. There seems no reason why 
rights should be assigned to non-rational agents. Animals will, therefore, have no 
moral standing under Rawlsian contractualism, in so far as they do not count as 
rational agents". 4 
Carruthers subscribes to the Rawlsian idea that a moral theory must achieve 
`reflective equilibrium': ie it must accord, at least to a large extent, with common 
sense intuitions about morality. If a moral theory conflicts with common sense, we 
can either adjust the theory or give up the belief. He thinks it is a weakness in 
moral thinking if the conclusions reached do not accord with common sense. He 
criticises utilitarian thinking for this reason: "Utilitarianism is clearly committed to 
making substantial revisions in the common-sense moral beliefs held by most 
people... From the standpoint of the governing conception of utilitarianism - that of 
an impartial benevolent observer - there can be no reason why the interests of 
animals should be discounted or outweighed where they conflict with those of 
human beings. If these consequences are to be acceptable under reflective 
equilibrium, then we need somehow to explain away the almost universal human 
belief in their contraries - for example the belief that the interests of an animal count 
for practically nothing when set against the suffering of a human being". 5 I agree 
with Carruthers about the importance of attaining reflective equilibrium, not least 
because of its practical implications. In the field of organ transplantation any plan 
for obtaining organs which deviates far from common sense thinking runs the risk of 
causing a backlash among the general public and having an adverse effect on 
donation, thus negating any benefits of whatever was proposed. 
159 
The limited scope of my response 
The first of Carruthers' claims above, that being a rational agent is a morally 
relevant characteristic, accords to a certain extent with what I said in chapter three. 
The second point, that membership of our species is morally relevant, that it is, in 
other words, a way of identifying those creatures with full moral standing and 
separating them from those with none, is a less good fit. While I allowed in the 
previous chapter that having a `richer' life may be a way of according a higher 
degree of moral status to some creatures over others, I required only that creatures 
be sentient and possess some basic interests in order to be admitted to the class of 
beings with moral status. Carruthers requires more: paradigmatic possessors of 
moral standing, on his account, must not only be conscious interest-bearers but 
must also be sufficiently intelligent to be rational contractors. He hopes that his 
theory will accord `full moral standing to all human beings while non-arbitrarily 
withholding such standing from all animals'. I do not believe it succeeds in doing 
either. However in this chapter I restrict myself to arguing that, according to his 
theory, we cannot accord any (let alone full) moral standing to the worst category of 
human marginal cases, the irreversibly unconscious. I hope that my chapter three 
discussion of how interests confer moral status sufficed to convince the reader that 
animals (at least of the sort to be used in transplantation) possess a degree of direct 
moral standing independent of the part they play in human plans or affections: I do 
not propose to discuss this further here. 
Humans who are not moral agents 
Carruthers thinks that rationality is only a sufficient condition for a creature to have 
moral standing, not a necessary condition. He wishes to confer such standing also 
on nonrational members of our species. Under this position humans, whether 
rational or not, have direct moral status, animals, whether rational or not, have only 
an indirect moral status conferred on them by being `test cases' for the sort of 
virtues it is desirable for a rational contractor to possess. He states "rational 
contractors should extend direct moral rights to all members of the human species, 
in order to avoid the dangers of a slippery slope and to preserve social stability, and 
in order not to undermine our natural reactions of sympathy for human suffering. 
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Since these arguments do not support the extension of direct moral rights to 
members of other species, it will turn out that species membership is a morally 
relevant characteristic from the perspective of contractualism". 6 (my italics) 
(Carruthers uses the term 'rights'- I prefer to think merely in terms of moral status, 
for the reason mentioned in chapter two. Carruthers has been accused of 
conflating the concepts of moral rights and moral status. 7) 
Carruthers develops each of the three points italicised in the above (not in the 
original) separately. I believe I have a response to each. To reiterate, I do not wish 
to deny that we have moral obligations to even the most damaged human beings, I 
wish only to deny that Carruthers' arguments succeed in conferring moral standing 
on humans (and excluding animals). I begin by addressing the `slippery slope' 
point. 
The slippery slope argument 
According to Carruthers, there are no sharp boundaries between a baby and an 
adult, between a `not-very-intelligent adult' and a `severe mental defective' 
(Carruthers' terms), or between a `normal old person' and someone who is `severely 
senile'. Therefore it would be dangerous to accord rights based on something like 
the comparative interest view discussed in the previous chapter. "The argument is 
then that the attempt to accord direct moral rights only to rational agents (normal 
adults) would be inherently dangerous and open to abuse". 8 For this reason, 
according to Carruthers, society should allow the inclusion of `mental defectives' (his 
term) into the sphere of moral concern. Conversely, the theory permits the 
exclusion of all animals from the protected circle as it is possible (according to 
Carruthers) to draw sharp boundaries between all humans and all nonhumans. 
"There really is a sharp boundary between human beings and all other animals. Not 
necessarily in terms of intelligence or degree of rational agency, of course -a 
chimpanzee may be more intelligent than a mentally defective human, and a 
dolphin may be a rational agent to a higher degree than a human baby. But there is 
not the same practical threat to the welfare of rational agents in the suggestion that 
all animals should be excluded from the domain of direct moral concern. Someone 
who argues that since animals do not have rights, therefore babies do not have 
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rights, therefore there can be no moral objection to the extermination of Jews, 
Gypsies, gays and other so-called `deviants', is unlikely to be taken very seriously 
even by those who share their evil aims". 9 (nb It is important to reiterate that 
Carruthers' `sharp boundary' between humans and animals is not to do with the 
creatures under consideration themselves, only with the bad consequences that will 
ensue if we step onto his slippery slope. He freely acknowledges in the quote 
above that many animals may be rational agents to a greater degree than are some 
`defective' human beings. ) 
Carruthers thinks it important that the rule governing who is allocated moral 
standing needs to be easily understood by the general public, or else it might be 
misapplied. "To think and speak in terms that withhold moral rights from some 
human beings is to invite people to try to draw yet further distinctions - for example, 
withholding rights from those who are sexually or intellectually `deviant', or from 
those whose intelligence is low. So I conclude that our slippery slope argument is 
indeed successful in according rights to all human beings". 10 
The one exception to this rule for Carruthers is unborn children - he willingly 
concedes that there is `no clear line' between a foetus and a baby any more than 
there is between a baby and an adult. However he says "the issues here are not 
the same. For one of the things that contracting rational agents should consider 
seriously, in framing their rules, are the natural responses of thought and feeling 
that antecede moral belief... It is natural to be struck by the suffering of senile old 
people or babies, in a way that both supports and is supported by assigning direct 
rights to these groups. It is not so natural for us to respond similarly towards a 
foetus, however, especially in the early stages, unless we already have prior moral 
beliefs about its status. A rule withholding moral rights from foetuses, and hence 
permitting at least early abortions, may therefore be quite easily defended against 
abuse". 11 The reason underlying this exception in Carruthers' argument is very 
important. I return to it in a moment. 
Before I begin I wish to make a trivial point: it seems to me that in the above 
statement of the `slippery slope' point Carruthers moves from attacking a defensible 
AMC position to a totally implausible one. I agree that anyone offering the above 
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argument would be unlikely to be taken seriously. This does not, I think, mean that 
other versions of the argument from marginal cases need be so easily dismissed. 
But I am moving too fast. 
Response to the slippery slope argument 
I disagree with Carruthers' pessimism regarding the possibility of drawing a 
boundary between a normal human and a `mental defective': I think it is possible to 
do so (and thus to avoid stepping onto the slippery slope) so long as one is careful 
in defining one's `defectives'. I think that Carruthers overplays the `fuzziness' of any 
possible distinction by considering, in the main, senile old people and babies as his 
examples of arational human beings. I agree with him that "It is no mere accident of 
culture or upbringing that a crying baby, or a senile old woman moaning with the 
pain of terminal cancer, can evoke our sympathy. For what is presented to our 
senses in these cases differs only in slight degree from the suffering of a child or 
normal adult". 12 However (and leaving aside the fact that such displays of suffering 
also differ only in slight degree from that which is presented to our senses by a 
suffering animal), the fact is that some humans - the permanently and irreversibly 
unconscious -- do not exhibit any signs of suffering in this way. 
Whether our 
concern is with suffering (of which such people are incapable) or with the 
wrongness of ending their lives, I find it difficult to see how such a contractualist 
position might be extended to give moral standing to such impoverished 'human 
beings. I am quite willing to agree with Carruthers that killing or causing to suffer 
profoundly mentally handicapped but conscious human beings would (or could) 
cause slippery slope concerns. I do not think that these concerns apply to the most 
severe category of `mental defectives' - the permanently unconscious. 
We must exercise caution however: many conditions, which admit of different 
degrees of both permanence and unconsciousness, are frequently lumped together 
by insufficiently scrupulous philosophers (such as those criticised in chapter one). 
For this reason I must determine a class of fully and permanently insensible human 
beings. 
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Permanently and irreversibly unconscious human beings 
The following discussion veers far from philosophy and into medicine for which I 
apologise in advance. However, it is necessary to delimit precisely the class of 
`marginal cases' which fall outside Carruthers' slippery slope argument for 
protecting `defective' human beings. In other words, it is necessary to show that 
there is a clear boundary of consciousness in order to avoid objections of the sort I 
levelled against AMC arguments in the previous chapter (concerns about the validity 
of comparisons between beings all of whom are undeniably conscious). Such 
problems are liable to become Carruthers-like slippery slope arguments if they are 
relied upon to make real world distinctions between beings we may and may not 
use as donors. 
Peter McCullagh has created the global term `cerebral death' to refer to all those 
conditions in which the cerebral hemispheres are destroyed but in which the 
brainstem continues to function. The first thing to note about McCullagh's term is 
that it encompasses two clinical conditions - persistent vegetative state (PVS) and 
coma. In point of fact, according to International Working Party Report on the 
Vegetative State (1996)13 there are two other variants of clinical presentation, not 
classified as `vegetative' by the International Working Party, but which still involve 
profound cognitive impairment. 
These are: 
(a) borderline presentations, "in which the patient has a sleep-awake pattern 
being awake for a major part of the day; generally more definite 
localising to visual, auditory or tactile stimulation; tracking eye 
movements following objects or people; may show emotional responses 
to presence of family; may smile or cry. Agreement was not reached as 
to whether this stage was vegetative or non-vegetative. "14 
(b) non-vegetative presentations, which may be further divided into "two 
main non-vegetative or early post-vegetative presentations based on the 
level of consistency of response: [either] the patient has a sleep-awake 
pattern; responds to simple commands inconsistently; remains totally 
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dependent; and has profound cognitive impairments, or suffers the same 
impairments but is able consistently to respond to simple commands-15 
I shall ignore the class of `truly' comatose patients in order to examine the sub- 
group of the persistent vegetative state. This is because although coma is the most 
profound state of unconsciousness it is seldom permanent. 16 I also ignore the two 
non-vegetative conditions above: my concern here is with those patients who are 
wholly and irreversibly unconscious. 
The term `persistent vegetative state' was created in 1972 to describe a state of 
`wakefulness without awareness'. 17 The word `vegetative' was specifically chosen to 
describe `a merely physical life, devoid of sensation and thought'. The 1996 
Working Party recommends the terms `persistent' and `permanent' be dropped from 
the diagnosis of Vegetative State since these `attempted to add a prognosis to a 
diagnostic terminology'. However, it is generally agreed by neurologists that such 
patients have lost `all conscious awareness, including the capacity to experience 
pain and suffering'. 18 
Characteristics of the vegetative patient 
Among the characteristics described by Jennett and Plum were: 
(a) The absence of any psychologically meaningful adaptive response to the 
external environment. (b) Absence of any evidence of a functioning mind which is 
receiving or projecting information. (c) The patient has prolonged periods of 
wakefulness. (d) Patients do not speak (verbalise) though may make sounds 
(vocalise). (e) Patients fail to signal appropriately by eye movements, although they 
sometimes follow moving objects in a slow intermittent pattern. (f) Initially the EEG 
may be isoelectric, but considerable activity ... may 
be found once the state has 
lasted several months. 19 
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The problem of proof 
There are two main difficulties facing anyone wishing to declare a patient to be fully 
and irreversibly unconscious. Unsurprisingly, these are: (a) problems in proving that 
the patients are completely unconscious (stemming partially from the fact that there 
appear to be degrees of severity within the class, and partially from a lack of 
diagnostic tools); and (b) difficulties in proving that the condition is permanent. Let 
us examine these problems in turn. 
Difficulties in diagnosis 
It is acknowledged among experts in the field that within the class of vegetative 
patients there exists differences of degree (the same is true of the class of 
anencephalic babies). The contributors to the IWPR were unable to decide whether 
there are in fact three different vegetative states or a single state with graded 
severity. Patients display differing responses to stimuli -- whilst some display none 
at all "Nearly all regain sleep-wake cycles; many display the facial appearance of 
interest; and some even show emotional fluctuations... Although none follow 
moving objects consistently, some occasionally move the eyes slowly towards 
visual stimuli. Others blink inconsistently to visual threat, startle or close the eyes in 
response to sudden noises... "20 The IWPR divides vegetative patients into three 
general groups based on severity. 
(a) Patients who have a sleep-awake pattern, may respond on occasions by 
a reflex activity in a delayed fashion but are generally unresponsive to 
stimulation from the environment. 
(b) Patients who have sleep awake patterns, generally respond in mass 
extensor responses or startle responses to stimulation without 
habituation. This may progress into flexor withdrawal responses. There 
may be roving eye movements but not tracking; facial expressions may 
occur to stimulation. 
(c) Patients who have sleep awake patterns; single limb response to 
stimulation; withdrawal or intermittent localisation may occur to touch, 
sound or visual stimulation; random eye movements may occur but the 
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patient does not focus on objects or people; though may turn to sound or 
touch. 21 
A patient may pass through some or all of these stages as he or she recovers, or 
may cease to progress at any of the stages. 
This lack of clarity concerning the severity of the condition is compounded by the 
fact that the condition is extraordinarily hard to diagnose accurately - so difficult in 
fact that several commentators, notably Chris Borthwick22,23, have suggested that 
the creation and application to patients of this medical term gives a false impression 
of the degree of diagnostic certainty available. The state does not lend itself to 
direct diagnosis: as the IWPR notes, brain function is too complex to assess by one 
single assessment tool. Even scans of the brain can only provide supporting or 
opposing evidence, they are unable to prove the presence or absence of the state 
directly. (The IWPR states "Neurodiagnostic tests alone can neither confirm the 
diagnosis of a Vegetative State nor predict the potential for recovery from 
awareness. "24) Thus, a diagnosis must be made on the basis of behaviour. (In 
fairness it should be noted that the term Vegetative State was coined by Jennett 
and Plum specifically to provide a clinical diagnosis based on behavioural 
observations of the patient. ) 
However the mere absence of behavioural indicators of pain or of any other 
manifestation of consciousness does not in itself prove the lack of such a mental 
state. The IWPR acknowledges that "deciding the cognitive awareness of the 
patient, especially when at a very low level, [is] an educated guess since there are, 
as yet, no tests which can confirm whether the patient has any `inner awareness". 25 
Thus, the diagnosis depends on a number of factors such as the physical ability of 
the patient to respond, the desire or willingness (if possible) of the patient to 
respond and the time available for observation and assessment. 
Because it is amenable only to diagnosis based on behavioural indicators, the 
possibility for error is greater than in the diagnosis of other medical conditions. 
Borthwick cites studies which show a false-positive diagnostic error rate of between 
17 and 37 per cent (patients diagnosed as being in a PVS by qualified medical 
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practitioners who did not, in fact, meet the criteria when tested by trained 
neurologists26). Certain neurological syndromes, notably the `locked in state', can, 
behaviourally, mimic profound unconsciousness. Furthermore as the McCuilagh 
quote above shows, many patients in PVSs do evince behaviour - they are neither 
immobile nor silent; yet it is assumed that their movements are not `reproducible, 
purposeful, or voluntary'. Borthwick questions whether this assumption is valid. 
The results of post-mortem examinations of the brains of people alleged to have 
been in PVSs is frequently alleged to show damage `incompatible with 
consciousness or with the capacity to feel pain'. However, whilst our knowledge of 
neuroscience remains imperfect, this seems to beg the question to some extent. 
Difficulties in giving a prognosis 
There are also problems regarding the degree of certainty available to doctors in 
asserting that the loss of conscious is irreversible. We are given cause for concern 
by reports such as the one I quoted in the previous chapter about the artificial 
device created by French scientists and doctors which mimics the function of the 
Ascending Reticular Activating System (the ARAS is an area of the brain which 
serves as a sort of `on/off' switch for consciousness) to allow some patients 
(admittedly, a small number of those on whom it was tried) in supposedly persistent 
vegetative states to regain some semblance of consciousness when the device is 
activated. Because of this, if one wishes to use irreversible unconsciousness as 
establishing a necessary condition which must be met (along with other conditions, 
of course) if we are to kill humans for their organs, one would want to exclude from 
the pool of potential donors patients whose loss of consciousness is caused by 
lesions in the ARAS; and to use only those who cannot, either in practice or in 
theory, regain consciousness. There are also reports, cited by Borthwick, of 
patients awaking from PVS, although whether this is due to them being incorrectly 
diagnosed or whether the condition need not truly be persistent in all cases is a 
matter for debate. Borthwick states "It is not possible to predict in advance that any 
given vegetative state will be persistent, still less permanent. The only means of 
deciding which initially vegetative clients will qualify for the diagnosis of PVS is to 
watch them and see if their condition persists". 27 He quotes another study which 
claims that of eighty four vegetative patients investigated, forty one per cent 
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became `conscious' within six months of their injury or illness, fifty two per cent by a 
year, and fifty eight percent within three years. I think perhaps that Borthwick's 
presentation of the facts here is rather pessimistic. Whilst his data clearly suggests 
that some vegetative patients do recover at least some of their faculties more than a 
year after the injury to their brains, to state simply that they `became conscious' is 
not terribly helpful - to what degree did they become conscious? 
It is generally agreed that patients who are still vegetative at three months following 
the brain damage do not make significant levels of recovery. That said, there are 
several reports in the world literature of patients who have made a late recovery. 
The IWPR cites a number of examples including a study of several patients who 
recovered from the vegetative state between 4-8 months after the brain injury, 
although many of these remained severely disabled. In another study cited by the 
IWPR, Rosenberg et a! 28 describe the case of a 43 year old man who was in a 
vegetative state for 17 months following anoxic brain damage before showing the 
first signs of awareness. He progressed to being able to tell stories and jokes 
though he was unable to recognise complex collections of objects in pictures and 
was unable to read. 
Many of these studies are anecdotal reports of single patients and may sometimes 
be accused of lacking rigor. However, the IWPR cites a few larger-scale studies 
which may be more convincing, for example a five year follow up of 30 patients in 
PVS, in which `five recovered from PVS between one and five years though only 
two recovered to a level where they could communicate. It is recognised that there 
is a lack of long-term follow up studies of those patients still vegetative beyond 2-3 
years. 29 
So an advocate of a policy of using such patients as organ donors ought to avoid 
generalisations such as claims that vegetative patients as a group meet even this 
first necessary condition for becoming donors. Such an advocate must also 
exercise extreme caution in selecting patients whose condition is deemed to be 
irreversible. Whilst misdiagnosis and uncertainty about the severity of the condition 
are certainly troubling even as we strive to keep such patients alive (if a patient is 
not truly insentient his `random' grimaces and `vocalisations' may in fact be a 
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response to untreated pain), they would become absolutely critical if we decided to 
use lack of sentience as one reason to consider such people as organ donors. We 
must draw a clear line between states of total and near-total loss of consciousness 
if we wish to avoid stepping onto a slippery slope. For this reason, I refer to those l 
usually wish to consider as donors as `the permanently and irreversibly 
unconscious': although this term is a mouthful it makes it clear that not all PVSs are 
suitable candidates. 
The totally and permanently unconscious: being as sure as 
we can be 
However having set the case for the opposition as strongly as possible I must now 
point out that it is also true that within this nonhomogeneous class there exist 
patients who are truly insentient and for whom we are as certain as we can be that 
consciousness can never return - cf the case of Tony Bland, who was carefully 
diagnosed, and whose cerebral hemispheres had been empirically confirmed as 
having liquefied. As the University of Pennsylvania's definition of the state notes, in 
its most severe form the condition involves "a complete unawareness of the self and 
the environment" and also involves a terminological change from `persistent' to 
`permanent' "when irreversible PVS can be diagnosed with clinical certainty". 30 
Here are patients who remain in the most severe category of the vegetative state, 
whose brains demonstrably have suffered enormous damage, sufficient to make 
trained neurologists as certain as they can be that consciousness is not, and will 
never again be possible, and who, further, utterly fail to show any outward signs of 
being conscious. These unfortunates form a more-or-less clear cut category - 
clinically it is possible to distinguish them from less-handicapped people. The 
boundary between consciousness and unconsciousness is not entirely beyond 
dispute: whether for reasons such as those just discussed concerning doubts in the 
diagnosis, or because the present state of neuroscientific knowledge allows room 
for doubt about what is means to be truly `unconscious' (cf the concerns expressed 
by David Lamb at the conclusion of my first chapter). However if the doubts raised 
in my discussion remain I refer the reader to the discussion of the boundary of 
species in chapter three in which it was demonstrated that the boundary of our 
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species, by its very nature, is also not clearly delimitable yet is used as both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for determining the permissibility of killing a 
creature for its organs: non human animals may be killed in virtue of their not being 
human, humans may not be killed. 
I think this point puts a brake on Carruthers' first objection. The slippery slope 
concern that if we were to exclude from the groups of possessors of moral standing 
only the most severely mentally defective we would then find it hard not to exclude 
the slightly-less defective derives its power from worries that excluding any human 
from the possessors of moral status would entail a `practical threat to the welfare of 
rational agents'. However, it is possible to find a foothold on this slope of `marginal 
cases': we can draw a more or less clear cut line at the boundary of consciousness. 
Thinking about human `marginal cases' only in terms of those who are unconscious 
also gives us a way to avoid the first problem for the AMC and for life comparative 
accounts generally which I mentioned in the previous chapter. It is not necessary 
on my account to concern ourselves with whether a large vocabulary or the ability to 
enjoy music is more or less important then is having a highly sophisticated nose, or 
with who meets the criteria for personhood and who does not. For, so long as we 
can acknowledge that there is `something which it is like' to be an animal, and 
`nothing it is like to be' an unconscious human being then we have a case of a 
human being who clearly possesses a weaker (or rather `no') interest in continued 
life than a given animal (certainly the sort of animal that is used as a donor to 
humans, in any case). 
To say that we can separate out a clear-cut category of humans to whom it no 
longer matters what we do and to say that they are a clear-cut case of creatures 
with a weaker interest in life than some animals emphatically does not mean that I 
think that we can have no obligations to the irreversibly unconscious. I am 
confident that we do have obligations to and with regard to these people which limit 
what we may do to them for the sake of other people. These obligations stem from 
`surviving interests' of the sort discussed in chapter two - wishes the patient may 
have had while competent regarding their treatment should they ever enter such a 
state. They also stem from social stability concerns of the sort Carruthers 
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discusses (concerns which, as I shall argue in a moment, need not arise if organs 
are taken only in the proper manner). The obligations do not stem from the slippery 
slope argument - such people do not present a face with which we can identify in 
the manner Carruthers describes above so using them need not lead on to using 
less damaged people. 
The fact that we can separate out some humans the (mis)use of whom would not 
lead to the misuse of others is in itself an argument against Carruthers, I think. This 
is what I meant in the introduction when I said that his theory cannot confer moral 
standing on these most damaged humans. For, on Carruthers' account, if we are 
able to find a stopping place on the slippery slope argument (as, I hope, I have) 
then we lose this slippery slope reason to attribute moral status to the most 
damaged of human beings. This point, by itself, is by no means a knock down 
argument against Carruthers, both he and I have other reasons to attribute moral 
status to humans. Therefore let us move on. 
First reason for considering permanently and irreversibly 
unconscious humans as donors 
So the boundary of consciousness provides a stopping place on Carruthers' slippery 
slope and avoids one of the major problems for `gradualist' life-comparative 
accounts of moral status of the kind discussed in chapter three. It provides firm 
ground from which to counter the claim that we should protect all humans from 
being killed for their organs as to do otherwise would pose a potential risk to rational 
contractors. The boundary of consciousness is as clear-cut a biological boundary 
as the boundary of species; this gives us a first reason for thinking that the use as 
organ donors of these people need not lead to the use of other, less damaged, 
human beings. It is important to recognise the weakness of this conclusion 
however. The fact that the permanently unconscious form a clearly bounded class 
merely begins to suggest that they may be used as donors. Irreversible 
unconsciousness is not in itself a morally relevant difference separating those 
humans we may kill for their organs from those we may not, it is simply a necessary 
condition: I assume that we cannot kill any conscious humans for their organs. And, 
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as discussed at the end of chapter three, the absence of consciousness does not 
mean that a person has no moral status; if we decide that it is permissible to kill 
people in this situation it is not because they do not matter. I simply think that, 
whatever else we decide about possible human donors, they must be unconscious: 
if not, the slippery slope argument applies. 
Unfair comparisons? 
By restricting the category of `defective' humans I am willing to consider as organ 
donors to this small subgroup I may be said to be tipping the comparison 
unfavourably against animals. Like Carruthers I do not deny that many animals are 
more intelligent, sociable, happy and so on than can be such damaged humans. 
However, like Carruthers, I think there is something special protecting the humans 
which the animals do not possess. It is this `something special' that prevents us 
from just `helping ourselves' to organs from humans whose interest in continued life 
is weaker than that of animal donors. The difference (or one of the differences) 
between myself and Carruthers is in what it is that we think is `special' about 
defective humans, and how it confers protection. Carruthers thinks that being a 
member of a species who are usually rational contractors is sufficient to confer 
direct moral status. I believe the relationship between typical, rational adult human 
beings and severely damaged humans is important: I think we can derive moral 
obligations with regard to almost all human beings in virtue of the fact that rational 
contractors care about them. However I think that such status can only be indirect. 
But I think it is also possible to confer direct moral status upon these humans in 
virtue of the fact that they have surviving interests. I talk more on these matters in a 
moment. 
I limit the class of possible living human organ donors to the permanently 
unconscious as by admitting conscious humans to consideration one becomes 
susceptible to Carruthers' slippery slope concerns and to the AMC problem of 
comparing lives. Although I concede that this is not a fair comparison with the sort 
of animals which are currently used as donors based on a consideration of the 
donors themselves I hope the reasoning behind it is now apparent. We have 
obligations to human beings which we do not have to other animals even when the 
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human being in question is wholly unaware of his treatment. In other words, a 
consideration of interests is not the only thing which confers moral obligations. I 
present a fuller case for this below. 
The above establishes only that consciousness has a clearly delimitable boundary - 
it says nothing about why it is the sort of thing that may usefully serve as part of a 
moral boundary which determines those creatures we may, under certain 
conditions, use as organ donors from those which are forever off limits. This is the 
subject of my next section. 
The argument from our `natural sympathetic response to 
human suffering' 
Carruthers says "The general thesis I want to defend ... 
is that some actions are 
seriously wrong, not because they cause any harm or violate any rights, but simply 
because of what they reveal about the character of the agent"31 (my italics). 
According to Carruthers' theory, rational contractors should take an interest in 
character because character forms the `springs of human action': ie it determines 
how we behave except on those occasions when we specifically consider an action 
before we perform it. The point germane to our discussion here is that 
contractualists should "believe in a duty to develop in themselves a disposition 
towards beneficence"32 as "rational agents should surely wish to agree on more 
than merely rules of noninterference. For they may be certain that they shall, at 
some point in their lives, require help from others". 33 
The rules governing how help should be given obviously cannot be fixed: actions 
demonstrating the virtue of beneficence can take many different forms depending 
on the situation. "The obvious and only feasible solution is that rational agents 
should agree to develop a general disposition to help those in need, to be exercised 
when the opportunity arises to do so at no comparable cost to themselves. What 
they should agree to develop is a general attachment to the good of others, and a 
predisposedness to act on their behalf'. 34 
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So it is wrong to cause suffering wantonly as "Contracting rational agents should 
agree to try to develop a ready sympathy for one anothers' suffering". 35 And it is 
wrong to end a life as "our reasons for fearing death derive from the fact that we 
have forward-looking desires that presuppose continued life. We would then expect 
rational contractors to agree to develop a general attachment to one another's 
lives". 36 Rational contractors should be prepared not only to refrain from killing but 
to act positively to prevent death "grounded in a sympathetic appreciation of the 
motives that rational agents have for going on living". 37 
Nonrational humans are protected under Carruthers' position. "It is no mere 
accident ... that a crying baby, or a senile old woman moaning with the pain of 
terminal cancer, can evoke our sympathy. For what is presented to our senses in 
these cases differs only in slight degree from the suffering of a child or normal 
adult... Someone who behaves in such a way as to be indifferent to the suffering of 
a baby or a senile old lady is therefore very wrong, because of what their behaviour 
reveals about their character". 38 And indifference to the suffering of arational 
humans runs the risk of setting a dangerous precedent: "Those who begin by 
rationalising their indifference to the sufferings of the senile may end by so warping 
their attitudes and moral imagination that they become insensitive to the sufferings 
of some who are, indisputably, rational agents". 39 
It is from rules of this sort that animals receive their (indirect) moral standing under 
Carruthers' contractualism. Regarding animal suffering he states "Such actions [as 
using one's cat as a dart board, even if no-one else will ever find out] are wrong 
because they are cruel. They betray an indifference to suffering that may manifest 
itself ... in that person's dealing with other rational agents. So although the action 
may not infringe any rights (cats will still lack direct moral rights under 
contractual ism), it remains wrong independently of its effect upon any animal lover. 
Animals thus get accorded indirect moral significance, by virtue of the qualities of 
character that they may, or may not, evoke in us". 40 Regarding killing: causing the 
painless death of an animal is not wrong under Carruthers' contractualism. "That 
someone fails to be moved by the painless death of an animal need not display any 
cruelty for there is no such thing, here, as entering sympathetically into the reasons 
that the animal had for going on living. Of course, we could, if we wished, enter 
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sympathetically into the future pleasures and satisfactions of the animals, which 
have now been lost through death... But given that this is not what sympathy for 
the death of a rational agent normally amounts to, the fact that we fail to have such 
feelings in connection with the death of an animal need not show that there is 
anything amiss with our moral character". 41 
There is much to respond to here. V wish to say little about Carruthers' discussion of 
animal suffering, despite it being extremely interesting, as it is not relevant to the 
special situation under consideration: that of ending lives in order to obtain organs. 
His treatment of the wrongness of killing is relevant to this case. I think that his 
theory runs into difficulties when applied to the special subset of `mental defectives' 
which I have set up: the permanently and irreversibly unconscious. 
`Forward looking interests' 
What is important about life, on Carruthers' account, is the `forward-looking 
interests' possessed by rational agents, which give reasons for their wish to 
continue living. "It counts in favour of the contractualist approach to these issues 
that when we enter sympathetically into the death of another, trying to see what 
their death may have meant from their point of view, we do seem naturally to focus 
on those plans and projects that have now been cut short". He continues "this sort 
of sympathy is only possible in respect of the death_of. a rational agent, since only 
such an agent has long-term projects, or the desire for continued life". 42 
To an extent I agree with Carruthers. In the previous chapter I asserted that death 
is `bad' because it deprives us of the opportunity to fulfil our important desires. And 
I agree with him that we might feel less sympathy, from the point of view of the one 
who dies, when a senile person dies than a normal person. Viewed this way I think 
many people would concur with Carruthers' suggestion that we may feel no 
sympathy at all for the death of an early foetus. 
However, I believe that this makes it difficult for Carruthers to confer direct moral 
standing upon the permanently and irreversibly unconscious. For, as discussed 
in 
chapters one and three, many people hold the common-sense belief that death 
is 
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not a bad thing at all, from the subject's point of view, for someone who is 
irreversibly unconscious. The terrible thing happened for such a person when he 
become irreversibly unconscious. Thus we cannot enter sympathetically into his 
reasons for going on living as there is `nothing it is like' to be in an unrousable 
coma: such a state is, subjectively, indistinguishable from death. Thomas Nagel 
writes "the value of life [to its subject] and its contents does not attach to mere 
organic survival: almost everyone would be indifferent (other things equal) between 
immediate death and immediate coma followed by death twenty years later without 
reawakening". 43 
There is, by contrast, `something it is like' to be an animal, even if we cannot 
describe it very accurately. Irreversibly unconscious people have no interests (apart 
from those similar to the `interests' of dead people, to do with not having their 
bodies mistreated or their good name besmirched): we cannot `put ourselves in their 
place' and there is no reason, from the present point of view of the subject of such a 
state, why such a life should not be ended. Even if we deny that animals are able to 
reflect on their interest in ongoing life I argued in chapter three that they have such 
an interest nonetheless. It seems that animals have more reasons for going on 
living than do such humans. 
Carruthers attempts to evade this conclusion for the most damaged humans by 
appeal to his slippery slope argument. However, as I discussed at the beginning of 
this chapter, so long as we are careful to restrict the categories of brain damaged 
humans we consider, we need not worry about killing such people causing slippery 
slope concerns - ending the lives of those who are irreversibly unconscious need 
cause no danger to other humans. So I think that Carruthers' `argument from 
sympathy', like his slippery slope argument, fails to support his claim that only all 
and only humans have full and direct moral status. This argument of Carruthers' 
gives no reason, either from a sympathetic entering into the subject's life or from a 
desire to avoid a slippery slope, why the special category of the irreversibly 
unconscious ought to be given moral protection. 
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Second reason for considering permanently and irreversibly 
unconscious humans as donors 
The fact that, as far as the subject is concerned, there is `no longer anything to be 
concerned about' also gives us a second reason for considering such people as 
donors. (Although I should reiterate here that my proposed use of such people 
does not stem from the belief that there is `nothing to be concerned about' when 
thinking about these people. ) The boundary of consciousness is clear cut. We saw 
above that by restricting the class of humans who can even enter consideration as 
beings we may kill for their organs to those who are wholly and permanently 
unconscious we can avoid the dangers of a slippery slope, and the problem of 
comparing lives across species. We now have a second reason for proposing their 
use. Humans who are unconscious have no present interests: they are far less able 
to be concerned about or harmed by their usage than are the animals which we 
currently use (and which I suggested in the previous chapter it is relatively 
acceptable to use. ) This sort of thought, that whether they do or do not continue to 
live is a matter of present indifference to the subjects of these profoundly 
unconscious states, underlies the feeling held by, I think, many people, that 
continuing life in the permanent absence of awareness can have no value to the 
possessor of such a life: that is, that they, at least, have lost the capacity to value it. 
Intuitively, it seems quite plausible that a person whose consciousness has 
permanently been lost, who will never again laugh or cry, feel love or anger does 
seem to have lost everything that makes life `worth living'. This suggests a way in 
which a policy of killing people for their organs can be made to fit with common 
sense intuitions: the thought that, as far as the subject of the life is concerned, all 
has already been lost is both widely believed and backed up by clinical evidence. It 
is also, I believe, what makes the `higher brain' definitions of death, such as those 
discussed and rejected in chapter one, appealing. 
A brief re-exploration of `higher brain death' 
To refresh the memory. These ontological definitions held death to be either (a) the 
loss of psychological continuity or `personhood' or (b) the permanent loss of 
consciousness. In chapter one I discussed at length my reasons for rejecting these 
positions. 1 can see no reason for declaring someone who is irreversibly 
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unconscious yet does not require the support of ventilators, inotropic drugs and 
suchlike to maintain their biological functioning to be dead. I can see even less 
reason for someone whose personal identity has been lost (which need not 
necessarily involve the loss of consciousness as previously discussed) to be 
declared dead. Differences in quality of life do not begin to provide grounds for a 
redefinition of death. 
However, despite my criticism of these theories, I found them to have a definite 
intuitive appeal: I hope that the source of this appeal is now clear. Permanently 
unconscious people, although not dead as argued previously, share an important 
similarity with the dead - they have lost the capacity to regret their circumstances, 
to suffer because of their condition, or, indeed, to think and feel in any way. 
Contrary to the Harvard Committee's contention that "The burden is great on 
patients who suffer permanent loss of intellect", 44 such a person can never suffer 
under a burden, make light of it, or even be aware that they are burdened. I hope I 
have shown how the intuitions that underlie the 'higher brain' concept of death do 
have a place without committing us to the (I think) unacceptable consequence that 
we must declare people who are perfused, spontaneously respiring and otherwise 
able spontaneously to regulate their internal milieu, to be dead. 
Moving away from the comparison with animals: some 
independent reasons supporting the killing of some 
irreversibly unconscious people for organs 
A brief recap. It is commonly assumed that animals have a lower moral status than 
do humans. I hope that my arguments in that chapter and this sufficed to convince 
the reader that one of the reasons we have for thinking that animals usually have a 
lower moral status than humans - their weaker interest in continued life - suggests 
that some humans too have a weaker interest in continuing to live than do `normal' 
humans. And irreversibly unconscious humans have no such interest at all. The 
inability of the latter group any longer to care what happens to them gives us initial 
grounds for thinking them to be suitable candidates for organ donation: we can 
delimit the boundaries of consciousness and so the practice need not cause a slide 
towards using less damaged people, and we can safely say that the person 
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themselves no longer cares what happens. However I do not wish to follow the 
AMC to the conclusion that is sometimes reached: the claim that the lack of present 
interests possessed by the most damaged of human beings mean that they are of 
no concern to other people -- that we may kill them if it suits us. 
In the above l hope to have convinced the reader that it is possible to delimit a 
category of human being whom, on a consideration only of their present state, 
would appear to have less of a claim to moral status than do animals. This is one 
way of thinking about `sympathy' or putting oneself in another's place: it is the way 
Carruthers seems to have in mind when he uses the term. However, the claim that 
it may be permissible to kill irreversibly unconscious humans for their organs 
engenders the possibility of other clashes with reflective equilibrium which have yet 
to be resolved - it is important to make clear that any such killing would not be 
performed from a lack of respect. I wish to argue that the comparison of present 
interests is not sufficient to determine all our obligations to these people. We tend, 
in a common sense sort of way, to think that we have obligations to people which 
stem from considerations other than facts about the individual in their present state, 
I believe. These obligations, if they exist, provide the best hope for grounding the 
`Kantianism for humans, utilitarianism for animals' idea (the thought that all animals 
may be used as organ donors yet that no humans may). Certainly I myself know of 
nothing to do with the present state of the individual themselves that would work to 
inform such a belief. 
What sort of thing might ground such obligations? The interests view (as Feinberg 
and Steinbock set it out) allows that some interests may survive their owner's 
capacity to comprehend them and that this gives moral status. This gives us a 
second possible way to think about sympathy which would allow us to confer direct 
status on these people. If someone has expressed a desire that their life be ended 
should they ever enter an irreversibly unconscious state, many people think it 
appropriate to carry out their wishes under these circumstances, unless there are 
strong reasons not to do so. I would argue that these people are harmed if their 
wishes are not carried out, just as the dead people discussed in chapter two are 
susceptible to harm although incapable of ever being aware of it. This second sort 
of appeal to sympathy is one to which Carruthers explicitly does not subscribe. 
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(This is not to say that Carruthers could not agree with me that it is, generally, good 
to respect the wishes of dead or unconscious people - it is just that his motive for 
saying so would be different. ) I believe that the importance of not causing what I 
shall call `anteunconsciousness harming' can also support the removal of organs 
from unconscious people who wish to die, if they have also expressed the desire to 
donate. 
Anteunconsciousness harming 
In chapter two I discussed the apparent paradox we face when thinking about 
whether the dead can be harmed. On the one hand, nothing can now trouble them, 
on the other, we feel that something terrible has befallen them. I took the side of 
those who believe that things can be better or worse for the dead, even though they 
can never know. I think a similar paradox is at work here: the arguments above 
supporting the use of irreversibly unconscious people as donors work because we 
know that they no longer, and can never again, care what happens to them. 
However, and for much the same reasons as those which protect the dead, we are 
not free to `do as we please' with them - they retain some moral status. It is true 
that when we try to put ourselves imaginatively in the place of such patients we find 
it impossible to think of any reasons they might have now for continuing to live. This 
is the `nothing it is like to be' argument discussed above. However, I also think 
considerations not to do with the present state of the subject are relevant. 
While I do not think that such people presently care about their continued existence 
I think it is possible to form an argument that some of them, at least, ought to be 
killed or allowed to die (I equivocate here, but the distinction is in fact of enormous 
consequence to this argument and will be discussed in the final section of this 
chapter) not because they `cannot care' but rather because it is `in their interests' 
based on a consideration of the sort of person they were prior to entering the PVS. 
And if the right thing to do is to end their lives, then ought we not also respect the 
further wishes of those who expressed a desire in life to donate their organs, just as 
is presently done with conventional cadaveric donors? 
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The idea of `anteunconscious harmings', like the discussion of the `interests' of dead 
people and of how they may be harmed post mortem, in chapter two, is somewhat 
contentious. I follow Nagel (and others) in holding that it is possible for someone to 
be harmed without their being aware of it. I shall not go into detail here about the 
problems concerning this kind of account - the questions of how people can be 
harmed by things which do not affect them consciously, or of who can be said to be 
the subject of a harm. The problems for the unconscious are the same as the 
problems for the dead, I think, and I discussed them sufficiently in chapter two. 
Suffice it to say, I hold, with Nagel, that "A man's life includes much that does not 
take place within the boundaries of his body and his mind, and what happens to him 
can include much that does not take place within the boundaries of his life". 45 The 
idea stems from the belief that people have interests which can survive their deaths 
or their entering an irreversibly unconscious state - interests in the survival and 
prosperity of their families, or businesses, and interests in their retaining a good 
name are common examples of surviving interests. I believe that interests 
concerning what is to be done with one's body following death or (and this idea has 
greater intuitive plausibility, I think, and may, by this means provide support for the 
attribution of such interests to the dead), following the onset of an irreversibly 
unconscious state, are also plausible candidates to be surviving interests. 
I believe that it makes sense to talk of `harm' being done to such a person if they 
are kept alive against their pre-unconsciousness wishes. Such `harm' is to do with 
the frustration of their general life plans -- the way their lives end in a way which is 
discordant to the way they lived their conscious lives. Some people find the idea of 
being maintained in an insensible state to be appalling. By the same token, if they 
wished that their organs be used to help other after their deaths, then I would say 
that they are `harmed' if the organs are not used (barring practical problems like 
them turning out not to be suitable for transplant, or there being no well-matched 
recipients). 
In order to avoid the assertion that I am advocating the killing of people `for their 
organs' I ought to make it clear that I am making two separate points and that the 
second does not follow automatically from the first. The first point is that it is 
sometimes appropriate to end the life (and only end the life) of someone in an 
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irreversibly unconscious state. (nb I am not sure whether this should strictly 
speaking be called `euthanasia' or not. On the one hand, considering my first 
argument from sympathy it does not seem possible to talk of death (or anything 
else) being `good' or `bad' for an irreversibly unconscious person. On the other 
hand, on the surviving interests account, perhaps death is a good for people who 
have requested it. I shall call it `euthanasia' here. ) This is morally permissible if the 
patient has previously expressed a desire for this to be carried out and, although 
this is more contentious, it may also happen when the patient has not expressed an 
interest either way -I discuss this more in the `problem cases' section below. Either 
way, it may be done only if doctors are as certain as they can be that consciousness 
is wholly absent and can never return. This claim is not uncontentious, but I do not 
wish to be drawn deeper into the euthanasia debate than necessary. I note simply 
that this is a widely held belief, and also that it is one backed up by law: since the 
Tony Bland decision in early 1993 there have been approximately 25 instances in 
which the UK courts have determined it to be lawful to end (just end) the lives of 
people in irreversibly unconscious states. However, I recognise that my argument 
for the excising of organs from those who wished both that their lives be ended and 
that their organs be used will appeal only to those people who subscribe to the idea 
that ending the lives of these people is, at least sometimes, the morally right thing to 
do. For those who believe otherwise my argument does not get off the ground. 
So my first point is that it is sometimes appropriate to end the lives of those in an 
irreversibly unconscious state who have expressed abhorrence at the idea of being 
so maintained. The second, separate, point is that if the person whose life is to be 
ended has made it clear during his pre-unconsciousness period that he would wish 
to donate, and assuming the family do not object, his organs should be used to help 
others. (The question of what to do if, as is quite likely, the unconscious person had 
voiced no opinion on the matter will be discussed in a moment in the `problem 
cases' section). This extension to the right to have one's life ended would fit well 
with the way in which we presently think about decisions concerning our own bodies 
which are not directly beneficial to us. In life, we may freely consent to donate 
blood, bone marrow, even single kidneys and sections of our lungs and livers and 
many of us also hold cards that express our desire to donate our organs after death. 
Both morality and the law find little to quibble with if a nontherapeutic action is 
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undertaken with the informed consent of the person undergoing the intervention. 
Concerns pull both ways 
However, I must reiterate that `surviving interests' need not support either ending 
the lives of such people or using them as donors. If people have a horror, during 
their normal conscious lives, of having their lives ended if they enter such a state 
then that is a reason not to kill them. In the case of people who believed, while 
conscious, that `where there's life there's hope' or that, no matter how awful the 
condition of the patient it would be wrong to end their life, ending their lives would 
be wrong: it would not be in their interests. (This is not to say categorically that it 
may not be done - perhaps the burden they impose on a state-funded healthcare 
program may be deemed to override their interests in being maintained. This is not 
for me to discuss however. ) Similarly if a person wishes that his life be ended if he 
ever becomes irreversibly unconscious but does not wish that his organs be used 
then, for the sorts of reasons appealed to in chapter two, we are not permitted to 
use his organs. I think such prohibitions are fairly clear cut and, as such, will not 
discuss the matter further here. All I am concerned to show is that, under certain 
circumstances, we can use unconscious humans as organ donors without denying 
them moral standing. 
Problem cases 
However, thinking about anteunconsciousness harming, points up two problem 
cases for this way of attributing moral status to the most profoundly damaged 
humans, ones which Carruthers' theory can perhaps evade. These are first those 
previously normal humans who did not hold or failed to mention an opinion on the 
matter of their treatment, should they enter such a state, and second those humans 
irreversibly unconscious humans who have never had any wishes and desires, such 
as anencephalic and similarly handicapped infants. How ought we to think about 
these people? 
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Those who were capable of expressing an interest but did 
not 
The greatest problem is presented by those previously-normal humans who did not 
offer an opinion on how they would like to be treated if they ever entered a 
permanently unconscious state. I am unsure what to say about these cases. 
Probably the best solution would be for the family to act as proxy decision makers. 
This sort of thought is already applied to decisions to end the lives of people in this 
state: the argument for ending the life of Tony Bland was of this sort. Bland had 
apparently never offered an opinion on what he would like done if he ever found 
himself in such a state. The judges ruled in favour of the family's request that he 
should die, holding that staying alive was not in Tony's interests. So it could be that 
the family should also be allowed to decide whether their relative would have 
wished to donate their organs too. 
I have two reservations about the idea of using the organs of irreversibly 
unconscious people who have never expressed an opinion but whose family or 
some legally appointed guardian wish them to be utilised. First, although there is 
talk of killing being `in their interests' it is not clear what this means as, in the 
absence even of `surviving interests', nothing can truly be said any longer either to 
be in or not to be in the interests of an unconscious person. As such it seems to me 
that we might be in danger of taking the view that such a life is of `no value' rather 
than thinking of such an act as being what the person would have wanted. The 
second problem is, as noted at the end of chapter two, there are ethical and legal 
difficulties when proxies give consent to a procedure which is not `in the interests' of 
an incompetent patient (where interests are thought of in a straightforward way as 
`health'). However, if the decision to end the patient's life has been made, it it 
perhaps fatuous to talk about whether subsequent organ excision is or is not in a 
patient's interests. And perhaps both killing and organ removal can be justified if we 
apply the conditions discussed by Shaw at the end of chapter two in relation to 
NHBDs. If such a practice causes no distress to the patient, and if the family, based 
on their knowledge of him, think that it is what he would have wanted, then it seems 
relatively ethically unobjectionable. 
185 
To allow proxy decision makers to make donation decisions on behalf of such 
people would fit with the way cadaveric organs are presently obtained in this 
country. Donation can go ahead based on what the family decide is in the interests 
of the dead person, even if they have never expressed an opinion during life. The 
second subcategory of controlled non-heartbeating donors discussed at the end of 
chapter two - those patients who are deemed to have little or no quality of life - also 
set a precedent, one that seems highly relevant. In these cases the family, in 
conjunction with the doctors, make the decision both to end life and to excise 
organs. I say more about these problem cases in the second argument from social 
stability section in a moment: there are some outstanding concerns regarding the 
use of these people which are masked by my employment of the phrase `ending the 
life of'. 
As a factual aside it has to be said that few people are likely to have formally given 
an informed consent to having their organs used should they ever (fail to) find 
themselves in a permanently unconscious condition - as such these problem cases 
are more likely to present a greater source of organs, if they are accepted. 
Those never capable of expressing an opinion 
The case of humans who have never been capable of expressing their wishes is 
perhaps the least complicated of the two. Most of these patients (anencephalics 
being the most widely-known example) are, like the majority of controlled non- 
heartbeating donors discussed in chapter two, dying. No matter what doctors do, 
they will die soon. This alleviates concerns about parents requesting euthanasia 
and organ donation simply in order to avoid the burden of care. However, the fact 
that the patient has never been capable of making a decision on how they would 
wish to be treated, and has never had a personality on which relatives could base a 
guess as to what would be desired, makes their case problematic - we cannot 
appeal to the second argument from sympathy. All we can fall back on here is the 
first argument from sympathy - that nothing we do to him can be either a benefit or 
a burden to such a baby. In such cases I think we must trust the parents to be 
proxy decision makers, in the hope that they are free from ulterior motives. Trusting 
the parents to make appropriate decisions brings me to the last of Carruthers' 
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arguments. 
The Argument from Social Stability 
Carruthers' third reason for attributing direct moral status to all human beings and to 
no animals appeals to social stability. According to this argument, rational 
contractors creating rules should decide "whether those principles would have the 
desired effect of facilitating a stable co-operative community". 46 A rule withholding 
moral standing from some humans would produce instability "in that many people 
would find themselves psychologically incapable of living in compliance with it". 47 
I agree with Carruthers that a rule merely requiring us to `respect the legitimate 
concerns of others' is insufficient to do the moral work we would like in protecting 
innocent human beings as it would "only accord such humans the same protection 
as items of property". 48 Intuitively most people certainly do feel that the destruction 
of somebody else's car and the destruction of (somebody else's or our own) child 
are not morally equivalent. Carruthers thinks it follows from this that the "only way 
of framing rules that we can live with, then, is to accord all human beings the same 
basic rights - that is to say, moral standing". 49 
I would certainly share Carruthers' intuitions concerning children, babies, the senile 
and other such people: I think that allowing the killing of such people would (or at 
least could) have deleterious effects on society and as such ought not to be 
considered. And I also agree with him that social stability concerns are sufficient to 
rule out the utilisation of permanently and irreversibly unconscious people against 
their wishes. However, Carruthers fails to convince me that the careful use of this 
latter group, under carefully specified conditions, would lead to social instability. 
There is a precedent for thinking that such uses will not lead to abuses: think of the 
many celebrated cases of people in persistent vegetative states who have been 
allowed to die: these have not, in general, led to outcry or a weakening of moral 
standards. It is but a small step from agreeing that it is permissible to allow them to 
die to allowing that their organs be used after death just as the organs of 
conventional cadaveric donors are presently used. 
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This is another reason why i think Carruthers' basis for moral status can be 
challenged (the other two worries were that (a) if a stopping place could be found 
then his slippery slope argument need not give a reason to confer full moral status 
to all and only humans and that (b) if there exist humans who have no forward 
looking interests then we cannot enter sympathetically into their lives to confer 
status). If it ever became common practice to treat some human beings as if they 
had no moral status, that is; if no bad societal consequences ensued from our 
treating them with disdain - then, on Carruthers account, we lose this reason for 
conferring moral status. Carruthers himself mentions the example of ancient 
societies in which infanticide and the killing of the crippled and elderly were 
practised. He claims that such killings were sanctioned by custom and religion and 
that such methods of achieving social stability are no longer available to us. He 
also notes that communities which permitted such practices tended to be those on 
the edge of starvation, and so the killing could be justified as self preservation. 
However, this seems to me to be missing the point. To claim that the problem in 
treating damaged human beings as if they have no moral status is only that it might 
cause social instability seems absurd - we would surely want to agree with 
Carruthers that there are some things it is simply wrong to do to human beings 
(such as the sort of abhorrent treatment some black people endured under South 
African apartheid) - to worry about whether or not they cause social instability is not 
the greatest concern. 
In the previous section I mentioned some safeguards intended to avoid giving the 
impression that my proposed policy involves killing people `for their organs'. it is 
time to mention a few more conditions which must be met in order for social stability 
to be maintained. The killing and utilisation ought to take place only with the 
consent of the family of the donor: even if the donor has agreed, pre mortem, to be 
used (this is the situation in cadaveric organ donation in the UK at present, even 
though the Human Tissues Act says otherwise). Doctors must be as certain as 
possible that the diagnosis of total irreversible unconsciousness is correct. This 
could be done in the way brainstem death testing is currently performed: a doctor 
who is independent of the transplant team conducts brainstem death tests on two 
separate occasions, but these are accepted as diagnosing death only so long as 
there are no possible biasing factors (such as the presence of a drug in the patient's 
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blood which could mimic some of the symptoms of brain death) and ideally only if 
there is a known injury which is deemed likely to have cause brain death. And 
perhaps we ought also to check carefully that the family has no ulterior motive for 
wanting the person dead (although, in the UK's state-funded healthcare system in 
which families do not meet the cost of treatment, this is unlikely to be a motive I 
think). 
I wish to suggest that it is ethically permissible, if these conditions are met, to end 
the lives of people who become unconscious (and who have, ideally, previously 
expressed both a horror of living on in such a condition and a desire to donate) and 
to excise their organs to help others. I propose such a use not because these 
people lack value, allowing us to do as we will with them, but because, just as 
different ways of treating people become appropriate as they pass from being alive 
to being dead, so it is appropriate to treat such irreparably unconscious people 
differently from normal human beings. Anne Maclean, a philosopher vehemently 
opposed to the idea that the lives of the most profoundly intellectually damaged 
humans ought to be judged less `valuable' acknowledges that there may be 
`something in' the idea that some badly-damaged people cannot value their lives, 
and that this may affect how we may treat them. She argues that we may choose to 
end the life of someone who is terribly handicapped or comatose, not because 
`there is no longer anything to be concerned with from a moral point of view' but 
because that is what respect for the person dictates at that, point. "Such 
considerations [having to do with the quality of a person's life] do not determine 
whether or not a person is entitled to respect; they do determine, at least in part, 
what counts as respect in a given case". 50 Thus, if we decided that euthanasia was 
`the best and kindest course' for someone permanently comatose "we would not be 
denying him respect in killing him, let alone denying that he still merited respect: we 
would be showing him respect - we would be doing what we thought respect for 
him required in the circumstances". 51 
So long as such treatment is not contrary to the known wishes of the unconscious 
person, i do not see why social stability problems need ensue from the further step 
of taking organs. I also think such a policy fits with common sense: l mentioned 
previously that the intuitions which motivate it - that irreversibly unconscious people 
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can never again care what happens to them - are widely held. It can now be seen 
that donation under these circumstances can be surrounded by sufficient 
safeguards to make it acceptable to at least that portion of society who approve of 
ending the lives of such people. 
The requirement for active killing 
There is, however, one obvious way in which instability might be caused which I 
have ignored up to this point. I am forced to concede a point which may make my 
suggestion appear deeply distasteful and is a large obstacle blocking my assertion 
that such a use could be made acceptable to the public. (Of course, the fact that a 
policy is seen as socially unacceptable need not mean that it is not built on solid 
moral foundations: however, any scheme which makes transplant doctors appear to 
be `body snatchers' is likely to be self-defeating by breeding public mistrust and 
ultimately, a reduction in the number of organs available for transplant. ) In order for 
someone in a permanently unconscious state to be killed in such a way that their 
organs are useful to others the killing must be an active killing, not the arguably 
passive death provided by the withdrawal of nutrition or by omitting to treat an 
infection - the only way in which the death of irreversibly comatose people has 
been brought about previously. Irreversibly unconscious people are seldom 
ventilated, so withdrawal of ventilatory support (which is sometimes, and perhaps 
oddly, seen as a `allowing to die' rather than `killing') is not an option. Allowing to die 
by removal of a feeding tube or failing to treat an infection, whether truly passive or 
not, would render the organs unusable. 
I require a further argument then, to the effect that if it is thought appropriate to end 
such a person's life by passive means, and if, further, it is decided that their organs 
are to be donated, then it is morally appropriate actively to end their lives. The 
concern is that because utilising the organs of PVS patients requires killing rather 
than allowing to die then this might `open the floodgates' to active euthanasia for 
other categories of patients, and perhaps, a general devaluing of human life. (I 
assume in what follows that if the patient has expressed approval of donation, the 
family agree, and the patient is clearly diagnosed as in a PVS then concerns about 
moving to a policy of active euthanasia for other categories of patient are the only 
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relevant ones. ) How might we respond to this? 
Precedents for such a policy 
The argument from discrepant views of brainstem death held by some intensive 
care doctors is relevant here, I think. As mentioned in the first chapter: if (as some 
people think) brainstem death is simply an `infallible indicator' of imminent death 
rather than being death itself then actively killing and the subsequent procurement 
of organs already happens. And it has not led to people being used against their 
will. As I noted in the first chapter, I can see no way of decisively refuting the 
argument that brainstem death is a 100% accurate prognostic indicator of the 
imminent occurrence of what may be called 'somatic death`, rather than being death 
itself, as Pallis claims - perhaps this uncertainty could be put to use here. 
However, I have a more potent response to the objection: I think that such active 
killings already happen, under the second subcategory of controlled non- 
heartbeating donors discussed in chapter two. The Potts and Herdman 1997 report 
includes under the heading of controlled NHBDs those who are "incompetent, but 
not brain dead, because of severe, generally neurological, illness or injury with an 
extremely poor prognosis as to ... any meaningful 
functional status"52 (my italics). It 
is hard to be sure on this point - Potts and Herdman make little mention of this 
group of patients, preferring to stay on the more solid ethical grounds of those 
whose death is imminent. However, if these patients are already utilised (and 
controlled NHBD programmes returned to prominence around a decade ago) then 
this seems to defuse the slippery slope worry that we would be unable to refuse 
active euthanasia on less damaged people. 
Conclusions 
Like Carruthers (and most other people) I think that the killing even of a 
permanently and irreversibly unconscious human being is a morally (and legally) 
serious matter; more serious than the destruction of somebody else's property, even 
though, like the property, the subject of such a killing can never be aware of the 
destruction. However, as I argued above, I believe that the reasons why it is wrong, 
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when it is wrong, to kill such people are not to do with the present state of the 
person in question: rather they are concerned with the feelings of the family, and 
with respecting the wishes of the person before his or her lapse into 
unconsciousness (ie the moral concerns are similar, and maybe stronger, than 
those which surround a potential cadaveric organ donor). 
Irreversibly unconscious people have direct moral standing, conferred by 
anteunconsciousness surviving interests, even if their interest in continued life is 
weaker than that of animals which we think it acceptable to use as organ donors. 
We also have moral obligations to them conferred in a contractualist manner, 
although these need not necessarily rule out donation I think. Because of this we 
may not, as the first two arguments and the AMC discussion in chapter three 
perhaps imply, `do as we like' with them. 
The arguments which confer standing on these people may serve as reasons 
independent of a comparison with animals why we might think that such people 
could be utilised. If a person would have chosen to die rather than live on with no 
hope of regaining consciousness and if they also wished for their organs to be used 
after their death then this might provide grounds for such a use. The argument 
accords with some widely held intuitions in society: (a) that the `tragedy' in this life 
has already occurred when consciousness was lost for the last time and that we can 
see no reason to live when we put ourselves in the place of such people and (b) 
that if euthanasia is appropriate why should organ donation not be. I hope that I 
have made the case for the use of these human beings as watertight against abuse 
as is possible. In order for a donation to be made I require that (i) ideally the donor 
and certainly the family have indicated that he would wish to die in such a condition; 
(ii) again ideally the donor and certainly the family should indicate their approval for 
organ donation and (iii) the diagnosis be as certain as it can be. If these conditions 
are met, I think that donation from living human beings would be acceptable to at 
least that portion of society which approves of euthanasia. However, it is also clear 
that such a proposal has the potential to appear very socially divisive entailing, as it 
does, the need for active rather than passive killing and the niggling suggestion that 
people are being killed `for their organs', much as I have tried to make it clear that 
the euthanasia decision and the organ donation decision must be independent. 
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I must acknowledge that, if society as a whole found the idea of using the organs of 
unconscious people to be abhorrent, despite the fact that it appears to fit with at 
least some common sense intuitions regarding the current state of the person and 
also their previous wishes, then Carruthers' point still holds and the practice ought 
not to be performed. However perhaps we ought to think about the needs of the 
recipients before we allow ourselves to become outraged at the idea of killing 
consenting human beings with no quality of life and using their organs to help 
others. I would not wish to adhere to a Harris-like argument that we should weigh 
concerns for the donor and the recipient according to a utilitarian calculus but it 
seems to me that to steadfastly refuse to use even the most damaged human 
beings in accordance with the carefully circumscribed conditions set out in this 
chapter is to fail to do all that we reasonably could to help those who are in dire 
need of organs. And when we consider again the comparison with animals with 
which we began chapter three such a refusal becomes more invidious: we do 
currently use animals with interests which grant them a degree of moral standing. 
We think that the harm done to them is outweighed by the benefit to human beings. 
However, if we refuse to use even those human beings who are no longer capable 
of caring what happens to them, even when such usage was proposed not because 
there is nothing to be concerned about but rather because such an action is in 
accordance with their wishes, then I think we would find it very hard to avoid a 
charge of discriminating according to the morally irrelevant characteristic of species. 
I also wish to draw a second conclusion. This is that Carruthers' arguments do not 
succeed in attributing privileged moral status to all and only human beings because 
it is hard to see how they can be made to protect the permanently and irreversibly 
unconscious. Carruthers' basis for attributing moral status to humans does not 
seem to be very strong. On his account the attribution of moral status is contingent 
upon certain facts about the world: upon there being no way to draw a line on his 
slippery slope, upon our being able to relate sympathetically to the mentally 
handicapped and upon public outrage being caused by a policy which allowed the 
killing of some humans. If these facts do not hold, as I have attempted to show they 
do not for irreversibly unconscious humans, then it is difficult to see what remains 
for Carruthers to use to attribute moral status. David DeGrazia goes so far as to 
193 
say that Carruthers has `the wrong basis' for attributing status as his argument is 
"only as strong as the empirical premise on which it rests". 53 "What is crucial is not 
rational agency, or one's social and psychological relations to rational agents, but 
the possession of interests". 54 A related point is that Carruthers' theory seems to 
struggle to achieve reflective equilibrium. According to his arguments as presented 
above, he has no grounds on which to attribute moral status to irreversibly 
unconscious people. It is difficult to see how this could be reconciled with our 
intuitions. 55 
Stalemate? 
Carruthers argues that "Rational contractors who are trying to agree on the rules 
that will assign basic rights and duties should therefore be aware that any attempt to 
draw distinctions within the category of human beings may have psychological 
effects that would prove morally disastrous. They should then agree to assign basic 
moral rights to all human beings, irrespective of their status as rational agents". 56 A 
rule excluding `mental defectives' from possessing moral standing may cause our 
`natural impulse of sympathy for the suffering of all who share human form' to be 
undermined. In contrast "no similar dangers attend the exclusion of animals from 
possession of moral standing ... for there is a large gulf, both of physical form and 
modes of behaviour, between human beings and even their closest animal cousins. 
A dividing line drawn here being clear cut, and appealing to features that are 
strikingly salient, may therefore be a stable one". 57 
I hope I have, in the preceding pages, given sufficient reason to doubt (a) that 
Carruthers' arguments are able to confer moral status on the most damaged human 
beings (I also think that they are not successful in denying moral status to animals, 
as interest-possession, not similarity to a rational contractor, is what gives 
admission to the class of beings with moral status. However, I do not argue this 
point against Carruthers directly) and (b) that Carruthers' arguments accord fully 
with common sense. They seemingly cannot, as they deny moral status to some 
humans. However, I must concede that my position, by the same token, also fails 
fully to achieve reflective equilibrium. I imagine that although many people share 
the intuition that someone who is permanently unconscious has already suffered a 
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great tragedy, in comparison to which death will not be so bad, it will not 
necessarily follow from this that people will share my subsequent reasoning that 
such people may, under appropriate conditions, be utilised as organ donors. 
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Overall Conclusions 
In this thesis I discussed several possible ways of increasing the supply of organs 
for transplant: by increasing the number of cadaveric donors, excising organs from 
animals, and by taking organs from irreversibly unconscious humans for whom 
death has been requested. 
As I noted in the introduction, regardless of the soundness of the arguments 
supporting such policies, any proposal to increase organ numbers needs to be 
acceptable to the general public. Policies which are not acceptable in this way are 
likely to be self defeating, causing a net decrease in the number of organs available 
for transplant by making people reluctant to allow their or their loved ones' organs to 
be used. 
Sources of concern 
For this reason, it is worrying that, over the course of my investigation, I have found 
several examples of doctors carrying out the sort of practices presented for 
discussion here, and doing so away from public scrutiny. As some examples: 
In my research into Professor Harris' proposal I discovered that endotracheal 
intubation techniques are frequently practised on the newly dead, and that only ten 
percent of the hospitals using cadavers in this way requested consent from 
relatives'. Some doctors actively advocate against asking for consent. They feel 
that fear of causing further distress would discourage trainees from approaching 
relatives, and they contend that asking for consent would cause a delay, allowing 
rigor mortis to set in. The procedure cannot be performed once this happens. 
When I first began thinking about using living but irreversibly unconscious people as 
donors I thought that it was an idea which, although morally defensible (with 
appropriate safeguards), would be difficult to justify to a non philosophical audience. 
So I was surprised to discover that a subcategory of controlled non heart beating 
donors - those who are "incompetent, but not brain dead, because of severe, 
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generally neurological, illness or injury with an extremely poor prognosis as to ... 
any meaningful functional status"2 seem very close to falling under this proposal. In 
fact, it could be said that the use of this category of controlled NHBDs is more 
difficult to justify morally than my proposed use of permanently unconscious people. 
By countenancing the use as donors of patients who are not irreversibly 
unconscious but who have a "poor quality of life"3 transplant teams make 
themselves vulnerable to Carruthers' slippery slope argument. 
The definition of death also seems subject to gerrymandering under some organ 
retrieval policies. While I do not think that the higher brain definitions discussed in 
chapter one are ever likely to underpin policy, the cardiac criteria used for declaring 
death under some NHBD protocols are contentious. 4,5 Under some protocols death 
may be declared as little as sixty seconds after cardiac arrest (Orr et a/ point out 
that a potential recipient would not be declared dead in so short a time if he or she 
suffered a cardiac arrest while awaiting surgery); other protocols do not specify the 
criteria for determining death to have occurred. While the doctors who write such 
policies are acting with good intentions, they wish to obtain organs in the best 
possible condition, and although consent for `allowing to die' is always obtained, 
using a criterion of death for a donor which would not be acceptable for patients 
who are not to become donors seems to me to run the risk of setting a dangerous 
precedent. 
While the enormous benefit of obtaining organs should not be underestimated, care 
should be taken that new retrieval policies are justifiable and available for public 
discussion. This is important both in order to avoid a controversial policy from 
having a negative impact on organ donation rates and to prevent the doctors 
themselves from losing respect for their donors. 
Other donors 
I based my discussion in the previous four chapters around two categories of 
donors, human cadavers and animals, which are already in use. These seemed to 
be good starting points for my discussion as I think it is reasonable to assume that 
the fact that organs and organ parts6 are already obtained from these sources 
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means that they are relatively morally uncontroversial. However, there are two 
other current source of organs which I did not discuss: human to human donation in 
which the donor remains alive ('living donation') and donation involving the death of 
the donor from humans who are "competent with intolerable quality of life". 7 
Living donation 
Living donation is usually limited to single kidney transplants, however it is also 
possible for someone to donate part of their liver or a lung lobe. It can take two 
forms, altruistic and commercial. It is very difficult to obtain any facts about the 
latter group: paid donation is, and is certain to remain, illegal in the UK. I can think 
of no moral reason why we might wish this to change and so I do not propose to 
discuss paid donors at all. Altruistic donors are a trickier situation. This type of 
donor is an increasingly popular source of organs and patients entering the 
transplant waiting list are routinely counselled regarding the appropriate way to 
discuss this matter with their relatives. There were 381 living donor organs 
transplanted in the UK in 2001, the highest ever number. Numbers have increased 
year on year since 1992, the earliest year for which UK Transplant provides data. 8 
However, it is not always clear that such donations are fully voluntary, and there are 
concerns about the risk to which the donor is exposed for the sake of another. 
I have little to say about the first of these points - by its nature it is not the sort of 
thing that is reported on. Its importance should not be blown out of proportion - the 
transplant team takes great care to provide the donor with every opportunity to back 
out. The recipient is not invited to attend the pre-transplant clinic in which the 
potential donor is interviewed by the surgeon. At such a meeting a donor with 
misgivings may be offered a letter stating that he or she is unsuitable for donation 
for unspecified `medical reasons'. That said, my personal experience suggests that 
once the donation work up process has begun, some donors feel it difficult to back 
out even if they develop anxieties, feeling perhaps that they `owe' the kidney to their 
relative once it had been offered. 
The second point is more serious. Donating a kidney is much more clearly against 
a person's interests (conceived here as their health) than simply not in their 
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interests in the way that a blood donation is. The donation process itself carries 
risk: the renal arteries connect to the aorta and so there is the potential for 
catastrophic bleeding. The donor may also suffer long term post-operative 
morbidity: a rib is often removed and nerves severed during surgery, both of these 
have the potential to cause long term pain. And, as kidneys play a role in regulating 
blood pressure, among other important bodily functions, the donor is at increased 
risk of developing hypertension compared to a person with the usual complement of 
kidneys. I assume that donating liver and lung lobes carries -a similar or greater 
risk. 
To say this is not to deny that people are free to subject themselves to things which 
are injurious to health: if we find no reason to ban smoking, drinking and `extreme 
sports' then surely we should not refuse people the chance to make such a noble 
gesture for the sake of a relative or close friend. However, if sufficient organs could 
be obtained from other sources it would be nice to make the practice of altruistic 
living donation redundant. 
I ought, perhaps, to mention here those people who offer organs not to a specific 
person as in usually the case in living donation, but to the general `pool'. I am very 
unsure what to say about these individuals: is their wish to donate an extreme 
extension of the sort of beneficence which- motivates others to donate blood or even 
bone marrow or is it rather indicative of a mental illness such as Munchausen's 
syndrome? At present, such a donation would not be possible in the UK - all 
unrelated living transplants (this includes donation between spouses) are assessed 
by a body called ULTRA (the Unrelated Living Transplant Regulatory Authority). 
ULTRA permits the transplant only if the donor can show clear evidence of a long 
term close relationship with the recipient (old photographs, letters, marriage 
certificates and so on are required as evidence). However, even if ULTRA changed 
its rules to permit donation from people unknown to their recipients, doctors would, 
at the very least, need to be very sure of the motives driving such donors before 
they accept organs offered under these circumstances. 
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People who wish to die 
In my chapter four exploration of humans who may, sometimes, morally be killed 
and whose organs may then be used for transplant I restricted my discussion to 
people who are irreversibly unconscious. This was in order to avoid the slippery 
slope argument of Peter Carruthers: if we are prepared to use some humans who 
are conscious it would be very difficult to draw a line demarcating whom we may not 
use. However, Potts and Herdman, in their discussion of controlled NHBDs, 
suggest that both incompetent patients and those who are competent but have an 
intolerable quality of life are included in this category. I have previously given my 
reasons for believing that it is not possible, morally or legally, to make use of 
incompetent but not unconscious patients whose death is not imminent without 
making oneself vulnerable to Carruthers' point. The question remains though, is it 
possible to allow those who are competent, not dying but with a terrible quality of life 
to die and donate? 
To allow these people to donate would clearly be to appeal to a different sort of 
argument from that which I employed in my discussion of the irreversibly 
unconscious. For the latter, my points were that the patients no longer care what 
happens to them, that they (prior to losing consciousness) or their relatives request 
it, and that there is no danger of a slippery slope as the boundary of consciousness 
is clearly marked. For competent patients the matter seems to turn on autonomy. 
Ought people with appalling qualities of life be allowed to request death? 
The legality or illegality of such a request seems to turn or whether it can be fulfilled 
by an act or an omission: Diane Pretty, who would have required an `active' killing 
had her request denied, `Miss B', whose life could be ended by the allegedly 
passive means of having her ventilator removed, was permitted to die. I say more 
on this in a moment. 
One of the objections to this sort of request, whether it entails killing or `allowing to 
die' is that acceding to it will perhaps lead to a general devaluing of the sanctity of 
human life in which doctors end life for frivolous reasons, or even end the lives of 
those who do not wish to die. We should perhaps separate these points out. I do 
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not see why we should worry about a practical slippery slope moving from ending 
the lives of competent people at their request to doctors killing people for trivial 
reasons or against their wishes. So long as death occurs only at the patients' 
competent request I can see no danger. With regard to the logical slope, people 
may argue that the idea of the sanctity of human life is perhaps threatened by such 
acts. In this cursory discussion I cannot fully answer this point but would point out 
that, so long as the ending of life is done for the sake of the patient and at their 
request, I would not worry overly about doctors losing respect for human life. It 
would obviously be a different matter and entirely immoral if doctors acted because 
in their opinion their patients' lives were worthless. 
There are concerns about whether a patients' right to die is equivalent to a right to 
be actively killed. When a competent patient wishes to die they may often have 
their request met by passive means - by having a ventilator removed or similar. 
However, those competent patients who request death and for their organs to be 
donated must, like the people discussed at the end of chapter four, meet a quick 
end, in order for the organs to survive in a transplantable state. Perhaps this is 
morally permissible -I am inclined to agree with Professor Harris that the, when the 
intention is that the patient should die, the means of achieving death are irrelevant. 
(Or, at least, an active killing seems no worse than a passive one and possibly even 
better if it means death can be brought about painlessly. ) Even if it is moral, 
however, it would entail a radical departure from the present legal situation. 
This leads me to my last point. As in the case of the irreversibly unconscious 
patient, there are social stability concerns. I think this is potentially the most 
problematic issue. Even if no slippery slope is, in fact, involved, if killing competent 
patients at their request and then using their organs for transplant caused public 
outrage then I think perhaps it ought not to be done. (Although we could always re- 
educate the public, of course. ) 
204 
Animals again 
In my discussion of xenotransplantation I assumed that that the animals kept for 
transplant would be housed in good conditions so that killing them was the only 
thing wrong with using them. This is quite a big simplification. Peter Singer's 
Animal Liberation takes no stance on the wrongness of killing animals. Instead, it 
argues for vegetarianism on the basis of the suffering that, as he says, "is, and as 
far as I can see always will be, associated with the rearing and slaughtering of 
animals on a large scale to feed urban populations". 9 Many commercial human 
uses of animals involve suffering for the latter. Need breeding them for donation do 
so? There seem to me to be two obvious ways in which donor animals may suffer: 
by being genetically modified to improve the chances of the organ being accepted 
by the recipient's immune system and by being kept in poor conditions. 
Are animals harmed by being genetically modified? I think perhaps only time will 
tell. Some reports suggest that Dolly the sheep is ageing at a much greater rate 
than normal sheep (although is she thus `suffering'? ) - it is not implausible to 
suggest that such manipulation may be injurious to donor animals. However, one 
might also note that, in order for the organs to be useful for humans, the engineered 
animals will need to be healthy. For this reason, perhaps genetic modification will 
not be a significant cause of donor animal suffering. 
The housing and general treatment of donor animals is a much more likely possible 
cause of suffering, I think. It is unlikely that donor pigs would be allowed to roam 
outdoors as they will need to be kept relatively sterile to avoid the risk of infection. 
That said, there is no reason why they could not be provided with stimulation, even 
in an indoors habitat. However, I wonder whether this would in fact happen? To 
provide the animals with a pleasant environment would inevitably increase the cost 
of rearing them and, as I noted above, the precedent set by most other forms of 
commercial animal rearing is a bad one. 
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What obligations are owed to those with failing organs? 
Throughout this thesis I simply assume that organ donation is sometimes the 
morally desirable thing to do for people whose own organs are failing. In preceding 
chapters I discussed some limits on the lengths to which we ought to go to obtain 
organs but I made no attempt to discuss whether people ought ever to get 
transplants. The `need' for transplants is a product of medical advances: the first 
(sadly unsuccessful) human to human kidney transplant was performed in 1933 but 
it was not until the 1950s, when doctors began to have a better understanding of 
immunology and the first immunosuppressive drugs were introduced, that the 
practice began to have a significant success rate. Prior to this, conservative 
medical treatment was the only option for those with failing organs: this remains the 
only option for people in developing countries without transplant programmes. 
A related point is that I have not discussed the costs and risks which society ought 
to endure in order to provide organs. Ought we to run the risk of spreading porcine 
endogenous retroviruses if xenotransplantation becomes technically possible? How 
much money should be spent on transplant programmes when there are other, 
competing, medical problems which are also in dire need of funding? 
How ought we to choose whom to save? 
Finally, I have made no attempt to address the question of how organs should be 
allocated among all those in need. The figures from UK Transplant show that the 
waiting list is increasing at a greater rate than the number of donors10: whom 
among the needy should receive this precious resource? Should priority be given to 
those awaiting first transplants over those whose transplanted organ is now failing? 
Or the young over the old? Or those with dependents over those without? These 
questions are the subject of another thesis, I think. 
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